PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna
czasopismo naukowe

Obowiązkiem uczonego jest nieposłuszeństwo myślenia

Disobedience of thought is the scholar's duty

Stanisław Ossowski

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

SPIS TREŚCI Contents

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Zdystansowanie

Zbigniew Rykiel

gniew@poczta.onet.eu

Pandemia koronawirusa Covid-19 wprowadziła do dyskursu publicznego termin *dystans społeczny*. Podchwycony przez umiarkowanie inteligentnych dziennikarzy i takichż polityków, termin ten – oderwany od swego właściwego znaczenia – łatwo wszedł do języka biurokratycznego, w tym do biurokracji uniwersyteckiej, następnie zaś do tekstów para-naukowych (*naukawych*).

Kuriozalnym przykładem tego zjawiska jest para-naukowa polskojęzyczna Wikipedia. Bezpośrednio pod hasłem *dystansowanie społeczne* pojawia się tam uwaga „Nie mylić z: dystans społeczny", co nie przeszkadza autorowi rozpocząć swego wywodu od przyjęcia, że dystansowanie społeczne jest synonimem dystansowania fizycznego, dalej zaś używać zamiennie, niekiedy nawet w ramach jednego zdania, terminów: „dystansowanie społeczne", „dystans społeczny", „społeczne dystansowanie", „zdystansowanie społeczne" i „społeczny dystans" (*Dystansowanie…*, b.d.).

Bohdan Jałowiecki zauważa, że *dystans społeczny* oznacza – zdaniem polityków i wielu dziennikarzy – „odległość między osobami na ulicy" (Jałowiecki 2020c), podczas gdy jest to dystans przestrzenny. „Dystans społeczny dzieli milionera i pucybuta, dyrektora i robotnika. W Polsce międzywojennej właściciela majątku ziemskiego dzielił olbrzymi dystans społeczny od pracującego tam fornala, a jednocześnie bliskość przestrzenna. Nie było zaś żadnego dystansu społecznego od mieszkającego wiele kilometrów dalej innego dziedzica. To elementarz nauczany na wykładach z socjologii, które obowiązują na wielu różnych kierunkach studiów. Może warto było na nie uczęszczać" (Jałowiecki 2020c). Ta ostatnia nadzieja autora wydaje się jednak zbyt optymistyczna, gdyż oprócz uczęszczania należałoby oczekiwać nie tylko słuchania ze zrozumieniem, ale i zapamiętania oraz kojarzenia faktów. B. Jałowiecki słusznie więc zauważa, iż „[w]ielu dziennikarzy jest niewyuczalnych, nie mówiąc

o politykach[,] bo od nich nie można wiele wymagać" (Jałowiecki 2020b). Wspomniany zatem wyżej „błąd pleni się w najlepsze" (tamże), a „[j]ęzyk debaty publicznej staje się co raz bardziej niechlujny" (Jałowiecki 2020a), zaś „niechlujstwo w języku jest w istocie niechlujstwem w rozumie" (tamże). To ostatnie jest zjawiskiem groźnym (tamże) dla tradycyjnego modelu kultury, charakterystycznym zaś dla populizmów, a także dla nowomowy jako nadawania terminom innych znaczeń.

Z tym większym więc zdumieniem można znaleźć w dokumencie uniwersyteckim zalecenie, co należy czynić „w przypadku braku możliwości zachowania dystansu społecznego min. 1,5 m pomiędzy poszczególnymi stanowiskami" (*Zarządzenie…*, 2020: 1). Z dokumentu tego wynika bowiem nie tylko założenie, że dystans społeczny mierzy się w metrach, ale również że dystans ten jest nie między ludźmi, ani pozycjami społecznymi, lecz między stanowiskami – domyślnie – pracy.

Źródłem całego zamieszania jest, jak można sądzić, pojęcie *dystansowania społecznego* – i odpowiadający mu termin. Terminem tym oznaczano tradycyjnie, chociaż niezbyt sensownie, zespół działań lub środków niefarmaceutycznych służących zapobieganiu rozprzestrzeniania się choroby zakaźnej przez utrzymywanie dystansu fizycznego między ludźmi i zmniejszenie częstotliwości bliskich kontaktów międzyludzkich (Johnson i inni, 2020). Amerykańskie Centra Kontroli i Prewencji Chorób (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) zdefiniowały początkowo *dystansowanie społeczne* jako zbiór „metod ograniczania częstotliwości i stopnia bliskości kontaktu między ludźmi w celu zmniejszenia ryzyka transmisji choroby" (Kinlaw, Levine, 2007), później jednak stwierdziły, że chodzi raczej o „pozostawanie z dala od miejsc zgromadzeń, unikanie masowych zgromadzeń i utrzymywanie w miarę możliwości dystansu (około […] 2 metrów) od innych" (Pearce 2020). Światowa Organizacja Zdrowia (WHO) zauważyła jednak słusznie, że chodzi tu nie o żadne „dystansowanie społeczne", lecz o *dystansowanie fizyczne*, gdyż jest to odległość fizyczna uniemożliwiająca transmisję zakażeń, co bynajmniej nie eliminuje kontaktów społecznych za pośrednictwem technik telekomunikacyjnych (Hensley 2020). Zalecono więc zaprzestanie używania bezsensownego terminu „dystansowanie społeczne" na rzecz dystansowania fizycznego (Tangermann 2020), czym najwyraźniej nie przejęli się ani dziennikarze, ani politycy, ani wikipediotwórcy.

Pojęcie dystansu społecznego jest ściśle związane z pojęciem dystansu personalnego. Ten ostatni jest, w ujęciu Edwarda Halla (1976), jednym z przejawów zachowań przestrzennych. Dystanse personalne traktuje się jak przedłużenie ciała. W stosunku do ludzi E. Hall wyróżnił cztery dystanse: intymny, indywidualny, społeczny i publiczny, w stosunku zaś do zwierząt także dystans krytyczny i dystans ucieczki. Dystans krytyczny to dystans bezwzględnej obrony, tj. odległość, z której intruz wyzwala agresję, dystans ucieczki natomiast to najmniejsza odległość, na którą zwierzęta pozwalają zbliżyć się swoim naturalnym wrogom. Wszystkie dystanse personalne można wyrażać za pomocą odległości fizycznej, związanej z rozmiarami anatomicznymi, w tym także w przypadku człowieka. Dystans intymny to taki, który umożliwia pogłaskanie partnera po policzku; dystans indywidualny umożliwia podanie sobie rąk przez partnerów; dystans społeczny umożliwia śledzenie mimiki partnera i wyraźne słyszenie jego głosu, przy nieodczuwaniu ciepła i zapachu jego ciała; dystans publiczny umożliwia widzenie całej postaci partnera wraz z jego otoczeniem. Szczegółowe odległości fizyczne związane z poszczególnymi dystansami personalnymi różnią się w poszczególnych kulturach. Dystanse personalne są ważnymi komunikatami niewerbalnymi (Hall 1987), gdyż odległość, jaką osobniki, w tym ludzie, zachowują w stosunku do innych, ilustruje stosunek emocjonalny do nich, ich status społeczny oraz typ ich interakcji, w tym rozmowy. Ogólnie można więc stwierdzić, że dystans społeczny jest wprawdzie skorelowany z dystansem fizycznym (Matthews, Matlock, 2011), co nie znaczy jednak, że są one tożsame.

W socjologii klasycznie definiowano dystans społeczny jako próbę sprowadzenia omawianej tu kwestii do mierzalnych kategorii zakresu i stopnia zrozumienia i intymności, które ogólnie charakteryzują relacje osobiste i stosunki społeczne (Park 1924). Współcześnie pod pojęciem dystansu społecznego rozumie się dystans między różnymi grupami społecznymi: klasami, rasami, etnosami lub płciami. Członkowie różnych grup rzadziej mieszają się ze sobą niż z członkami tej samej grupy. Dystans społeczny jest więc miarą bliskości lub intymności, jaką dana osoba lub grupa czuje w stosunku do innej osoby lub grupy w sieci społecznej; jest to też miara poziomu zaufania, jakim dana grupa darzy drugą, a także stopień postrzeganego podobieństwa przekonań (Boguna i inni, 2004; Helfgott, Gunnison, 2008). Dystans społeczny

obejmuje dystans afektywny, normatywny, interaktywny oraz kulturowy i nawykowy (Karakayali 2009).

Dystans afektywny odnosi się do reakcji uczuciowych, zwłaszcza sympatii albo antypatii, osób wobec innych osób i grup społecznych (Bogardus 1947). *Dystans normatywny* odnosi się do powszechnie akceptowanych i często świadomie wyrażanych norm dotyczących tego, kogo można uważać za „swojego", a kogo za „obcego", normy te określają więc różnice między „nami" a „nimi". Normatywny dystans społeczny ujmuje zatem dystans społeczny jako intersubiektywny, strukturalny aspekt stosunków społecznych (*Social distance*, b.d.). *Dystans interaktywny* odnosi się do częstotliwości i intensywności interakcji między grupami, opierając się na założeniu, że im silniejsze lub częstsze są interakcje tych grup, tym grupy te są bliższe społecznie. Częstotliwość interakcji można więc uznać za miarę siły międzygrupowych więzi społecznych (tamże). *Dystans kulturowy i nawykowy* nawiązuje do koncepcji kapitału społecznego (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1990). Powyższe cztery koncepcje dystansu społecznego można uznać za jego aspekty, a w ujęciu topologicznym – nieskorelowane liniowo wymiary (Karakayali 2009). Dystans społeczny często wiąże się z uprzedzeniami, wywodzącymi się z głęboko zakorzenionego przekonania o wyższości kulturowej własnej grupy i niższości innych kultur.

Wskazywano także, iż dystans społeczny jest częścią szerszej kategorii, jaką jest dystans, przy założeniu że przestrzeń jest wytwarzana społecznie (Jałowiecki 2010) i nasycona życiem społecznym, a nie tylko pojemnikiem aktywności ludzkiej (Simandan 2016). W tym kontekście zidentyfikowano eksperymentalnie cztery wymiary dystansu: przestrzenny, czasowy, społeczny i hipotetyczność (Simandan 2016). Innymi słowy, są to cztery odrębne sposoby dystansowania obiektu od jaźni obserwatora tu i teraz (tamże), a więc obiektu widocznego przed oczami jego duszy (d'Eposito, Postle, 2015). W tym kontekście „przekraczanie dystansu społecznego następuje za każdym razem, gdy dana jednostka zaczyna myśleć o ludziach innych niż ona sama, nawet jeśli ci ludzie są tu i teraz, tj. przestrzennie i czasowo blisko. Jest to umiejętność, która rozwija się w pierwszych latach życia, gdy dzieciom udaje się przezwyciężyć swój wcześniejszy egocentryzm i stopniowo uwzględniać inn[ych…]. Pokonywanie dystansu społecznego stanowi podstawę zachowań altruistycznych

i kultywowania etyki troski o odległego innego" (Simandan 2016: 250). Pokonywanie dystansu społecznego musi również być z góry dopuszczalną zdolnością do postrzegania ludzi jako relacyjnych twórców miejsca (Pierce i inni, 2011), ponieważ wytwarzanie miejsca jest procesem społecznym (Malpas 2015).

<div align="center">***</div>

W naszym czasopiśmie *Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)* nieodmiennie odnosimy się *z dystansem* do niefrasobliwości terminologicznej i nieporadności językowej, co odróżnia nas od stylu narracji akceptowanego w głównym nurcie niektórych nauk społecznych w Polsce, do których jesteśmy zatem *zdystansowani*. A etyka troski o odległego innego jest naszym imperatywem.

<div align="center">**Literatura**</div>

Bogardus E. S., 1947: *Measurement of Personal-Group Relations*. „Sociometry", 10, 4, 306-311.

Boguna M., Pastor-Satorras R., Díaz-Guilera A., Arenas A., 2004: *Models of social networks based on social distance attachment*. „Physical Review", 70, 1-8.

Bourdieu P., J. C. Passeron, 1990: *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. London: Sage Publications.

Dystansowanie społeczne, b.d.; https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dystansowanie_społeczne.

Esposito M. d', Postle B. R., 2015: *The cognitive neuroscience of working memory*. „Annual Review of Psychology", 66, 115-142.

Hall E., 1976: *Ukryty wymiar*. Warszawa: PIW.

Hall E., 1987: *Bezgłośny język*. Warszawa: PIW.

Helfgott J. B., Gunnison E., 2008: *The influence of social distance on community corrections officer perceptions of offender reentry needs*. „Federal Probation", 72, 1, 2-12.

Hensley L., 2020: *Social distancing is out, physical distancing is in – here's how to do it*. „Global News", 23.03.2020; https://globalnews.ca/news/6717166/what-is-physical-distancing/.

Jałowiecki B., 2010: *Społeczne wytwarzanie przestrzeni*. Wydanie rozszerzone. Warszawa: Scholar.

Jałowiecki B., 2020a: *Pik czy pikuś.* „Facebook", 14.05.2020.

Jałowiecki B., 2020b: *Uczyć się zawsze warto.* „Facebook", 06.07.2020.

Jałowiecki B., 2020c: *Warto było się uczyć.* „Facebook", 21.04.2020.

Johnson C. Y., Sun L. H., Freedman A., 2020: *Social distancing could buy U.S. valuable time against coronavirus.* „The Washington Post", 10.03.2020; https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/10/social-distancing-coronavirus/.

Karakayali N., 2009: *Social Distance and Affective Orientations.* „Sociological Forum", 23, 3, 538-562.

Kinlaw K., Levine R. J., 2007: *Ethical guidelines in pandemia influenza – recommendations of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.* Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, 15.02.2007; "Ethical guidelines in Pandemic Influenza – Recommendations of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention".

Malpas J. (red.), 2015: *The Intelligence of Place: Topographies and Poetics.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Matthews J. L., Matlock T., 2011: *Understanding the link between spatial distance and social distance.* „Social Psychology", 42, 185–192.

Park R. E.,1924: *The Concept of Social Distance As Applied to the Study of Racial Attitudes and Racial Relations.* „Journal of Applied Sociology", 8, 339-344.

Pearce K., 2020: *What is social distancing and how can it slow the spread of COVID-19?* „The Hub", 13.03.2020; https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/03/13/what-is-social-distancing/.

Pierce J., Martin D. G., Murphy J. T., 2011*: Relational place-making: the networked politics of place.* „Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series", 36, 1,54-70.

Simandan D., 2016: *Proximity, subjectivity, and space: rethinking distance in human geography.* „Geoforum", 75, 249-252; www.academia.edu/27402601/Proximity_subjectivity_and_space_rethinking_distance_in_human_geography?email_work_card=view-paper.

Social distance, b.d.; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_distance.

Tangermann V., 2020: *It's Officially Time to Stop Using The Phrase 'Social Distancing'*. „Science Alert", 24.03.2020; https://www.sciencealert.com/who-is-no-longer-using-the-phrase-social-distancing.

Zarządzenie Nr 107/2020 Rektora Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego z dnia 30.09.2020 r. w sprawie: organizacji pracy w Uniwersytecie Rzeszowskim w roku akademickim 2020/2021; https://www.ur.edu.pl/uniwersytet/aktualnosci/zarzadzenie-nr-1072020-rektora-uniwersytetu-rzeszowskiego-z-dnia-30092020-r-w-sprawie-organizacji-pracy-w-uniwersytecie-,26989.

Od Redaktora
Editorial

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Distancing

Zbigniew Rykiel

gniew@poczta.onet.eu

The Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic introduced the term *social distance* into public discourse. Picked up by moderately intelligent journalists and politicians alike, the term – divorced from its proper meaning – easily entered bureaucratic language, including university bureaucracy, and then para-scientific texts.

A curious example of this phenomenon is the para-scientific Polish-language Wikipedia. Directly under the entry *social distancing*, there appears the note "Not to be confused with: social distance", which does not prevent the author from beginning his arguments by accepting that social distancing is a synonym for physical distancing, and then using interchangeably, sometimes even within one sentence, the terms: "social distancing", "social distance", "socio-distancing", "socially distanced" and "socio-distance" (*Dystansowanie…*, n.d.).

Bohdan Jałowiecki notes that *social distance* – according to politicians and many journalists – means "a distance between people in the street" (Jałowiecki 2020c), while in fact it is a spatial distance. "Social distance separates the millionaire from the bootblack, [and] the director from the worker. In interwar Poland, the landowner was separated by a huge social distance from the groom working there, and at the same time by spatial proximity, while there was no social distance from another heir who lived miles away. This is a primer taught in sociology lectures, which are obligatory in many […] fields of study. Maybe it was worth attending to them" (Jałowiecki 2020c). The author's hope seems too optimistic, because, apart from attending, one should expect not only listening with understanding, but also remembering and associating facts. B. Jałowiecki rightly notices that "[m]any journalists are uneducated, not to mention politicians[,] who cannot be expected of much" (Jałowiecki 2020b). Therefore, the above-mentioned "error rises to the best" (ibidem),

and the "[l]anguage of public debate becomes more and more sloppy" (Jałowiecki 2020a). This "sloppiness in language is in fact the sloppy in reason" (ibidem), which is a dangerous phenomenon (ibidem) for the traditional model of culture, but characteristic of populisms if not of newspeak as assigning different meaning to terms.

Therefore, it is astonishing to find in a university document a recommendation on what to do "in the event that it is impossible to maintain a social distance of at least 1.5 m between individual places" (*Zarządzenie…*, 2020: 1). This document implies not only the assumption that social distance is measured in meters, but also that it is not between people or social positions, but between workplaces.

It might be supposed that the source of the confusion is the notion of *social distancing* – and the corresponding term. The term has traditionally, though not very sensibly, been used for "a set of non-pharmaceutical interventions or measures intended to prevent the spread of a contagious disease by maintaining physical distance between people and reducing the number of times people come into close contact with each other" (Johnson et al., 2020). The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initially described *social distancing* as a set of "methods for reducing frequency and closeness of contact between people in order to decrease the risk of transmission of disease" (Kinlaw, Levine, 2007), but later stated that rather it is about "remaining out of congregate settings, avoiding mass gatherings, and maintaining (approximately […] two meters) from others when possible" (Pearce 2020). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) rightly pointed out that this is not about any "social distancing" but about *physical distancing*, as this is the physical distance that prevents transmission of infections, and "people can remain socially connected via technology" (Hensley 2020). It was therefore recommended that one stops using the nonsensical term "social distancing" in favour of physical distancing (Tangermann 2020), which apparently did not register with journalists, politicians, or Wikipedia's authors.

The concept of *social distance* is closely related to the concept of *personal distance*. The latter is, according to Edward Hall (1966), one manifestation of spatial behaviour. Personal distances are treated as extensions of the body. In relation to people, E. Hall distinguished four distances: intimate, individual, social and public, and

in relation to animals also critical distance and escape distance. The *critical distance* is the absolute defence distance, i.e. the one from which the intruder triggers aggression, while the *escape distance* (alert distance or flight zone) is the shortest distance at which animals allow their natural enemies to approach. All personal distances can be expressed in terms of physical distance related to anatomic dimensions, also in the case of humans. An *intimate distance* is one that allows one to stroke the partner's cheek; *individual distance* allows partners to shake hands; *social distance* allows to follow the partner's facial expressions and clearly hear his/her voice, without feeling the heat and smell of his/her body; *public distance* makes it possible to see the entire partner's silhouette together with his/her surroundings. The detailed physical distances associated with individual personal distances vary from culture to culture. Personal distances are important non-verbal messages (Hall 1959) because the distance that individuals, including humans, keep to others illustrates their emotional relationship to them, their social status, and the type of their interaction, including conversation. Generally, it can be concluded that social distance is correlated with (Matthews, Matlock, 2011), although not identical to, physical distance.

In sociology, social distance has been classically defined as an attempt to reduce the issue discussed herein to the measurable categories of scope and degree of understanding and intimacy that generally characterise personal relationships and social relations (Park 1924). Nowadays, the notion of social distance is understood as the distance between different social groups: classes, races, ethnic groups or genders. Members of different groups mix less than members of the same group. Social distance is therefore a measure of the nearness or intimacy that an individual or group feels towards another individual or group in a social network; it is also a measure of the level of trust that a given group has for the other, as well as the degree of perceived similarity of beliefs (Boguna et al., 2004; Helfgott, Gunnison, 2008). Social distance includes affective, normative, interactive, and cultural and habitual distances (Karakayali 2009).

Affective distance refers to emotional reactions, especially likes or dislikes, towards other persons and social groups (Bogardus 1947). *Normative distance* refers to commonly accepted and often consciously expressed norms about who can be con-

sidered as "insider" and who as an "outsider", so these norms define the distinctions between "us" and "them". Thus, normative social distance embraces social distance as a non-subjective, structural aspect of social relations (*Social distance*, n.d.). *Interactive distance* refers to the frequency and intensity of interactions between groups, based on the assumption that the stronger or more frequent the interactions of these groups, the closer these groups are socially. The frequency of interactions can therefore be considered as a measure of the strength of inter-group social ties (ibidem). *Cultural and habitual distance* refers to the concept of social capital (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1990). The above four concepts of social distance can be considered as its aspects, and, in topological terms, as non-linearly correlated dimensions (Karakayali 2009). Social distancing is often related to prejudices stemming from a deeply entrenched belief in the cultural superiority of one's own group and the inferiority of other cultures.

It was also pointed out that social distance is part of a wider category of distance, assuming that space is socially produced (Jałowiecki 2010) and saturated with social life, and not only a container of human activity (Simandan 2016). In this context, four dimensions of distance were experimentally identified: spatial, temporal, social and hypotheticality (Simandan 2016). In other words, these are four separate ways of distancing the object from the observer's self here and now (ibidem), and thus the object visible in one's mind's eye (d'Eposito, Postle, 2015). In this context, the "[t]ranscending of social distance is produced every time a given individual begins to think about people other than herself, even if those people are in the here and now, i.e. spatially and temporally close. It is an ability that develops in the first years of life, as children succeed in overcoming their earlier egocentrism and progressively take into account other[s]. Traversing social distance constitutes the foundation for altruistic behaviour and for the cultivation of an ethics of care for the distant other" (Simandan 2016: 250). "Traversing social distance must also be a pre-supposed ability for theorisation of humans as relational place-makers" (Pierce et al., 2011), because space-making is a social process (Malpas 2015).

***

In our journal *Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)*, we invariably have a *distance* to terminological carelessness and linguistic awkwardness, which distinguishes us from the narrative style accepted in the mainstream of some social sciences in Poland, to which we are therefore *distanced*. And the ethics of care for the distant other is our imperative.

References

Bogardus E. S., 1947: *Measurement of Personal-Group Relations*. „Sociometry", 10, 4, 306-311.

Boguna M., Pastor-Satorras R., Díaz-Guilera A., Arenas A., 2004: *Models of social networks based on social distance attachment*. „Physical Review", 70, 1-8.

Bourdieu P., J. C. Passeron, 1990: *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. London: Sage Publications.

Dystansowanie społeczne, b.d.; https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dystansowanie_społeczne.

Esposito M. d', Postle B. R., 2015: *The cognitive neuroscience of working memory*. „Annual Review of Psychology", 66, 115-142.

Hall E., 1976: *Ukryty wymiar*. Warszawa: PIW.

Hall E., 1987: *Bezgłośny język*. Warszawa: PIW.

Helfgott J. B., Gunnison E., 2008: *The influence of social distance on community corrections officer perceptions of offender reentry needs*. „Federal Probation", 72, 1, 2-12.

Hensley L., 2020: *Social distancing is out, physical distancing is in – here's how to do it*. „Global News", 23.03.2020; https://globalnews.ca/news/6717166/what-is-physical-distancing/.

Jałowiecki B., 2010: *Społeczne wytwarzanie przestrzeni*. Wydanie rozszerzone. Warszawa: Scholar.

Jałowiecki B., 2020a: *Pik czy pikuś*. „Facebook", 14.05.2020.

Jałowiecki B., 2020b: *Uczyć się zawsze warto*. „Facebook", 06.07.2020.

Jałowiecki B., 2020c: *Warto było się uczyć*. „Facebook", 21.04.2020.

Johnson C. Y., Sun L. H., Freedman A., 2020: *Social distancing could buy U.S. valuable time against coronavirus*. „The Washington Post", 10.03.2020; https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/10/social-distancing-coronavirus/.

Karakayali N., 2009: *Social Distance and Affective Orientations*. „Sociological Forum", 23, 3, 538-562.

Kinlaw K., Levine R. J., 2007: *Ethical guidelines in pandemia influenza – recommendations of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*. Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, 15.02.2007; "Ethical guidelines in Pandemic Influenza – Recommendations of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention".

Malpas J. (red.), 2015: *The Intelligence of Place: Topographies and Poetics*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Matthews J. L., Matlock T., 2011: *Understanding the link between spatial distance and social distance*. „Social Psychology", 42, 185–192.

Park R. E.,1924: *The Concept of Social Distance As Applied to the Study of Racial Attitudes and Racial Relations*. „Journal of Applied Sociology", 8, 339-344.

Pearce K., 2020: *What is social distancing and how can it slow the spread of COVID-19?* „The Hub", 13.03.2020; https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/03/13/what-is-social-distancing/.

Pierce J., Martin D. G., Murphy J. T., 2011: *Relational place-making: the networked politics of place*. „Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series", 36, 1,54-70.

Simandan D., 2016: *Proximity, subjectivity, and space: rethinking distance in human geography*. „Geoforum", 75, 249-252; www.academia.edu/27402601/Proximity_subjectivity_and_space_rethinking_distance_in_human_geography?email_work_card=view-paper.

Social distance, b.d.; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_distance.

Tangermann V., 2020: *It's Officially Time to Stop Using The Phrase 'Social Distancing'*. „Science Alert", 24.03.2020; https://www.sciencealert.com/who-is-no-longer-using-the-phrase-social-distancing.

Zarządzenie Nr 107/2020 Rektora Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego z dnia 30.09.2020 r. w sprawie: organizacji pracy w Uniwersytecie Rzeszowskim w roku akademickim 2020/2021; https://www.ur.edu.pl/uniwersytet/aktualnosci/zarzadzenie-nr-1072020-rektora-uniwersytetu-rzeszowskiego-z-dnia-30092020-r-w-sprawie-organizacji-pracy-w-uniwersytecie-,26989.

Artykuły
Articles

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Xenophobia in Africa: origins and manifestations

Peter O. O. Ottuh

Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy,

Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State, Nigeria

pottuh@delsu.edu.ng; ottuhan@gmail.com

Acknowledgements

Abstract

The issue of xenophobia is fast becoming a negative uprising on the African continent with the recent cases of Zambia and South Africa. This xenophobic tendency in Africa is based on prejudice and hatred directed towards foreign nationals, specifically fellow black Africans. Foreign nationals are deemed by the natives as persistent threats to employment security, accommodation and resource distribution, to mention a few. This alien attitude towards fellow humans, and especially fellow Africans, is against the ethic-theological attitude of *live and let live*, embedded in African communal worldview. Africans are said to be notoriously religious, though African religious consciousness was originally derived from African Traditional Religion, while Islam and Christianity have given further impetus to this consciousness. With African Traditional Religion, God is at the apex of the ontology, and He expects humans to thrive in a mutual complementary fashion with all other beings within the environment. This gives the background to the ethic-theological spirit of *live and let live*, where Africans are to put the interest of the community above their individual interest. However, with the recent xenophobic uprising on African soil, there is a need for a critical study on the new wave of individualism taken sway on African soil and natives. The purpose of this research, therefore, is to expose the ethic-theological implications of xenophobia for the twenty-first-century humanity in Africa.

Key words: xenophobia, Africa, ethics, religion, humanity.

1. Introduction

The term *xenophobia* results from two Greek words: *xenos* and *phobos*, which mean strange or foreign and fear, respectively (Mabera 2017). Therefore, xenophobia can be defined as the hatred of fear of foreigners. It is exemplified in discriminatory behaviours and attitudes which often culminates in abuses, violence, as well as exhibitions of hatred (Ejoke, Ani, 2017). R. Sundstrom (2013) defines *xenophobia* as the strong dislike, fear or hatred of others, who are foreign. He further argues that *xenophobia* often incorporates some cultural and ethno-linguistic identifiers that form the base of suspicion and distrust of the "other". J. Peters (1991) also sees *xenophobia* as the illogical distrust or fear of strangers and foreigners. In the South African milieu, xenophobia is noticeable in negative perceptions and attitudes together with convoying acts of violence, hostility or discrimination against non-nationals. From B. Harris' (2002) perspective, the term, *xenophobia* should be reframed to include manifestations, acts or practices of physical abuse or violence which usually accompany to *fear* or *dislike* of foreigners.

It is important to note that though xenophobic violence typically targets foreign nationals, it can also target *nationals* who are seen as being "foreign" or are perceived to be from another country, even though incorrectly. For this work, the broadest possible connotation of *xenophobia* is acknowledged. This includes attitudes of fear, jealousy, hatred, negative perceptions, distrust, and manifestation through acts of violence or discrimination.

Also worth noting is that *xenophobia* and *racism* are two closely connected words and at times, mutually supportive forms of coercion. The two conceptions are, however, distinct in that, that while xenophobia typically targets foreigners, racism expresses itself in fixed prejudices and socially constructed notions of physical differences, which are singled out as ethically significant, thus emphasising the superiority of one race over another. In both phenomena, the "foreigner" or the "other" is viewed as a threat, discriminated against and excluded because of certain innate features, e.g. race or origin. In both phenomena, certain policies, for instance, enactment of measures by countries to tighten immigration controls, are likely outcomes. However, J. Peters (1991) avers that *xenophobia* differs from *racism* in that that the latter is

the conviction that one race is superior to another, while, as explained above, xenophobia is hatred of foreigners inspired by their foreignness and it is always based on fear. It is important to note that though xenophobic violence typically targets foreign nationals, it can also target "nationals" who are seen as being "foreign" or are perceived to be from another country, although incorrectly. For this work, the broadest possible connotation of *xenophobia* is acknowledged. This includes attitudes of fear, jealousy, hatred, negative perceptions, distrust, and manifestation through acts of violence or discrimination.

Also worth noting is that *xenophobia* and *racism* are two closely connected words and at times, mutually supportive forms of coercion. The two conceptions are, however, distinct in that that while xenophobia typically targets foreigners, racism expresses itself in fixed prejudices and socially constructed notions of physical differences, which are singled out as ethically significant, thus emphasising the superiority of one race over another. In both phenomena, the *foreigner* or *the other* is viewed as a threat, discriminated against and excluded because of certain innate features, e.g. race or origin. In both phenomena, certain policies, for instance, enactment of measures by countries to tighten immigration controls, are likely outcomes. However, J. Peters (1991) avers that *xenophobia* differs from *racism* in that that the latter is the conviction that one race is superior to another, while, as explained above, xenophobia is hatred of foreigners inspired by their foreignness and it is always based on fear. Instances of xenophobia and its manifestations through attacks, harassment and discrimination of foreign nationals have been acknowledged on the African continent, in Egypt, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa.

In Egypt, for instance, the main targets of xenophobia and racist violence were asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries (Human Rights First, 2011). In Kenya, migrants and natives from Somali were exposed to xenophobic discrimination and other human rights abuses due to pirates and high levels of terrorism prevalent in their country. In this regard, Somali citizens in Kenya are often perceived as pirates and terrorists (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Xenophobia in Ghana raised its ugly head when Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown as Ghanaian president. The new administration of Kofi Busia then came up

with the shameful and infamous *Aliens Compliance Order*, which saw the brutal and compulsory expulsion of 'aliens' mostly from Burkina Faso and Nigeria out of the country. This was followed by revenge on the part of Nigeria, where hundreds of Ghanaians were burnt alive to flush them out of the country; this era is known as the *Ghana must go* era of early 1980 (Ucham 2014). In South Africa foreign nationals were attacked, displaced, killed or deprived of their property because some of the natives saw them as threats to their jobs and other economic prosperity. The recent xenophobic attack in South Africa took place in 2019 (Misago 2019).

Amid the late 20th century, many social issues facing the African continent, e.g. colonialism and apartheid, have often provoked an 'integrative approach' as a means of solving them. However, xenophobic attacks on fellow Africans are currently provoking disintegrative effects among African states as most of them have demonstrated dissatisfaction as regards to how the crisis is handled within the affected countries. For instance, many African countries have pointed on how they collectively participated against the apartheid system in a bid to liberate South Africa from its colonial master. They point to how their labour force has been recruited into the country as a supplementary workforce in the various important sectors, e.g. agriculture, mining, as well as manufacturing, and yet those immigrants now face violent and inhumane treatment in the country of which many of them have now considered home. A greater problem with xenophobic violence in Africa is that it leads to other ends, i.e. refugee problem, rampant and ever-increasing gang-related atrocities and human rights violations within the affected areas. Today, the decline social values in the affected countries and communities are of great concern to many scholars as some see it as an act against human rights while others, e.g. B. Bush (2018), try to speculate on the root reasons of the problem.

Many African communitarians have argued that Africans are deeply religious, which implies that it is perhaps sacrilegious to isolate the African moral values from her religious values as the latter values are fundamental and triggers the moral values (Bassey, Bubu 2019). In Africa, religious or spiritual element characterizes human relationship with the divine, with God, lesser gods, the ancestors, fellow human beings and other lesser being (plant, animals). It is also an undeniable fact that this

sense of religion promotes moral excellence, it endows the African with respect for human dignity and human life. However, with xenophobic violence upraising on the African continent, there is no doubt that the problem poses both ethical and religious problems with its consequences. There is currently little or no literature which investigates the ethic-theological implication of xenophobia on African societies. This study hopes to bridge the knowledge gap in which studies relating to xenophobia discourse have created.

2. An overview of xenophobia on African soil

Most African countries, at one level, have similar world views, common history, culture and tradition that transcends national borders and these include pre-colonial warfare, colonialism associated with the subjugation of native blacks by invading white settlers and so on. The existing sporting platforms that are held at different levels as a means to achieve coherent interaction and cooperation, e.g. the African Cup of Nations (AFCON) for both sexual groups can also be appreciated. Unfortunately, xenophobic attacks impede such coherent and perpetual relations. To this N. Mlambo (2019: 55) avers that "the manifestation of xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, and good governance as well as constituting a violation of human rights". Xenophobian attacks on African soil are deemed by many as a new phenomenon, hence still shrouded in mystery. Discrimination and inhuman treatment of foreigners exhibit utter disrespect of human rights which entails fair treatment of one on the basis that they are humans.

L. Jooste (2012) avers that the resentment towards foreigners began in South Africa in 1910. Also it was noted that "the first group of people to fall victim to restraining immigration policies of the South African government were the Indians" (Ramaswamy 2010: 37). As such, segregation laws including the likes of the Urban Areas Act of 1923 were enacted hence introducing residential segregation and people were discriminated based on their national origin, race, class and gender.

However, A. Dick (2005) noted that xenophobic attacks in Africa can be traced back to as far back as 1914 as he points out the stories of peasant Afrikaners who looted British owned shops, being, therefore, indeed startling precursors of the country's contemporary attacks. Presumably, the attacks could have been based on the distribution of the national cake, therefore, the poor Afrikaners resorted to looting British owned shops as a means to express their discontentment in the manner in which resources were being distributed among various social groups.

For C. Mcconnell (2015) the violent episodes are not necessarily sporadic but rather a representation of long-simmering anti-migrant sentiments that had been increasing in the country since the early 1990s. For instance, with the collapse of apartheid, South African borders were opened to foreign migration as such, many within the country ended up blaming the foreigners, rather than the whites, or the government for democracy's failed promises embodying high unemployment and scarce resources. They had found new scapegoats for their dissatisfaction. In this case, therefore, the episodes in May 2008 which claimed the lives of 62 foreigners and displaced thousands, as well as those in April 2015 which were sparked by the remarks made by Goodwill Zwelithini, the king of Zulus, that all foreigners should pack their bags and go back to their countries are resultant of the scapegoating culture the natives have nurtured since then (Arndt 2018). D. Everatt (2011) notes that the native South Africans dusted off their freedom songs because instead of them condemning apartheid, they condemned foreigners for the jobs, houses, and women they were stealing. Regardless of periodisation, South Africans authorities aver that citizenship and identity is a major aspect of the xenophobic attacks.

According to A. Klotz (2016), the studies that have been done over the issue of xenophobia in Africa have attributed the hatred of foreigners to several causes and J. Pillay (2017: 33) has mentioned them to include "the fear of loss of social status and identity, a threat perceived or real, to citizens' economic success, a way of reassuring the national self and its boundaries in times of national crises, a feeling of superiority and poor intercultural information".

E. Coetzee (2012) attributes the phenomenon to three factors, which are cultural factors which include identity and nationality, interactive factors related to the number of exposure inhabitants have to strangers, and material and economic factors related to employment opportunities and available resources. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) avers that the crisis is a result of a series of government's policy failures which essentially contributed to the creation of the perfect storm of lawlessness, poverty and also unfulfilled expectations which erupted into violence (Pringle 1973).

A. Dick (2005: 6) is of the view that "xenophobia basically derives from the sense that non-citizens pose some sort of a threat to the recipients' identity or their individual rights and is also closely connected with the concepts of nationalism: the sense in each individual of membership in the political nation as an essential ingredient in his or her sense of identity". M. Hlatshwayo (2011: 170) comments on how South Africans of every colour were socialised to draw and follow boundaries around identity as racial divisions were forged into almost every element of their lives that is "from the hospital one was born in, to the jobs he could acquire, to the cemetery where he would be buried". As such, apartheid did not end with these divisions but rather it merely displaced them. For F. Mabera (2017: 30), "the similarities between the violent policing of citizenship during and after apartheid are particularly stark". All this supports the notion that the attacks are a demonstrative reaction that we belong here and you (foreigners) do not. For B. Harris (2002) xenophobia has something to do with superiority but it is also part of a "scapegoating" process where unfulfilled expectations of the new democracy resulted in the foreigner coming to embody the failures of unemployment, poverty and deprivation.

One major problem documented is that most, if not every, time xenophobic attacks break out in South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states, in turn, prefer to take a backseat as they expect the national government to deal with the problem which is contrary to the experience where they used to intervene and pool resources to collectively deliberate on feasible solutions to mitigate the prevalent crises. It is also documented that Bot-

swana's President, Ian Khama, had mouthed off to Zimbabwe's President, Robert Mugabe, that if he solved his problems back home, there would not need to drag everyone to summits to deal with the attacks in South Africa (Ojedokun 2015). Therefore the tendency of reluctance and inaction by other African countries and people to mitigate the xenophobic attacks on fellow member states is a source of concern for many scholars.

3. The effects of xenophobia in Africa

3.1. Political

Since the phenomenon has multi-faceted implications, in political terms J. Crush et al. (2017: 50) declare that "to allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another is ultimately and extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony". Amongst other prominent gospels preached on the African continent, those concerning regional cooperation and integration prevail over the rest since the essence is that African countries are politically weak and vulnerable, therefore they should strive to achieve a unity of purpose, especially in security terms, if they are to survive in the hostile and brutal world system. Henceforth the inception and perpetuation of a vast array of integrative platforms that is the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community – Troika (SADC-Troika), East African Community (EAC), just to mention these few, should be appreciate. Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a security effort put up to fight terrorism, so are the former examples as they exist to mitigate certain specific prevalent African contingencies.

Nevertheless, xenophobic tendencies, therefore, pose a limitation to the much needed integrative approach to problem solving. Authorities have noted a rather handful occasions where the South African government has received responses of discontentment and dissatisfaction from other governments within the region and the world over. Chinese, Zimbabwean and Nigerian governments are part of the list, as well as Somalia, as noted when the Somali president Sheik Mohammed demanded action and response from his South African counterpart

Jacob Zuma after a graphic video of a Somali man being brutally stoned to death went viral. Various organisations have also expressed their loss of trust in the South African government to deal with the prevalent crisis hence the rule of law has completely been overrun as the general public has established rhetoric where they can freely take to the streets without any apparent persecution. The Somali Association of South Africa's (SASA) spokesperson, Ismaeel Abdi Adan, commented that the South African government has completely failed to arrest the crisis since every time the violence erupted, nothing is ever done (Ojedokun 2015).

3.2. Economic

In this platform, integration would be considered as a process in which barriers to the exchange of goods and services, as well as capital and people are reduced or eliminated between member-states. As an ongoing procession of stages, it usually begins with a preferential trade area and then graduates to a free trade geographical location to a customs union with common markets which end up with economic and political unions. Such examples are that of the European Union (EU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), just to mention these few. However, xenophobic attacks have resulted in divergent economic efforts, especially in the SADC region. The proposed intentions were to achieve free trade or customs union but instead, following a series of xenophobic eruptions in South Africa, the Zimbabwean government found it feasible to implement Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016, which ban South African imports (Crush et al., 2017). Possibly, if there were sound underlying relations, then maybe such barriers would not be put up amongst African neighbouring countries who depend on each other if development is to be realised.

On a local level, xenophobia does impact on the country's economics. The vandalism and looting of foreign-owned businesses could be a huge blow, as noted by J. Pillay (2017), therefore there is a great need to realise that immigrants are beneficial for the development of any country, as their vast numbers have po-

tential to contribute to the economics of the day. Authorities appreciate the era of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to have ushered in extensive development with a huge pool of manpower being received from neighbouring Zambia and Malawi (the then Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, respectively).

Foreign-owned businesses also tend to create employment opportunities for the less and unskilled locals, which is a considerable investment effort. In turn, the heinous and inhuman attacks do lead, to some extent, to the instability of the micro-economy hence resulting in high prices on basic commodities as some elements of competition are obliterated. It also tends to scare away foreign investment from the country, as is noted by J. Pillay (2017: 53) that, "the Durban xenophobia gave many foreign investors pause, giving serious consideration to the stability". At one point, the Protea Group founder and chair, Otto Stehlik, pointed out that, "South Africa was taking a knock, not just from a tourism or travel perspective but also from an economic perspective" (Klotz 2016: 43). The economy was not doing well already and the eruption of xenophobic violence exacerbates the situation. Therefore, this serves to illustrate the negative economic implications of xenophobia.

3.3. Socio-cultural

Most African countries, at one level, have a common history, culture and tradition that transcends national borders and these include pre-colonial warfare, colonialism associated with the subjugation of native blacks by invading white settlers and so on. Integration in the socio-cultural terms is an important form of developmental cooperation that facilitates interaction and exchange between different societies through communication and mutual understanding of diversity on the continent.

4. African religion, ethics and worldview

The presence of ethics and religion is widespread and is one of the longest standing phenomena known to humankind (Ogar, Ogar, 2018). It can be argued that religion and ethics have featured prominently in human history and that in

nearly all societies, they have also played a portentous and stupendous role in human life since the antiquity. Consequently, they have featured in literature related to social relations, conflict resolution, human identity, etc. It is also evident that religion institutes an indissoluble part of African societies. As such, socio-economic and political activities in traditional African societies are often flavoured with religious expressions and rituals. Due to this reason, many authors argued that colonialism strived in Africa because it came along with religious flavours.

Christian missionaries came almost the same time as the colonial masters. These missionaries helped spread the message and principles of love, peace, tolerant and gentleness while on the earth. The missionaries proclaimed that holding on to these principles will guarantee a bliss in the afterlife despite what they are facing with the colonialist. These religious teachings held sway on Africans and this is evident in the number of years colonialism thrived in African, as well as the growth of Christianity within a few years of missions in Africa. However, before the coming of the missionaries, Africans have their religious experience which guilds their thinking and undertakings in African Traditional Religion.

J. Parratt (1977), sees African Traditional Religion (ATR) as those institutionalised practices and beliefs of the indigenous religion of Africa, which are rooted, from time immemorial and practices that were transmitted through oral tradition, sacred space, sacred specialists' persons, objects and symbols. Africans hold that there is no clear cut divergence between the material and the sacred. To this, J. Mbiti (1980) explains that, for Africans, religion is an ontological phenomenon: it concerns the question of existence or being. He also argues that "in traditional African communities, life is religion and religion is life. All aspects, whether inanimate or animate, are considered to be interwoven" (Mbiti 1980: 818). G. Tangwa (2007: 820) echoes the same sentiment when he avers that African attitude towards nature and the rest of creation is that of "respectful co-existence, conciliation, and containment, there are frequently offerings of sacrifices to God, to the divine spirits, both benevolent and malevolent, to the departed ancestors and the sundry invisible and inscrutable forces of nature".

This belief system could explain why Africans are curious in their dealings towards everything including non-human beings since everything originates from God and God resides in all things, hence mutual respect is expected (Bassey 2019). What this implies is that traditional Africans see life as one big whole and religion pervades all aspects of life. In relation of this philosophy, it is the whole that brings about the unification of the parts. That is, there is no dichotomisation when it comes to human existence; there is no division between matter and spirit, soul and body, and religious practice and daily life. This religious value is a way of being African; it is all-incorporating and it expresses values, attitudes and actions that are uniquely African (Koenane 2013). Due to this belief system, each person within African society is expected to treat others with compassion, dignity, respect and expects being treated similarly by others. This is the source of African ethics. D. Olowu (1988: 216) avers that "Our own view is that morality is basically the fruit of religion and that, to begin with, it was dependent upon it. Man's concept of deity has everything to do with what is taken to be the norm of morality". More precisely D. Olowu (1988: 217) further avers that "The sense of right and wrong, by the decree of God, has always been part of human nature".

Traditional Africans do not believe in an anthropocentric universe; rather they have always assumed that humanity is surrounded by a realm of spirits in which God is thought to preside over a pantheon of sub-divinities and ancestral spirits (Green 1983). The African worldview recognizes the centrality of the spiritual feature of all elements of life. Spirituality, in the African context, is taken to mean the transcendent or invisible substance which connects the entire universe. As T. Metz and J. Gaie (2010) argue, all African life is a vital life force in dynamic participation. Africans have a certain emotive sensitivity, an effective rapport with the forces and forms of the universe, direct and immediate contact with the other.

As results from the above, African traditional religion (ATR) hold the belief that humans do not live in this world alone; there is a sense of human beings' close relationship with every other thing that exists. Even within human social relations, in an activity, e.g. family gathering, funeral, fishing, child-naming and trading, there is religious adherence. K. Gyekye (1998: 4) explains this religion's deep pres-

ence in African life when he argues that to "be born into African society is to be born into a culture that is intensely and pervasively religious and that means, and requires, participating in the religious beliefs and rituals of the community". This understanding of the inescapable impact of religion from cradle to the grave and the African awareness of the divine is captured in a Ghanaian Akan proverb, which states that "no one teaches the child to know God"; the consciousness of God is said to be inherent in the child from birth.

For most black Africans, the life of the individual is understood as the involvement in the sacred life; that is, the individual taking part in all aspects of life in the community. It is that vital union or bond of life with its interconnectedness that ensures unity among members of the same family or clan and prompting how one conducts himself/herself in that community (Bassey, Mendie, 2019). The point being made here is that the communal nature of most African societies with their strong network of relationships plays an influential role in the individual's life; (s)he is very much shaped and formed by the socio-cultural and religious context of the community.

In a traditional African society, the neediest members of a community are often given support through spiritual bonding. The latter among Africans disposes them to help one another. The individual within African society is thus not complete without others. This indicates that the African religious worldview has a solid ethical dimension. At the heart of African religion is the quest for harmony: among humans, human beings and nature; between the human being and the community; between the human being and the living spirits of ancestors; between the living and the dead; between the visible and the invisible worlds; and, most importantly, harmony between human beings and God. This makes up of the African ontology (Ikegbu, Bassey, 2019).

However, despite the diversity among indigenous cultures in Africa, G. Ayittey (2006) summarised the following common themes in African life:

(1) everything in the cosmos are part of a whole; there is no sharp distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred;

(2) in most African traditions, there is a Supreme Being – creator, sustainer, provider, and controller of all creation;

(3) serving with the creator are a variety of lesser gods and guardian spirits; lesser gods are continually involved in human affairs; people communicate with these gods;

(4) the human condition is and always will be imperfect; suffering, sickness and death are all essential parts of life; suffering is caused by misdeeds and sins that offend the gods and ancestors or by being out of harmony with society;

(5) ritual actions may relieve the problems and suffering of human life, either by satisfying the offended gods or by resolving social conflicts; rituals help to restore people to traditional values and renew their commitment to spiritual life;

(6) human society is communal; ancestors, the living, the living dead and those yet to be born, they all form an important part of the community; the associations between the worldly and the otherworldly help to balance and guide the lives of the community. People need to interact with the spirit world which is all around them.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that Africans have their conception of ethics and religion before the coming of the Europeans. Hence, as J. Mbiti (1980) argues, the Christian missionaries did not bring God to Africa but God brought them to Africa. Some authors also argued that Westerners, over years, have tried by all means to destroy African values of togetherness enshrined in the African Traditional Religion in an attempt to erode the African identity. The new Christian missionaries converts were often made to believe that salvation could only be complete if they did away with their old cultural life and superstitious religious. It is important to note that the Western missionaries might not have planned these damaging results of their actions, nonetheless led to social disruption as tensions, and sometimes resulted in violence within communities in Africa. Reacting to this, G. Williamson (1974: 56) observed that the result "was to bring under suspicion every aspect of traditional life and, worse, to develop in the convert an attitude of

shame and condemnation towards his traditional past and those who continued to share it".

The above situation is explained by C. Achebe (2018) in his novel: *Things Fall Apart*. He noted that there were some indications of social and religious disintegration as a result of the impact of European culture and Christianity on the African indigenous worldview, those cultural and traditional religious threads that bound the people together were detached. Yet, C. Achebe recognised some of the positive changes that Christianity and European colonial rule brought to Africa, especially, through the establishment of education and prospects of material progress. However, he further claimed that the plea of Western culture and its material promise is still very strong, especially among the younger generation of Africans, who, regrettably, embrace everything Western to the neglect of their cultural practice and values.

It is important to note that, the African traditional cultural, religious beliefs and expressions had some of the negative elements that dehumanised humans, e.g. human sacrifice and killing of twins, especially before the advent of Christianity and European colonisation, however, this research points to some positive aspect of cultural values, e.g. the solution to xenophobic mindset and attitude.

5. Xenophobia and its implications on humanity in Africa

As it i indicated above, in traditional African societies a shared morality is the foundation of society. In this context, K. Gyekye (1978) avers that traditional African moral ideals or virtues exhibit the following: compassion, kindness, concern for others benevolence, in short, any behaviour or action that is beneficial to the elevation of the well-being of others. M. Motlhabi (1986) also maintains that, like the Ten Commandments, which prohibits stealing, adultery, murder, deceive or lies telling, they are enshrined in the African Traditional Religion concept of a virtuous life. M. Gelfand (1987) agrees with M. Motlhabi (1986) by stating that the most important virtues in African societies are: respect, compassion, truth, kindness, love, generosity, humility, rectitude, forgiveness, self-discipline, mercy, sufficiency, pity, repentance, trust, strength, giving, patience, hard work, courage, unselfishness and

the willingness to share whatever one has, notwithstanding how little it may be. M. Gelfand (1987) further claimed that African moral values reject: abuse, stealing, adultery, lying, deceit, violence, pride, quarrelling, jealousy, hatred, covetousness, anger, ingratitude, negligence, assault, weakness, selfishness and provocation. However, the problem of xenophobic violence on the African continent contradicts these African values and worldview which now poses some serious implications on the continent.

In a study on morality in Africa, M. Letseka (2013) concludes that the present situation contrasts sharply with the previous due to modernity. B. Bush (2018) likens the present African as someone stuck between two worlds: the old and the new ones. However, in a limbo between these two worlds, a contradiction pervades his moral behaviour. From the above argument, one can argue that the problem of xenophobia has eroded the ethic-theological spirit of *live and let live* where Africans are known to put the interest of the common good above their individual interest and this have serious implication for humanity in Africa.

First of all, no African ought to ever feel like a foreigner in Africa. The problem of xenophobia has led to reprisals elsewhere in Africa, which if not taken care of will further cause division and hatred among fellow Africans and member states. For instance, Zambia, due to the xenophobic attack on foreigners cancelled a supposedly friendly match against South Africa in its capital Lusaka which was due in September 2019. Madagascar had pulled swiftly in to replace Zambia but later pull out from the feature over similar concern. The response in Zambia continued with student protesters marching in streets and making shopping centres to close in the capital. A popular local radio station in the country, Hot FM, also announced that it will stop playing the music of South African origin and artists until further notice (Mkhize 2019). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, protesters in Lubumbashi smashed the windows of South Africa's consulate and sacked South African-owned shops (Mkhize 2019).

Nigeria's response to the xenophobic attack in South Africa was more brutal, as Nigeria's foreign minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, conveyed a deep emotional statement stating that "Enough is enough", "We will address this once and for all this

time" (Durokifa, Ijeoma, 2017: 3299). In response to this, the Nigerian government pulled out of the World Economic Forum on Africa which was held in South African port city of Cape Town latter the year, 2019. Nigerian high commissioner to South Africa was recalled from there. Influential Nigerian artists and Afrobeats star, Tiwa Savage, withdrew from a concert in South Africa. The Nigerian national chairman of the ruling All Progressives Congress, Adams Oshiomhole, also called on the government to nationalise some South African-owned businesses, which includes the Mobile Telephone Network (MTN), he also called for a boycott of South African goods and services. He further demanded that the landing rights of South African Airways be withdrawn until xenophobic attacked in South Africa is stopped. Lastly, he avers "Nigeria needs to show that we are not chicken to be molested" (Durokifa, Ijeoma, 2017: 3299). In response to this, angry Nigerian protesters rode in the streets of Lagos, Abuja and a few other cities across the country to forced South African-owned telecommunications giant MTN and Shoprite to suspend operations for weeks.

Also unemployment in the xenophobic area will tend to increase. For instance, some foreign-owned businesses were destroyed during the xenophobic attacks as a reprisal, while some shut down to avoid been destroyed. The implication of this is that those working in these companies were displaced of their jobs leading to the increase in the unemployment rate, aside from this reason, many foreigners in South Africa have decided to go back home, and this will further increase the unemployment rate in this countries.

Xenophobia is an international crime against humanity and crimes against humanity are mass crimes committed against a civilian population (McKinnon 2017). Crimes against humanity have been perpetrated against innocent civilian groups since the dawn of time. Despite the long duration of execution of the evil, it was not only about hundred years ago when the international community acknowledged such crimes as morally reprehensible and unacceptable with the introduction of the Hague Convention IV of 1907. Crimes against humanity are violations under some international tribunes, e.g. the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 of the latter names crimes against humanity to include: murder, extermination and other cruel acts (Gauin 2015). Thus, this author declares that xenophobic attacks are crimes against humanity committed under international criminal law because they are systematic attacks and widespread executed on a large scale against civilian groups. Furthermore, Africans need to come together to do more to arrest the situation.

6. Conclusion

This article concludes that indeed xenophobia and the related violence that comes with it is a societal problem that still haunts the African community. This crisis is a result of anti-migrant sentiments expressed by natives of a country who perceive foreigners to be threats to their entitlements. However, this is against the ethic-theological spirit of *live and lets live* where Africans are to tolerate each other by putting the interest of the community above their individual interest. Africans have a long history of apartheid, and together they have galvanised themselves to unite under solidarity for the liberation of sister countries within the continent. As this work reflects on these deeds of selflessness from the entire black race, it is no misnomer that Africans allow division on the continent. It was pointed out in this article that xenophobia is a prevalent phenomenon, i.e. threatening the relations between Africans, especially those in the Southern African region. Currently, it undermines the intended peaceful co-existence and social cohesion through violations of human rights which are consequently impeding good governance. Therefore, there is a great need to do away with this societal problem if cordial relations are to be perpetuated as the worst-case scenario will be the ultimate and extreme devastation of regional harmony and cooperation. Since the problem is not a prevalent one on the continent, government, agencies, and citizens need to re-orientate themselves on the ethic-theological *live and let live* attitude enshrined in African communalism. Africans need to stand together to help put to an end this crime to humanity. It is only an enemy of humanity that will result in killing and destroying his fellow African for selfish sake, being inconsistent with the traditional African values.

7. **References**

Achebe C., 2018: *Things Fall Apart*. London: Penguin Books.

Arndt J. S., 2018: *Struggles of land, language, and identity in post-apartheid South Africa: The case of the Hlubi*. "Journal of the Middle East and Africa", 9, 1, 1-26.

Ayittey G. B., 2006: *Indigenous African institutions.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan; in: J. Crush, D. Tevera (eds): *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*. Ottawa – Cape Town: The Printing Press.

Bassey S. A., Bubu N. G., 2019: *Gender inequality in Africa: a re-examination of cultural values*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 3, 21-36.

Bassey S. A., Enang N. R., Nwaeke C. U., 2018: *Revisiting the Language Question In African Philosophy*. "Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research (JSHSR)", 5, 23, 1053-1067.

Bassey S. A., Mendie J. G., 2019: *Alexis Kagame's Ontological Categories*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 1, 23-32.

Ikegbu E. A., Bassey S. A., 2019: *Ahamefula: discovering leadership gaps of the African being*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 4, 75-89.

Bush B., 2018: *Motherhood, morality, and social order*; in: M. Joseph, G. M. Hödl (eds): *Developing Africa*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1-7.

Coetzee E., 2012: *Exploring perceptions of xenophobia in a sample of South African employees*. "Journal of Psychology in Africa", 22, 4, 609-615.

Crush J., Tawodzera G., Chikanda A., Tevera D., 2017: *Living with xenophobia: Zimbabwean informal enterprise in South Africa*; in: J. Crush, D. Tevera (eds): *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*. Ottawa – Cape Town: The Printing Press.

Dick A. L., 2005: *To make the people of South Africa proud of their membership of the great British empire: Home reading unions in South Africa, 1900-1914*. "Libraries and the Cultural Record", 40, 1, 1-24.

Durokifa A., Ijeoma O., 2017: *The post-apartheid xenophobic attacks in South Africa: A reflection on government interferences*. "Etude de la Population Africaine", 31, 1, 3293-3306.

Everatt D., 2011: *Xenophobia, civil society and South Africa*. "Politikon", 38, 1, 1-5.

Gauin M., 2005: *Proving a "Crime against Humanity"?* "Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs", 35, 1, 141-157.

Gelfand M., 1987: *The genuine Shona; survival values of an African culture*. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo.

Green R., 1983: *Religion and Morality In The African Traditional Setting*. "Journal of Religion in Africa", 14, 1, 1-23.

Gyekye K., 1978: *The Akan Concept of a Person.* "International Philosophical Quarterly", 18, 3, 277-287.

Gyekye K., 1998: *African cultural values: an introduction*. Accra: Sankofa Publ.

Harris B.*, 2002: Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa?*; in: D. Hook, G. Eagle (eds): *Psychopathology and social prejudice.* Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; 34-46.

Hlatshwayo M., 2011: *Is there room for international solidarity within South African borders? COSATU's responses to the xenophobic attacks of May 2008*. "Politikon", 38, 1, 169-189.

Jooste L., 2012: *Foreigners in the Defence of South Africa*. "Scientia Militaria – South African Journal of Military Studies", 16, 2, 56-64.

Klotz A., 2016: *Borders and the Roots of Xenophobia in South Africa*. "South African Historical Journal", 68, 2 , 180-194.

Koenane M., 2013: *Xenophobic attacks in South Africa: An ethical response – Have we lost the underlying spirit of ubuntu*?. "International Journal of Science Commerce and Humanities", 5, 6, 110-116.

Letseka M., 2013: *Anchoring Ubuntu morality*. "Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences", 4, 3, 351-360.

Mabera F., 2017: *The impact of xenophobia and xenophobic violence on South Africa's developmental partnership agenda*. "Africa Review", 9, 1, 28-42.

Matunhu J., 2011*: Re-Visiting the May 2008 Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa*. "African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS", 5, 2, 95-105.

Mbiti J., 1980: *The encounter of Christian faith and African religion*. "Christian Century", 97, 27, 817-820.

Mcconnell C., 2009: *Migration and xenophobia in South Africa*. "Conflict Trends", 1, 1, 34-40.

McKinnon C., 2017: *Endangering humanity: an international crime?* "Canadian Journal of Philosophy", 47, 3, 395-415.

Metz T., Gaie J., 2010: *The African ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for research on morality*. "Journal of Moral Education", 39, 3, 273-290.

Mkhize K., 2019: *South Africa and the Politics of Coevality*. "Scrutiny2", 24, 1, 73-91.

Motlhabi M., 1986: *The concept of morality in African tradition*; in: B. Tlhagale, I. Mosala (eds): *Hammering swords into ploughshares; essays in honour of archbishop M. D. Tutu*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans; 85-99.

Ogar E., Ogar J., 2018: *Globalization in Africa and Beyond: The Quest for Global Ethics*. "GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis", 1, 1, 34-44.

Ojedokun O., 2015: *An ethical approach to the xenophobia against foreigners in South Africa*. "OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies", 11, 1, 169-174.

Olowu D., 1988: *Bureaucratic Morality in Africa*. "International Political Science Review", 9, 3, 215-229.

Parratt J., 1977: *Time in traditional African thought*. "Religion", 7, 2, 117-126.

Patel K., 2016: *Sowing the Seeds of Conflict? Low Income Housing Delivery, Community Participation and Inclusive Citizenship in South Africa*. "Urban Studies" 53, 13, 2738-57.

Peters J., 1991: *When Fear Turns to Hate and Hate to Violence*. "Human Rights", 18, 1, 22-30.

Pillay J., 2017: Racism and xenophobia: The role of the Church in South Africa. "Verbum et Ecclesia", 38, 3, 43-47.

Pringle L., 1973: *Should Race Institute Testify Before Schlebusch Inquiry?*. London – New York: Routledge; 168–190.

Ramaswamy V., 2010: *Gandhi's satyagraha in South Africa and the Tamils*. "Economic and Political Weekly", 45,39, 36-41.

Sundstrom R.R., 2013: *Sheltering Xenophobia*. "Critical Philosophy of Race", 1, 1, 68-78.

Tangwa G., 2007: *Some African Reflections on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics*. "A Companion to African Philosophy", 4, 5, 387-95.

Tella O., 2016: *Understanding xenophobia in South Africa: The individual, the state and the international system*. "Insight on Africa", 8, 2, 142-158.

Ucham E., 2014: *African Hybrids: Exploring Afropolitanism in Ghana Must Go*. "NAWA Journal of Language & Communication", 8, 2, 63-75.

Williamson G., 1974: *Akan Religion and the Christian Faith*. Accra: Ghana University Press.

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Residential satisfaction and mobility
in Göktürk peripheral neighbourhood

Somaiyeh Nasrollahzadeh

Graduate School of Science Engineering and Technology,

Urban and Regional Planning Department,

Istanbul Technical University

Maslak,34496, Istanbul, Turkey

s.nasrz@yahoo.com.tr, nasrollahzadeh@itu.edu.tr

Turgay Kerem Koramaz

Faculty of Architecture Urban and Regional Planning Department,

Istanbul Technical University

Taşkışla, 34367, Istanbul, Turkey

koramaz@itu.edu.tr

Abstract

Among the main factors that affect residential mobility, satisfaction of households from their living environment and dwelling is outstanding since it covers most of the related variables. The extent to which households expectations are met by their residential environment depends on the socio-economic features matching the physical and spatial qualities of their living environment. This paper aims to contribute to theory and practice concerning residential satisfaction in housing through an assessment of the Göktürk residential neighbourhood and its housing, and its relationship to households' residential mobility. Göktürk, which is located in the northwestern periphery of Istanbul, is

a significant residential area, with the majority of its inhabitants live in houses with luxury lifestyle while other households are living in informal settlements with the lowest quality of housing and neighbourhood. In the first section of this paper, an overview of the residential texture of the Göktürk neighbourhood is discussed. Following this, the methodology and analysis of findings covering 210 households' views living in two main segments in terms of their socio-economic characteristics are reviewed. Finally, the physical features of neighbourhood such as housing and status of its quality are discussed to explore the overall satisfaction of respondents with their current situation. The importance of this research is that, in this area, two income groups of households which are very different from each other are living side by side. The major findings reveal that most households are satisfied with the quality of neighbourhood while a significant number of high-income households are dissatisfied with the environmental quality of neighbourhood and are satisfied with their housing, whereas some middle- and upper-class households are dissatisfied with their housing. It should be noticed that low-income households continue to admit that they are satisfied with their homes, despite the fact that they are living in squatter settlements, indicating that they do not want to lose their houses even with the least level of quality.

Key words: residential mobility, residential satisfaction, physical features, socio-economic features, gated community.

1. Introduction

Residential mobility through its connections to housing profile (Fattah et al., 2015), housing market, governmental policies, economic changes, land use value (Jordan et al., 2012), and rearrangement of neighbourhoods is the main axis of housing theory in micro and macro scales. Based on W. J. McAuley and C. L. Nutty (1982) the concerned needs of individuals and families are; housing size, neighbourhood amenities, school quality, distance to stores or services, employment opportunities, and climate, with the requirements depending on the current life-cycle stages. During the 1950s, residential mobility found its roots in geography and sociology while distinguishing its borders by factors like household characteristics, satisfaction, residential history, market forces, and family structure (Coupe, Morgan, 1981; McAuley, Nutty, 1982; Davies, Pickles, 1985; Hedman 2011; Coulton, Turner, 2012).

The presence of attractive neighbourhoods in the proximity of housing units may motivate households to move. Inversely, households resist moving because of attachment to the current neighbourhood as social ties and sense of belonging (Poortinga et al., 2017). The other definition that is associated with mobility is disequilibrium that regarding this model no mobility decisions occur unless the current

living arrangements become suboptimal (Benenson, Omer, 2004; Rabe, Taylor, 2009; Fattah et al., 2015; Falkingham et al., 2016). So, a composition of push and pull factors determine both when and where the households move, or become subject to various constraints or barriers to mobility (Dane et al., 2014). The aforementioned factors are considered as a combination of adequacy of urban public facility centres (recreational, open and green spaces, parking lots, educational, cultural and health centre, local shops and shopping malls), household income, and tenure status, convenient accessibility to the aforementioned centres and public transport system, social environment including noise, crime, family's security and emotional attachment to the residential environment (Lu 1999; Mohit, Al-KhanbashiRaja, 2014; Egercioğlu et al., 2015; Pudjiwidyastuti et al., 2016; Manaf et al., 2018).

Based on relevant studies, mobility for low-income families occurs not because of reaching better circumstances, but unstable housing arrangements (Gruber, Shelton, 1987). On the one hand, such moves may have negative consequences whilst on the other hand, high-income families move in order to reach a higher quality of life and amenities in new neighbourhoods. Based on empirical evidence, such families even have the ability to change the host neighbourhood, so for them, mobility can be a path to greater opportunity and satisfaction (Benenson 2004; Jordan et al., 2012; Thomas et al., 2013; Morris 2017).

The decision about whether or not to move can be seen as weighting satisfaction with current housing relative to the anticipated satisfaction with alternatives (Dane et al., 2014). To determine the residential area's willingness to relocate, residents' satisfaction levels should be assessed. Mobility experience is one of the most significant assessors in the value system of residential satisfaction (Herfert et al., 2013). Generally, residential mobility would be determined by a complex framework of environmental, socio-economic, households' needs, values and priorities (Etminani-Ghasrodashti et al., 2017). Among the satisfaction determinants factors, housing and neighbourhood are the sources of assessments. Then, in the case of dissatisfaction with status of neighbourhood and housing, a critical motivation for movement of households would be provided (Balestra, Sultan, 2013). One of the most significant indicators affecting households' living status is residential neighbourhood satisfaction (Herfert et al., 2013). Residential satisfaction is considered as a mixed

framework, referring to the location and time of assessment involving a wide range of households (Mohit, Al-KhanbashiRaja, 2014; Abidin et al., 2019). Satisfaction can be explained as compilation of subjective responses to objective circumstances, gained in lived environment (Potter, Cantarero, 2006; Herfert et al., 2013; Mohit, Raja, 2014).

Once the households' expectations from their current houses are far from their desired dwellings, it does not provide their needs, so stress and dissatisfaction are created (Oktay et al., 2009; Salleh, Badarulzaman, 2012; Etminani-Ghasrodashti et al., 2017). In this case the household's reaction to such circumstances may be migration to new housing where they adjust their needs (Gleave, Hays, 1977). For instance, residential dissatisfaction occurs in case accessibility to schools for children, and workplaces for individuals and medical centres for households in emergency situations is not convenient. Among many indicators in assessment of neighbourhood status, there are some critical features such as environment, security and safety, public facilities and housing satisfaction (Egercioğlu et al., 2015; Abidin et al., 2019). In addition to the aforementioned features, accessibility to the public services, their adequacy and security also influence on the overall assessment of residential neighbourhood satisfaction. In order to structure the affecting factors, two main classes are determined as physical and socio-economic features (Tab.1). For the physical features satisfaction about housing and neighbourhood issues are significant (Balestra, Sultan, 2013; Tan 2016). Integration with neighbourhood status of people living in the neighbourhood and crime level explores the social features of neighbourhood. Finally, land value, socio-economic characteristics of households and neighbourhood improvement implementations (Chen et al., 2019).

Table 1. Types of variables

Features of neighbour-hood satisfaction aim	Satisfaction with
Physical	Homes, neighbourhood facilities, quality of environment, quality of streets and roads, crowding and noise level (Oktay et al., 2009; Balestra, Sultan, 2013; Mohit, Raja, 2014; Tan 2016; Abidin et al., 2019).
Socio-economic	Integration with neighbours, people living in the neighbourhood, crime level, home value, cost of living, socio-economic status, homogeneity of social class (Mohit, Raja, 2014; Egercioğlu et al., 2015; Abidin et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019) .

Neighbourhood satisfaction and housing satisfaction have a mutual relationship so that they are source of satisfaction regarding their elements which lack of any of them influence on overall satisfaction (Gruber, Shelton, 1987; Mohit, Raja, 2014; Etminani-Ghasrodashti et al., 2017). As a result the residential mobility depends on households' satisfaction referring to their perceptions of the residential environment while housing and neighbourhood satisfaction are considered as predictor of residential mobility (Herfert et al., 2012). The aim of this paper is assessment of the households' satisfaction across Göktürk neighbourhood referring to their residential mobility probability in result of the satisfaction from the housing and neighbourhood facilities.

2. Overview of Gökürk and its neighbourhood segments

Göktürk, located in the northwestern periphery of Istanbul, south of the northern forest of Istanbul and 8 km north of the second beltway, became a gated town of 16,000 in the latter half of the 2000s (Candan, Kolluoğlu, 2008) – (Fig. 1). In the 1920s, the village hosted a mixed population, including Greeks, that refers to the time before exchanging population between Turkey and Greece. Around the 1970s, the main source of income in the village was agriculture until the end of this decade

the spread of the industrial areas from Alibeyköy and Kağıthane also affected Göktürk (Esen, Rieniets, 2005). Göktürk experienced cleared forest for agriculture usage, squatting as a means of settlement and agricultural plots of land were sold to migrant workers, who illegally reorganized them into residential areas (Gül 2017). The majority of the inhabitants of Göktürk live in houses with gardens, maintained with the assistance of domestics, gardeners and drivers. It was only a decade later that the rush to Göktürk actually took off. The increasing pace of development in Göktürk is no exception to the rapid growth of gated towns in other parts of Istanbul (Candan, Kolluoğlu, 2008). In the 1980s, for the first time, Turkey witnessed the emergence of the gated communities as a phenomenon in the shadow (course) of economic liberalization (Özkan, Kozaman, 2006; Akgün, Baycan, 2007; Gül 2017). In the north-western part of Istanbul, on the outskirts of northern forests and close to the Kemerburgaz residential neighbourhood, Kemer country, which is known as one of the first gated communities for high income households is located in this district. After obtaining its brand as high-class American style gated community, Kemer country in Göktürk was not just a residential area as usual, but through construction of a state-of-art infrastructure, golf courses, tennis courts, artificial lakes, multipurpose sport facilities like horse riding and country club stabilized its uniqueness (Esen, Rieniets, 2005; Bozdoğan 2010). Today, Göktürk has witnessed Kemer country spreading over the neighbourhood, while the village is turning into a town. The total developed land of Göktürk is part of the forest and national park that is privatised and rented to the residential usage through the Kemer Construction and Tourism Company (Candan, Kolluoğlu, 2008).

Figure 1. Location of case study
Source: Authors

The remarkable areas of forestland located on the western part of Göktürk, which had informal development background on formerly authorized lands as forest regime, have gained legal private ownership status by recent regulations. Today, in the aftermath of such a course of development, many villagers have sold their land to investors in order to ensure their share of the emerging real estate boom, and the investors launched new projects feeding the growing appetite for luxurious residences. Today, the former village has reached an (urban) density. Göktürk's squatter settlements, so called gecekondus in Turkish urban development, includes a housing pattern with detached buildings in low-density and worse infrastructure quality, are successful to find their way to relocate themselves in the legal market (Esen, Rieniets, 2005; Akgün, Baycan 2007; Bozdoğan 2010; Gül 2017).

The significance of assessing household's satisfaction and residential mobility in the Göktürk neighbourhood is due to the fact that the gated communities and the informal settlements are positioned next to each other. Obviously, having higher-income families and lower income groups settled next to each other, the neighbourhood considers disparate expectations from housing and their residential environ-

ment and living standards of these two income groups which must be addressed (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Neighbourhood subareas versus land value
Source: Authors derived from e-Devlet kapısı (2018)

3. Methodology and analysis

3.1. Method and data

The current study is based on collected data through surveys conducted in 2019, which were structured to explore the neighbourhood satisfaction of residential Göktürk neighbourhood. The questionnaire is structured into two groups of questions as socio-economic characteristics of households and assessment of satisfaction with physical features of a neighbourhood. The measurement of satisfaction level

with housing and neighbourhood features is based on a five-point Likert scale where the moderate value is 3, which considers midpoint range that above this point implies satisfied households and lower indicates dissatisfied (1 for very unsatisfied and 5 for very satisfied). Analysis of frequencies and percentages of households' characteristics are provided through descriptive statistics. Using chi-square test through crosstabs analysis, the relationship between housing and neighbourhood satisfaction of households and their income groups are generated.

For spatial sampling of the case study, two factors as neighbourhood zoning and land value are applied and overlaid to explore sampling zones. By exploring the spatial patterns of land use, the neighbourhood of Göktürk can be classified to main fragments as, Kemer country, squatter settlements (known as *Gece kondu*) established on 2B zones, agricultural sites, and housing transformation zones developed with new "residential projects" and "apartment" blocks. Generally, holding three squatter settlements under the ticket of 2B lands and three luxury residential great spots, the neighbourhood of Göktürk is recognized as a heterogeneous region. So, the neighbourhood zoning is considered as the first layer based on the abovementioned statements. In order to overlay two maps (land value dynamics and neighbourhood zoning) common weighting range is dedicated to the variables (intensity of importance on Saaty's scale). Regarding the usage type of land, weights from 3 to 9, respectively, considered for Kemer country to squatter settlements. For the land value factor, in order to reach a relatively constant character of land, the dynamics of values from 2003 to 2018 are investigated and the neighbourhood is classified to four ranges from unstable to stable. Therefore, as the second layer the specified ranges are standardised by weights from 3 to 9. It should be noticed here that the outcome map recognizes subareas which can be the precise stratifying of the neighbourhood to subareas in order to take samples. Referring to above mentioned points the formal surveys are carried out over 210 cases which are randomly chosen throughout the distinguished subareas of the case study.

The outputs of the analysis are presented in the maps illustrating how the variables are distributed. Also, descriptive tables of socio-economic, physical and environmental features and by crosstabs analysis (chi-square test), the research came to the conclusions:

(1) maps, representing the exact locations of responses, and neighbourhood features;

(2) tables of descriptive analysis of households' socio-economic characteristics and chi-square test.

3.2. Physical teatures of neighbourhood satisfaction

In this section physical features of the neighbourhood are analysed regarding respondents' appraisals over environmental features such as existence of areas to be renovated, sense of crime, safety and security level, rent value, and distance to public service centres and workplace. Level of satisfaction from housing and neighbourhood features are weighted through Likert scale. According to the respondents' view, safety and security threats in the area are as presence of addicts, alcoholics, and hooligans that are found mostly on Çamlık Street (located in mid-eastern part of the area, covered with low-income housing), which decreased the security quality of area up to 64.7%. On the other hand, under construction projects, located in the north nearby the forest zone have provided low level of safety sense which threats security of area by 29.4% concern (Tab. 2). Based on what has been discussed in the security situation of the neighbourhood, people are not very satisfied because of the presence of alcoholics and addicts sauntering through the area and the existence of buildings in construction scattered around the area (Fig. 3).

Figure 3. Threats to security of neighbourhood
Source: Authors

The buildings and residential areas in which these units are located require renovation and improvement. These circumstances go on in the squatter settlements, roads nearby the stream and the border between the centre of neighbourhood and Kemer Country. Open public spaces also need renovation, improvement, and completion. Generally, the centre and the northern parts of the neighbourhood need infrastructural renovations in terms of electrical installations, buildings, and environmental quality (Fig. 4). Quality status of residential buildings, 74.7% of households are in desirable condition and do not need urgent renovation and repair, as reported in the survey results. And only 25.2% share the need for renovations in their current residential buildings. More than half of the sample population is satisfied with the ease of access to public transport.

Figure 4: Need to be renovated
Source: Authors

Regarding the size of the houses, 5.3% of the households are satisfied with their living space and only 5% are dissatisfied. 0.4% of the population resides in homes that are 50 m² or less, while 32.5% of households live in houses that are 50-99 m². In addition, 33.4% of households reside in units having 100-129 m² space, whereas the left other shares belong to houses which are larger than 130 m² that belong to high-income households (Tab. 2). Due to the mean size of houses which is 136.9 m² (Fig. 5), and satisfaction of the housing unit size, which is illustrated in Figure 6 can be acceptable that most of the households are satisfied with their space of living. Among the surveyed households, 79.0% are completely or relatively satisfied, 13.8% are completely or relatively dissatisfied, and 7.1% have no idea about their housing size.

Figure 5. Size of house
Source: Authors

Figure 6: Satisfaction from size of the housing unit
Source: Authors

According to the responses of inhabitants, the majority of costs of housing rent is within the range of 174.82-349.65 EUR by 72.2% share of all and the higher rent value that is more than 349.65 EUR covers 27.8% of samples. According to these figures, households with income levels lower than 349.65 EUR monthly, constitute the poor group (Tab. 2). The residents of the wealthy housing quarters in the centre and east of the neighbourhood are satisfied with their current housing while dissatisfied and very dissatisfied households reside as they move north and west of the area. Regarding the following figures, access to the public and commercial service centres are easy reach for households. The density and convergence of households in the centre of the residential neighbourhood has created the condition that households from different income groups have access to these centres (Fig. 7).

Figure 7: Distances to public service centres
Source: Authors

Regarding the tenancy of the residential units, it can be seen that 16.9% of the units are lower than 157 EUR rental groups. Like 55.3% of rent value belongs to 157-314 EUR, while 15.3% refers to 314-471 EUR, around 6.1% covers the 471-550 EUR values, and finally 6.1% belongs to more than 628 EUR.

Table 2. Responses to physical features of Göktürk

	Variable	Percent
Status of neighbourhood security	Urban security threats (addicted, alchoholic persons, …), Çamlık street	64.7
	Gece kondu area	5.9
	Under construction lots within forest	29.4
Quality of buildings and neighbourhood	Old houses (Gece kondu),	40.0
	Infrastructure needs to be re-paired (road, lightening)	27.5
	Low quality of environment	10.0
	Building of public services	22.5
Size of house	<50 m²	0.4
	50-99	32.5
	100-129	33.4
	130-250	24.2
	251-380	1.5
	>380	8.0
Rent value (EUR)	<157	16.9
	157-236	16.9
	237-314	38.4
	315-393	10.7
	394-471	4.6
	472-550	6.1
	551-628	0.0
	>628	6.1

Source: Authors

3.3. Socio-economic features of neighbourhood satisfaction

Households expressed their level of satisfaction from social features of the Göktürk neighbourhood such as household's income, mobility experience, location of their previous house, living years in the current house, households' origins, and attachment to the neighbourhood. By looking at the distribution of income groups

throughout the area, it would be obvious that 18.3% of the households are from low-income level whereas 35.3% and 46.5% respectively belong to middle and high income groups (Tab. 3). According to the survey results, households' income can be predominantly between two groups of 710-860 EUR and more than 1311 EUR. Given the low, medium and high income categories for households, it can be seen that the majority of residents belong to the two groups of low-income and high-income residents who live in the neighbourhood. The average rental price is 392.50 EUR, which is almost equal to the income level of lower income households.

Figure 8: Distribution of Households income
Source: Authors

According to Figure 8, middle and upper income class households are located in the centre, some parts of the west and eastern part of the neighbourhood. In the

central and northwestern part, the income groups are mixed and heterogeneous. However, given the congestion of households with a high income level, it is higher than the low income level. Therefore, it can be concluded that these low-income households are at risk of being integrated into renovations or under construction projects, or at risk of being excluded, because the presence of high-income households increases the land and rent values in the neighbourhood. So the presence of low-income households in these areas is gradually diminishing. Concerning household ownership, 69.0% of households own their property where most of the nuclear and non-nuclear families including 30.5% of households also live on rent.

Households in this area have experienced mobility from 1 to 8 times since the year 2000, of which 24.5% have moved between 2 and 3 times, whereas 10.1% of people have moved houses between 3-4 times (Tab. 3). Just 2.9 % were more mobile in the last 19 years while 26.4% never have moved houses since the 2000 (Fig. 9).

Figure 9: Distribution of mobility since 2000
Source: Authors

Figure 9 indicates that most of the households living high-income group areas and newly constructed apartments areas have come to the neighbourhood recently, whereas residents of squatter settlements and some of the central area either have no relocation experience or their mobility restricted to the neighbourhood border. Residents of these areas have either not moved or relocated once or twice, and also in the northern part of the centre, households move more than twice that reflects the dynamics of residential mobility in the central area.

The previous households' residents show that 38.2 % of them just had mobility within Göktürk, while 44.9% immigrated to this neighbourhood from other districts and regions (Tab. 3). Based on interviews most of the households moved house regarding their job necessities (Fig.10).

Figure 10: Distribution of households' previous location
Source: Authors

As can be inferred from the data, 30% of people have been living in their current houses less than 5 years while 41% are living between 5 to 15 years. The other

29% of households have been living in the same houses for more than 15 years (Tab. 3). Generally, the mean number of years spent living in this area is 12.6 year, which is shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Histogram of living years
Source: Authors

It should be noticed that 75.2% of the current inhabitants are from Istanbul who originated from other neighbourhoods or areas of Istanbul. Around 14.8% of families moved out of Istanbul to the area, indicating that the social context of this area is homogeneous. The distribution of households which have attachment feelings to the neighbourhood shows that most of the residents in informal settlements and some parts of the central areas are much attached to the neighbourhood where they are located on the old core of the neighbourhood.

Table 3. Socio-economic features of Göktürk

	Variable	Percent
Households income (monthly) Euro	<393	2.4
	393-550	15.9
	551-710	13.0
	711-860	22.3
	861-1020	7.3
	1021-1177	5.6
	>1177	33.5
Mobility since 2000	No move	26.4
	1	44.2
	2	16.3
	3	8.2
	4	1.9
	5	0.5
	6	1.9
	8	0.5
Households previous location	Same neighbourhood	38.2
	Another neighbourhood	6.6
	Anther district	30.6
	Another region	14.3
	Never move	10.3
Living years	<6	30.0
	6-10	28.2
	11-15	12.8
	16-20	9.5
	21-30	13.8
	>30	5.7

Source: Authors

Observations on income and housing ownership indicate that the majority of the low-income group are homeowners, while the high-income group has a significant share of rent, ownership and joint ownership with family. In addition, the middle class group are often homeowners and tenants and have only a small share of households living in nuclear families.

3.4. Satisfaction level of neighbourhood and residence

Compared to the income group's satisfaction with the quality of their neighbourhood, most households are satisfied with the quality of neighbourhood while a significant number of high-income households are dissatisfied with the environmental quality of neighbourhood (Tab. 4).

Table 4. Socio-economic features of Göktürk

Household groups	Satisfaction from neighbourhood		Satisfaction from residence	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
High income	4.44	.799	3.857	1.0755
Middle income	4.12	.718	3.707	.8788
Low income	4.07	.908	3.836	.8769

Source: Authors

By comparing household income and household satisfaction from their current housing, most income groups are satisfied from their housing, whereas some middle- and upper-class households are dissatisfied with their housing. It must be noticed that low-income households continue to admit that they are satisfied with their homes, despite the fact that they are living in informal settlement, indicating that they do not want to lose their houses even with the least level of quality.

Households in the informal settlement and neighboring districts are not very satisfied with their housing size, this point indicates that the household dimension is not commensurate with their space of housing. Since the area is surrounded by forest and park, unsurprisingly people are satisfied with the quietude throughout the area. Availability of different modes of transportation result in satisfaction from accessibility to workplaces and other urban public service centres. This level of satisfaction refers to the fact that most of the household's workplaces are not far from their houses. In addition to the presence of forests, quality of parks and green spaces within the neighbourhood are also essential. However, most of the residents are dissatisfied with the number and quality of existing green space and besides the cleanliness of streets and pedestrian walkways, the existence of stray dogs and worn down streets that need to be repaired are other causes of residents' dissatisfaction (Tab. 5).

Table 5. Overall view of households' satisfaction with neighbourhood

Satisfactory assessment	Mean	Std. deviation
Satisfaction from size of house (n:210)	3.85	1.015
Satisfaction from attributes of current house	3.80	1.025
Satisfaction from security of neighbourhood	4.06	.886
Satisfaction from quietude of neighbourhood	4.25	.839
Satisfaction from neighbourhood destination accessability (n: 208)	3.61	1.203
Satisfaction from accessibility to work place (n: 151)	4.01	.973
Satisfaction from accessibility to park and green spaces	3.90	1.026
Satisfaction from neighbourhood quality attributes (sanitation and cleaning) (n:209)	3.50	1.114
Neighbourhood attachement level (n:208)	4.09	1.157

Source: Authors

By examining the cross-tabs between the two variables, it can be seen that the percentage of neighbourhood security is not related to the households' decision to stay or relocate (tab. 6). In every satisfaction range from very dissatisfied to dissatisfied, there is a large percentage of people who do not want to move out of the neighbourhood. Examination of the satisfaction from quietness and households' mobility, reveals that satisfaction rate placed on the average level. Besides this, the desire to move on the basis of current housing includes over 83.3% of all satisfaction ranges. According to the chi-square test there is no significant relation between mobility and satisfaction from the quietude of the neighbourhood regarding the validity of this confrontation and comparison (Tab. 7).

Table 6. Mobility vs satisfaction from security of neighbourhood

Test		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square		36.507	28	.130
Likelihood ratio		34.038	28	.200
Test		Value		Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.419		.130
by nominal	Cramer's V	.209		.130
N of Valid Cases				208

Source: Authors

Table 7. Mobility vs satisfaction from quietude of neighbourhood

Test		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square		23.305	21	.328
Likelihood ratio		26.434	21	.190
Test		Value		Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.335		.328
by nominal	Cramer's V	.103		.328
N of Valid Cases				208

Source: Authors

Most of the households which are satisfied from accessibility to public urban services do not intend to move. Table 8 confirms the accuracy of this analysis for educational centres using the chi-squared test. For other urban public facilities the p value of chi square test is not significant. The same comes true for access to the workplace. Often those who do not wish to change their homes are satisfied and very satisfied from their workplace. Obviously, these people often live in the workplace close to their home (Tab. 9).

Table 8. Satisfaction from urban public centres (educational) and mobility

Test		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square		14.596	7	.042
Likelihood ratio		15.759	7	.027
Test		Value		Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.274		.042
by nominal	Cramer's V	.274		.042
N of Valid Cases				194

Source: Authors

Table 9. Mobility vs satisfaction from accessibility to work place

Test		Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square		16.891	8	.031
Likelihood ratio		11.608	8	.170
Test		Value		Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.334		.031
by nominal	Cramer's V	.236		.031
N of Valid Cases				151

Source: Authors

Most residents who are relatively satisfied with access to green spaces and parks are not reluctant to move to another housing unit as they express but since the chi-square value confirms there is no meaningful relation between these two variables (tab. 10). There is a weak and inverse relationship between housing ownership and satisfaction from housing size (R2= .023, B= -0.025, P= .000) – (Tab. 11). Around 89.5% of people do not consider their houses in need of renovation and households

are not in a state of disrepair. This can be deduced from the average year of residence (age of building) that no residential building is more than 20 years old. The majority of households are from Istanbul and since 2000, the number of households relocating has been often low, as 70% of households either not moved or only once.

Table 10. Mobility and satisfaction from accessibility to park and green spaces

Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	25.214	28	.616
Likelihood ratio	18.393	28	.916
Test		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.348	.616
by nominal	Cramer's V	.174	.616
N of Valid Cases			208

Source: Authors

Table 11. Housing tenure and satisfaction from housing size

Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	21.226	12	.048
Likelihood ratio	16.073	12	.188
Test		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.318	.047
by nominal	Cramer's V	.184	.047
N of Valid Cases			210

Source: Authors

This is also documented by statistics, as far as households are concerned about the social relationship with the rest of the households, it can be seen that 52.9% an-

swered positively to their relatively social attachment in Göktürk. The results have been obtained regarding the responsiveness of the urban environment to the daily needs of households show that the adequacy and accessibility to retail stores, households are satisfied from urban public services by 81.1% positive answer. More than half of the population expressed satisfaction from the adequacy of local business centres to their needs. Concerning recreational centres and parks, 59.5% of residents expressed satisfaction with the adequacy of these areas in terms of service provision. However, in relation to establishments and cultural centres less than half have expressed satisfaction from being responsive to the current population of the area, indicating that the number of centres is not sufficient for the families. Besides this, 68.1% of households also acknowledge the adequacy of these health centres. Referring to sports facilities, given that less than half of the population are satisfied with their adequacy, indicate that as population grows then the area needs to increase in health service centres to meet household's needs. Most income groups are not very reluctant to change their housing unit, whereas the high percentage of households that tend to move are middle-class households. According to the data of this study, there is a weak and inverse relationship between the desire for reconstruction and the times of mobility over the past 20 years ($R2=$ .023, $B=$ -4.976, $P=$ .000) – (Tab. 12). Besides, there is a positive and significant relationship with satisfaction from housing and the desire for reconstruction ($R2=$ .056, $B=$ .792, $P=$ .001) – (Tab. 13). The average year of residence of the households in the study area is approximately 13 years, which indicates that there is not a long history of living in this area. In general, most households with low, moderate and high income are generally satisfied from their housing space, which indicates that the average household size of 3.67 is proportional to the average 136.2 m^2.

Table 12. Mobility and satisfaction from accessibility to park and green spaces

Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	25.214	28	.616
Likelihood ratio	18.393	28	.916
Test		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	.348	.616
by nominal	Cramer's V	.174	.616
N of Valid Cases			208

Source: Authors

Table 13. Satisfaction from housing and housing reconstruction

Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	13.688	4	.008
Likelihood ratio	11.267	4	.024
Test		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal	Phi	255	.088
by nominal	Cramer's V	.255	.008
N of Valid Cases			210

Source: Authors

Regarding household's satisfaction from proximity to the central workplace, the residents of all three income groups are satisfied with the proximity to their workplace, indicating that their workplaces are in the same neighbourhood. Finally, the weak relationship is considered between residential ownership and the times of household's mobility over the past 20 years (R^2= .022, B= .031, P= .032) – (Tab. 14).

Table 14. Mobility and tenure

Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	65.806	21	.000
Likelihood ratio	66.103	21	.000
Test		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by nominal	Phi	.562	.000
	Cramer's V	.325	.000
N of Valid Cases			208

Source: Authors

4. Discussion and conclusion

To urban planners, property developers and policy makers, residential satisfaction is a significant indicator that contributes to defining the level of contentment which households obtain. In context of residential satisfaction, an extensive range of pull and push variables influence residential mobility intention of households within neighbourhoods. According to the discussion in this study, satisfaction is a perception of the environment comparing to the expectations of inhabitants from environmental quality. Satisfaction of households from their residential environment is significantly associated with the level of their income groups. Majority of households from a high-income group, tend to have more opportunities and willingness to change both the quality and location of their living environment, than the lower income group.. In this case, the tendency to move to another residence due to the environmental quality decreases within high-income group.

On the other hand, housing to low-income households is more likely defined as shelter since their expectations of the residential environment are related to how they can meet this initial need. Therefore, their expression of satisfaction from the quality of the residential environment and assessment of its standards can be less reliable. The solid reason is that they do not have other opportunities to move so they claim to be satisfied from the current environmental conditions.

It must be noticed that, over the past decade, large areas of Istanbul have been renovated as a result of urban transformation projects regarding renewal policy on worn-out areas (Kuyucu, Ünsal, 2010; Kuyucu 2017). And Göktürk is not in exception in this rule due to its slums. So, while the physical characteristics of the residential neighbourhood of the households are going through a transformation period, the inhabitants living in informal settlements are not socially and economically capable of coping with the improvement of their residential environment.

Regarding the case study, the development of Göktürk neighbourhood from rural to urban area for high-income households has led to ongoing renovation of low-income residential areas and informal settlements. Results put forward the significance of a transformation process with possible evictions in these neighbourhoods, which can be gradually dominated by high-income groups.

The presence of exceptional environmental attractions, including the peacefulness of being enclosed in the forest, has made this environment a particular region for luxury housing projects. Another significant attraction of Göktürk is being surrounded by the challenging large-scale urban projects such as Marmara motorway, New Airport of Istanbul and Canal Istanbul, which is an artificial waterway project that will connect the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, approximately 25 km away from the natural waterway, Bosporus. The presence of these projects and their further development have definitely influenced both the development of Göktürk neighbourhood and on the residential mobility of inhabitants in moving or staying in the neighbourhood that can be discussed in another research.

Besides, land prices and rents do not match the financial levels of lower income group living in the centre and informal settlements, which is one of the effects of an influx of higher income families. Households regarding their social status, income group, land price, and availability of housing supplies compete for their most desired available options to accommodate in residential neighbourhoods. That is how in the case study, the absence of favourable socio-economic conditions for families living in the low-quality dwellings, on the one hand, and dissatisfaction of households living in new luxury residential projects from nearby informal settlements may lead to another experience of eviction in Istanbul in the name of gentrification and new development. Due to the fact that this area is isolated and the closest

residential neighbourhood to it has similar conditions (gated-communities), so their mobility for this group of families is a critical issue that needs to be addressed. Since, there are significant numbers of these families who are more prone to be evicted, a preventive approach for planning must be defined to be put on the agenda of urban planners. Planners in such circumstances should consider the economic status and minimum living standards of this vulnerable group (who tend to relocate) in order to avoid the challenge of displacements by adopting appropriate policies to improve the quality of their housing and residential environment to where they belong. In summary, the proximity of two different income groups' inhabitants together, one of which is growing faster (due to environmental attractions and benefits as a result of large-scale projects), has gradually provided the conditions for the displacement of low-income, so-called vulnerable, households. For the further studies, dimensions and scales of these evictions and the prediction of possible moves would be examined in the form of detailed spatial analyses.

5. References

Abidin N. Z., Abdullah M. I., Basrah N., Alias M. N., 2019: *Residential Satisfaction: Literature Review and A Conceptual Framework*. IOP Conference Series: *Earth and Environmental Science*, 385, 1.

Akgün A. A, Baycan L.T., 2007: *Gated communities in Istanbul: the new walls of the city*. "Town Planning Review", 83, 1, 87-109

Balestra C., Sultan, J., 2013: *Home Sweet Home: The Determinants of Residential Satisfaction and Its Relation with Well-Being.* OECD Statistics Working Paper Series, 5, 42.

Benenson I., 2004: *Agent-Based Modeling: From Individual Residential Choice to Urban Residential Dynamics;* in: M. F. Goodchild, D. G. Janelle (eds): *Spatially Integrated Social Science: Examples in Best Practice*; 4, 67-95.

Benenson I., Omer I., 2004: *Agent-Based Modeling of Residential Distribution*; 1-19; http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlod?doi=10.1.1.582.8408.

Bozdoğan S., 2010: *Residential Architecture and Urban Landscape in Istanbul since 1950*; in: P. Pyla (ed.): *Landscapes of Development*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 118-141.

Candan A. B., Kolluoğlu B., 2008: *Emerging spaces of neoliberalism: A gated town and a public housing project in Istanbul*. "New Perspectives on Turkey", 39, 5-46.

Chen N., Hall C. M., Yu K., Qian C., 2019: *Environmental satisfaction, residential satisfaction, and place attachment: The cases of long-term residents in rural and urban areas in China*. "Sustainability" (Switzerland), 11, 22.

Coulton C., Turner M. A., 2012: *Residential Mobility and Neighbourhood Change: Real Neighbourhoods Under the Microscope*. "Policy Development and Research", 14, 3, 55-90.

Coupe R. T., Morgan B., 1981: *Towards a Fuller Understanding of Residential Mobility: A Case Study in Northampton, England*. "Environment and Planning", 13, 2, 201-215.

Dane G. Z., Grigolon A. B., Rasouli S., Timmermans H. J. P., 2014: *Determinants of residential mobility intentions: A mixed binary logit model*. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies, HKSTS: Transportation and Infrastructure, 21-27.

Davies R. B., Pickles A. R., 1985: *A Panel Study of Life-Cycle Effects in Residential Mobility*. "Geographical Analysis", 17, 3, 189-216.

E-Devlet kapısı 2018: Arsa rayış değeri sorgulama; http://www.turkiye.gov.tr/eyup-belediyesi-arsa-rayic.

Egercioğlu Y., Yilmaz S., Cete M., Cupi R., 2015: *Resident's Satisfaction to Evaluate Residential Environment before Urban Regeneration: Kizilay Neighbourhood, Izmir*. "Environment-Behaviour Proceedings Journal", 1, 2, 145.

Esen O., Rieniets T., 2005: *Fortress Istanbul. Gated Communities and the Socio-Urban Transformation*; in: F. Eckardt, K. Wildner (eds): *Public Istanbul: spaces and spheres of the urban*; 83-113.

Etminani-Ghasrodashti R., Majedi H., Paydar M., 2017: *Assessment of Residential Satisfaction in Mehr Housing Scheme: A Case Study of Sadra New Town, Iran*. "Housing, Theory and Society", 34, 3, 323-342.

Falkingham J., Sage J., Stone J., Vlachantoni A., 2016: *Residential mobility across the life course: Continuity and change across three cohorts in Britain.* "Advances in Life Course Research", 30, 111-123.

Fattah H. A., Salleh A. G., Badarulzaman N., Ali K., 2015: *Factors Affecting Residential Mobility among Households in Procedia.* "Social and Behavioral Sciences", 170, 516-526.

Gleave D., Cordey-Hayes M., 1977: *Migration dynamics and labour market turnover.* "Progress in Planning", 8, 1- 95.

Gruber K. J., Shelton G. G., 1987: *Assessment of neighbourhood satisfaction by residents of three housing types.* "Social Indicators Research", 19, 3, 303-315.

Gül M., 2017: *Architecture and the Turkish City: An Urban History of Istanbul since the Ottomans.* London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Hedman L., 2011: *Residential Mobility and Neighbourhood Effects: A Holistic Approach.* Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Geografiska regionstudier, Uppsala, 88, 1-52.

Herfert G., Neugebauer C. S., Smigiel C., 2013: *Living in residential satisfaction? Insights from large-scale housing estates in central and eastern Europe.* "Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie", 104, 1, 57-74.

Jordan R., Birkin M., Evans A., 2012: *Agent-Based Modelling of Residential Mobility, Housing Choice and Regeneration*; in: A. Heppenstall, A. Crooks, L. M. See, M. Batty (eds): *Agent-Based Models of Geographical Systems.* Heidelberg: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.; 511-524.

Kuyucu T., 2017: *Two Crises, Two Trajectories: The Impact of the 2001 and 2008 Economic Crises on Urban Governance in Turkey*; in: M. Arsel, F. Adaman, B. Akbulut (eds): *Neoliberal Turkey and Its Discontents: Economic Policy and the Environment under Erdoğan.* Istanbul – London: I. B. Taurus; 44-74.

Kuyucu T., Ünsal Ö., 2010: *'Urban Transformation' as State-led Property Transfer: An Analysis of Two Cases of Urban Renewal in Istanbul.* "Urban Studies Journal Limited", 47, 7, 1479-1499.

Lu M., 1999: *Determinants of residential satisfaction: ordered logit vs regression models.* "Journal of Growth and Change", 30, 264-287.

Manaf A., Wahyono H., Puspita Sari I., Aprilia D., 2018: *Housing Satisfaction and Willingness to Move to Low-cost Rental Apartments of Slum Dwellers in Semarang Ur-*

ban Area. IJCAET & ISAMPE (MATEC Web of Conferences); Bali, Indonesia, 24-26 August 2017,159, 277-283.

McAuley W. J., Nutty C. L., 1982: *Residential preferences and moving behavior: A family life-cycle analysis.* "Journal of Marriage and the Family", 36, 3, 301-309.

Mohit M. A., Raja A. M. M. A. K., 2014: *Residential satisfaction-Concept, theories and empirical studies.* "Planning Malaysia: Urban Planning and Local Governance", 3, 47-66.

Morris T., 2017: *Examining the influence of major life events as drivers of residential mobility and neighbourhood transitions.* "Demographic Research, Journal of Population", 36, 1015-1038.

Oktay D., Rüstemli A., Marans R. W., 2009: *Neighbourhood satisfaction, sense of community, and attachment: Initial findings from Famagusta quality of urban life study.* "A|Z ITU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture", 6, 1, 6-20.

Özkan E., Kozaman S., 2006: *Gated Communities: As an Efficient Force in the Fragmentation Process of Istanbul.* 42nd ISoCaRP Congress, Istanbul, Turkey, 14-18 September, 1-17.

Poortinga W., Calve T., Jones N., Lannon S., Rees T., Rodgers S. E., Johnson R., 2017: *Neighbourhood Quality and Attachment: Validation of the Revised Residential Environment Assessment Tool.* "Environment and Behavior", 49, 3, 255-282.

Potter J., Cantarro B., 2006: *How does increasing population and diversity affect resident satisfaction?* "Journal of Environment and Behaviour", 9, 7, 514-545

Pudjiwidyastuti A., Setijanti P., Ratna H., 2016: *Residential Attributes for Housing Preferences on Suburban Area.* "International Journal of Engineering Research and Technology (IJERT)", 5, 1, 477-484.

Rabe B., Taylor M., 2009: *Residential mobility, neighbourhood quality and life-course events.* ISER Working Paper Series: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 28, 1-37.

Salleh A. G., Badarulzaman N., 2012: *Quality of life of residents in urban neighbourhoods of Pulau Pinang, Malaysia.* "Journal of Construction in Developing Countries", 17, 2, 117-123.

Tan T. H., 2016: *Neighbourhood satisfaction: responses from residents of green townships in Malaysia.* "International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis", 9, 1, 137–155.

Thomas M., Stillwell J., Gould M., 2013: *Modelling Residential Mobility Behaviour Using a Commercial Data Set: An Analysis of Mover / Stayer Characteristics across the Life Course.* Leeds: University of Leeds, School of Geography.

Artykuły
Articles

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Technology, environmental sustainability
and the ethics of anthropoholism[1]

Samuel Akpan Bassey

Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar,

Etta Agbo road., 540242, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

samuelbassey15@yahoo.com

Abstract

Technology has tremendously shaped human society, economy and environment. The quest for better ways to human development has always been a key driver of technological advancement. However, such advancements have somewhat turned human beings to slaves of modern technology, its effects are therefore devastating. Several philosophers of technology have described technology as alienating: making humans lose their connection with fellow beings and nature, besides causing environmental degradation. Even though civilisation faces new unprecedented challenges regarding the negative impacts of technology on human societies, it can still be useful. This work posits that environmental challenges threatening humanity are not something that can be simply overcome by reducing or increasing technological use, but rather by humans re-thinking the attitude in which technology is applied to the environment. This study investigates the possibility of environmental sustainability through the ethics of anthropoholism. This work agrees with several environmentalists that the traditional anthropocentric attitude, which sees the environment only as a store-house for human exploitation with the use of technology is the major reason behind environmental degradation. This research reveals that humans need to adopt the ethics of *anthropoholism*, which sees the environment as having inherent value and humans as caretakers of the environment. Anthropoholism is the idea that human beings are a part of nature and that (s)he cannot exist independently of the environment, hence technological tools should be developed and applied with the *live and let live* attitude towards the environment. This study, as philosophical research, is critical in approach and uses the textual and contextual analytic method in arriving at its conclusions.

Keywords: anthropoholism, technology, sustainability, environmental ethics, live and let live.

---

[1] This paper was presented at the International Symposium for Environmental Science and Engineering Research (ISESER2020) at the Süleyman Demirel Culture Center Uncubozköy Yerleşkesi, Manisa, Turkey in 2020.

1. Introduction

New technologies usually arrive with some promises of changing human life for the better. They either improve human performances by simply working more and at a faster rate or create possibilities and options that did not previously exist. Computational machines are one such technology. They create different possibilities for interacting with the world and the environment by applying calculations to information processing and thus form a new arena for social interaction. In the process, technology has generated new ethical challenges in many areas of contemporary human life. It has affected how humans now interact with fellow beings and the environment. Beyond that, it has also rendered all the norms of a pre-computer society, including those associated with education and values, open to question (Saha 1999).

The problem posed by technology became more obvious at the outset of the industrial era (1760-1840) when humans started exploiting nature recklessly for selfish purposes. This attitude has caused environmental degradation; and an anthropocentric mindset has been blamed for the problem. Anthropocentrism literally means *human-centeredness*. Hence, "anthropocentric" orientation permitted and drove humans to pursue exploitative, destructive and wasteful applications of technology on the environment for selfish purposes. In this way, human beings have become pervasive, overwhelming and abusive to the natural environment. C. Akpan (2013) raises the question of whether it is the man or the machines that are now in control. This author further warns that the value placed on machines by man is alarming and that the machines have now turned around to devalue humanity and the environment. Hence there is an urgent need to re-evaluate man's uses of technological machines. Of course, challenges like this raises serious ethical concerns. In particular, this work discerns serious conflict between humanity and nonhuman nature. Technological advancement has and is allowing humans to extract natural resources for their benefits to the detriment of the environment, as humans often consider nature as an inexhaustible resource to be exploited basically for human use (Ozanne, Smith, 1995).

The present-day environmental crisis has forced humanity to rethink their traditional attitude towards the environment or nature at large. Humans are now deeply concerned with frequent changes in the climate and with the increasing glob-

al warming haunting the present-day world. Technologists, scientists, sociologists and economists have attempted and are still attempting to contribute their quota in overcoming this crisis. Philosophers also are framing environmental ethics through which these problems are to be looked at and solutions sought for. This has led to the emergence of the field of environmental ethics, which seeks to regulate and guide the human-nature relationship. According to contemporary environmentalists, against the traditional "anthropocentric" worldview, the human species occupies no special position on the earth, and nature in its biotic and abiotic parts has value in itself, which means nature has inherent value, irrespective of its usefulness to any other species, including the human race (Bassey 2019).

In the initial phases of the emergence of environmental ethics, articulating a non-anthropocentric ethic (i.e. an ethical worldview not centred on humans) was seen as the only way the interests of the environment could be accommodated and protected. Different views were advanced in this regard; some maintained that sentience (or the ability to feel pain or pleasure) was the appropriate criterion (Humphreys 2020), while others found it in bio-centrism, "being a subject of a life". Others still argued that "life as a whole, including the whole set of ecological relationships and conditions forming the preconditions and life support system of life in general" should be the criterion for moral considerability (eco-centrism) (Leigh-Lawrence 2017: 181). However, sentientism has been accused of being too biased to animals, completely leaving out the plant kingdom and other non-living beings in the environment. Bio-centrism promises to widen the scope of moral concern to include not only human beings but all *living entities*, including non-human animals, plants, etc. Hence, bio-centricism signifies a life-centred world-view of environmental philosophy (Basl 2019). However, there is a problem with bio-centrism which is only centred around "life", as the environment also contains non-living entities which are *abiotic*, viz. rocks, water, minerals, etc. This implies that bio-centrism is systematically biased to non-living entities in the environment as it excludes *abiotic entities* in its consideration. This is not plausible for environmental ethics, as every being in the environment deserves respect. Also, Paul Taylor, a major advocate of bio-centrism, introduced a principle of self-defence which argues "that human interests can over-ride the in-

terests of other living things where significant human goods are at stake" (O'Neill et al., 2017: 85). Some ethicists are worried about this principle and have interpreted it as privileging human beings over other non-humans in certain situations which amount to going back to the very anthropocentric connotation that biocentrism seeks to avoid.

Eco-centricism came with another dimension of non-anthropocentricism, which holds that "the biosphere as an interconnected whole has moral standing" (van de Veer, Pierce, 2003: 178). Hence, eco-centrism is said to be a holistic environmental theory, according to which not only living beings but the whole ecosystem, including the abiotic part of nature, is worthy of moral consideration. However, T. Regan (1987) cautioned that environmental holism or eco-centric ethics taken to its logical conclusion leads to *environmental fascism*. Eco-fascists put the well-being of the environment, at the forefront of their ideology, which implies that everyone has the right to use all means necessary to save the environment, including sabotage and murder (Nelson 1996). Or, as J. O'Neill et al. (2008: 105) put it, holism "appears to justify human diebacks for the sake of the *summum bonum*; the highest good of the biotic community". A similar criticism can be seen in S. Bassey's (2019) against African communal environmentalists, viz. G. Tangwa (2007), S. Ogungbemi (1997), O. Ugwuanyi (2011), O. Oruka (1992), K. Wambari (1997), etc., whom, while trying to fashion out a communal African environmental ethics (Holistic Environmental Ethics) placed *all* emphasis on the environment. Among these philosophers, following the traditional communal philosophers' (excluding K. Gyekye's *moderate communitarianism*), the importance of man in the environment was silent or overlooked. For instance, K. Wambari specifically opined that anthropocentric connotation is alien to the traditional African worldview and the African worldview is strictly communitarian (holistic), likewise G. Tangwa (2007: 392) attests that "the Western world-view can be described as predominantly anthropocentric and individualistic, and contrasted with its African counterpart, which I [Tangwa] have described as eco-bio-communitarian". These two and many other African communal environmentalists advocated for environmental holism within the African context and argued as if no

level of individualism (anthropocentricism) is inherent within the African worldview and environmental ethics.

There is no doubt that anthropocentricism in environmental ethics is the opposite of environmental holism. This is because anthropocentricism is human-centred, while eco-centricism – holistic environmental ethics – is environment-centred. However, this paper states that staying extreme to anthropocentric or eco-centricism – holistic environmental ethics – position is not ideal for environmental ethics. This is because any attempt to conserve the environment (i.e. sentientism, bio-centrism, eco-centrism, etc.) will involve the human value system as well as an obligation which is still human-centred; it can be called weak or *weakly anthropocentricism*. This implies that a minimal level of anthropocentrism should be welcome in environmental ethics, as long as the speciesism embedded in the traditional concept of anthropocentrism is not evident. However, it is important to note that an earlier version of *weak anthropocentricism* has been advocated by Bryan Norton (1984) who had accused many environmentalists of seeing the traditional conception of anthropocentricism only from an extreme version. He polarised anthropocentricism into weak and strong anthropocentricism prototypes. For *weak anthropocentricism*, B. Norton (1991) sees it as satisfying *considered preference* of human wants as contrasting to *strong anthropocentricism* which he sees as satisfying any *felt preference* of human wants. This means that *weak anthropocentricism* tends to be environmentally friendly, the reason being that it *considers* the environment before attempting to fulfil any desire held by a man. *Strong anthropocentrism* fulfils any *felt desire* held by man without consideration; hence, it leads to reckless exploitation of nature (Piso 2019). This work agrees with B. Norton that *weak anthropocentric* worldview makes possible environmental ethics that help to praise and censure certain human actions towards the environment.

It is also important to note that *weak anthropocentrism* does not imply *holistic environmental ethics* as it only considers worldviews and accord some form of respect to non-human beings in the environment. This is the reason why this work adopts the ethics of *anthropoholism* as a sustainable mechanism for environmental ethics and environmental sustainability. *Anthropoholism* seeks to bridge the gap between the two

seemingly opposed worldviews (anthropocentricism and holistic ethics). In anthropoholism, one finds a fusion of the weak anthropocentricism with holistic environmental ethics. Anthropoholism sees all beings within the environment in an interconnected web in which all beings cannot survive without one another. It accepts the importance of man in the environment but argues that human is not supreme above other beings in the environment. Anthropoholism tries to balance the extreme ethical worldviews of anthropocentricism and holistic environmental ethics. This essence of this paper is to investigate how environmental sustainability can be achieved by humans while applying technology to the environment with the ethics of anthropoholism.

2. Technology and environmental crisis

The term *technology* comes from two Greek words, transcribed as *techne* and *logos*. *Techne* implies art, craft, skill or the way, means or manner by which a thing is gained. *Logos,* on the other hand, means word, the utterance by which inward thought is expressed, or a saying. So, literally, *technology* implies discourse or words about the way things are "gained" (Jensen 2010). Lately, t*echnology* has gained more diverse meanings. In one respect, the term has come to mean something narrower. For instance, the etymological definition given above would admit politics or even art as *means of something gain*. Though these deeds are permeated by technology, most people would not see them as examples or subsets of technology. In another regard, when most people speak of technology today, it means more than just discourse about means of something "gained".

Firstly, L. Goeller (1996) sees technology as the rational process of generating *means* to order and transform energy, matter and information to achieve *certain valued ends*. Secondly, J. Cockcroft (1965) avers that technology is the set of means (devices, tools, systems, procedures and methods) created by the technological process. Technological objects range from toothbrushes to transportation systems. Thirdly, T. Layton (1974) sees technology is also the knowledge that makes the technological process feasible. It entails the procedures and facts necessary to manipulate and order energy, matter and information, as well as how to realize new means for such

transformations. Fourthly, R. Aunger (2010), sees technology as a subset of related technological knowledge and objects. For instance, medical technology and computer technology are examples of technologies. This work adopts the definition of technology to mean the scheme consisting of the technological knowledge, technological process, technological objects, developers of technological objects, users of technological objects, and the worldview (i.e. the beliefs about things and the value of things that shape how one views the world) that has emerged from and drives the technological process (Kirkpatrick 2008). This is what Jacques Ellul referred to as the *technological system* (Davis 2018).

The evolution of human society is sometimes described as a series of radical technological innovations. The progress of society is often described in terms of chains of technological breakthroughs each one replacing its antecedents. Humans often glorify the heroic inventors and their spectacular innovations. Their names and achievements are forever written in society's special "Halls of Fame" the historical writings and the Nobel Prize. The world will always celebrate the achievement of James Watt, Thomas Alva Edison, Alexander Graham Bell or Charles Babbage for their technological breakthroughs. However, through technological innovations, the tendency to leave visible scars after the earth's resources have plundered is one thing that sets aside humans from other species in the environment. The environment can be seen as the surroundings in which an animal, plant or person lives and operates. From a historic perspective, humans have always affected the environment as they rely on the earth's resources to sustain life. Take, for instance, the issue of genetic engineering and biotechnology, where xenotransplantation is seen as a lifesaving option for people with severe ailments, e.g. heart, lungs, liver, kidney, etc. diseases. J. Okeke and C. Akpan (2012) note that where there are no human donors, biotechnologists have resorted to falling on non-human animals as the "sacrificial lamb" in so far as the animal organs are seen as congenial to the human erring organs. How this type of practice by man has destroyed the balance in the eco-system is not farfetched. Thus it is not out of place to say that in the blind race for the fulfilment of materialistic desire humanity has gradually cultivated an intense, individualistic outlook and attitude against the famous dictum: *live and let others to live*. He even fails to

remember the Gandhian axiom that there is enough in the world to satisfy his needs but not his greed. Humanity's relentless march towards scientific and technological development has marred his caring attitude towards nature. During the Stone Age, several pieces of evidence exist that humans in the Stone Age wiped out various animal species in places as varied as the plains of North America and the mountains of New Zealand (Ryder 1996). Yet the environmental effects of hunting were minimally equated to the influence of agriculture, including herding as well as cultivation and, especially, industrialisation (Eyo 2019).

The twenty-first century is marked by ecological, scientific and technological development, on one hand, and this technological development has caused serious environmental problems on the other. The major reason behind this environmental crisis is the rapacious exploitation of the earth's natural resources, speedy rate of urbanisation and industrialization with the use of technology. Estimating the rapid rate of environmental degradation due to interference of man with nature, R. Dassman, in a witty response, argues that "the human race is like an ape with a hand grenade. Nobody can say when he will pull the pin of the grenade and the whole world will be destroyed" (Singh 1991: 329). R. Dassman's proposition seems true because of the rapid pace of industrialisation since the dawn of the industrial revolution has raised the material standard of living of the people at the cost of the balanced natural environment. The adverse effect of rapid industrialisation has led to severe environmental pollution which has ruined man's delicate relationship with nature. Reckless plundering of forest cover, the collapse of land for drilling of oil, excavation of land for mining, excessive withdrawal of groundwater for an industrial purpose has its fatal effects on the environment. Production of poisonous gases, industrial wastes released from human volcanoes (industrial chimneys) toxic chemicals, aerosols, polluted water, smoke and ashes are many of some undesirable harmful elements released due to industrialisation. Discharge of several other toxic gases, smoke and aerosols into the atmosphere from human volcanoes pollutes the air humans breathe bringing about severe environmental problems. Such harmful elements explained above pollute the environment imperilling human health as well as the well-being of the environment. The hydrological environment presents a waning scenario wherein the

stagnant water of the lakes and ponds is contaminated due to the release and dumping of industrial effluents and wastes resulting in the death and disease of the aquatic ecosystem. Some of the products of the chemical industry, e.g. different types of fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides applied to the soil and crops to enhance and hasten agricultural production reaches the food chain of a human and animal population indirectly bringing about their fatal disease and death.

The intensive burning of fossil fuels, forest and rapacious exploitation of forest-cover in the name of industrialisation has amplified the concentration of carbon-dioxide content of the atmosphere. As this gas traps much of the terrestrial radiation, a rise in the magnitude of carbon-dioxide levels in the atmosphere leads to global warming which in turn causes a major shift in weather patterns, with rainfall increasing in some parts, droughts in another and hurricanes becoming stronger and frequent. The rapid pace of modernisation and industrialisation has led to greater utilisation of fire extinguishers refrigerators, air conditioners and spray can dispensers emitting halos and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC). Jet planes flying through the atmosphere releases nitrogen oxide. These gases released into the atmosphere are harmful in the sense that they deplete the stratospheric ozone layer which plays a vital role in filtering and absorbing the ultra-violate rays of the sun. The creation of ozone holes in the industrial hubs increases the incidence of skin cancer chiefly among the white-skinned masses. Releases of sulphur dioxide from the industries bring about "acid rain" which is very harmful to the plant, animal and human life. Noise pollution, especially in the vicinity of industrial centres, cars and other technological products, is a serious form of environmental disturbance. It even affects the human brain, auditory mechanism and sometimes causes hypertension.

The modern man is bewildered as he has to fulfil his needs and unwanted desires by the acceleration of productions through the adoption of scientific techniques, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, he ought to be conscious about the irreparable environmental damages caused by such techniques. When natural resources are depleted at a faster rate due to innovations without any sustainable attitude and ethical worldview in place, there will be environmental disequilibrium and crisis will certainly occur. Again, when animals and plants are lost without replacements to

keep the ecosystem a life, which will also constitute an environmental crisis (Osuala, Nyok, 2020). The environmental crisis will always be a major problem facing the earth as long as man continues to recklessly exploit the earth for his own benefits, for humanity's demands on natural resources outstrip nature's capacity to regenerate on its own time cycles. The environmental crisis caused by man has become the reason for the emergence of a philosophical field called environmental ethics.

3. Environmental philosophy and the ethics of anthropoholism

The concern for nature is not completely new to humans, but it can be said that it has undergone conspicuous neglect in the circle of philosophy for a long time. Even the philosophy of science has concentrated on scientific concepts and methods rather than on integrated nature. Social and political philosophy has also given more emphasis on the social environment than on the natural environment. None of the branches of mainstream Western philosophy, e.g. metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, has historically been hospitable to the issue of environment and its values. Only with the advent of the applied philosophy movement, environmental ethics has come out as a sub-discipline of philosophy. Environmental ethics argues that morality should be extended to include human-nature relationships. Newly developed environmental ethics and philosophy is that discipline that studies the theories and principles of the relationship of human beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its non-human contents (Akpan, Leonard, 2018). It concerns not only human behaviour, but also the normative theories and principles as applied to the conservation and survival of the environment. Naturally, it thus involves human views on nature, value theories, human's position on this earth, of the non-human animals and plants and the "non-living nature" (Manzini 2019). With all these, environmental ethics and philosophy have set out its journey.

Being faced with an imminent eco-catastrophe, responsible thinkers from diverse spheres of life, both academics and activists, have come forward to tackle this problem. Contemporary philosophers, especially moral philosophers, have responded as well. They have been concerned with the moral grounds for protecting the non-human animals, the moral foundations for codes and laws protecting endangered

species and the ethical basis for preserving and restoring the environment in general. Moral philosophers, to be precise, environmental moral philosophers, have come forward to review humans' traditional views towards nature and corresponding normative codes. Many of them have found out that traditional (Western) nature-views and normative principles have neither been eco-friendly nor been morally adequate. They say it fails to rise above the anthropocentric moral framework which takes human interests to be only intrinsically, and morally valuable, while the rest of non-human nature is regarded valuable, as long as it serves a human purpose only. Contemporary environmental philosophers regard anthropocentric ethics as hailing speciesism, the position that is based on species-discrimination, which exhibits human moral blindness and shallowness of heart towards the non-human nature (Bassey, Pimaro, 2019). Needless to say, this attitude goes against any healthy environmentalism. It seems that unless and until human overcome this speciesism and accept a holistic position in which a living organism or a plant species or a landscape is regarded as having some value in itself (i.e. intrinsic/inherent value), humans would not feel a direct moral obligation to save them. Genuine ecological ethics demands that as humanity is inseparably connected with other things and beings, nature should be regarded as intrinsically or inherently valuable, irrespective of their usefulness to the human species.

In 1971, the First Conference on Environmental Philosophy was held at the University of Georgia, USA. Two years later, Richard Routley (1973) published his paper, which advocated clearly for a new ethic against the dominant Western worldview of *anthropocentricism* (Beall 2015). L. White, also concurring with R. Routley's sentiment, averred that the whole question of the environmental crisis was a crisis of the West's anthropocentric philosophical, religious orientations and values (Whitney 2013). R. Fisher (2010: 3) defines *anthropocentrism* as "the assumption that man is the centre of all things", thus, it is also known as human-centeredness. The focus of anthropocentrism is humans and their interests. Anthropocentrism can also be said to be the view that humans alone are superior beings, the only beings with a moral status, are at the centre of the universe and, lastly, all other beings in the environment exist for an instrumental purpose to man (Kolb 2018). This implies that

since anthropocentricism means human-centeredness, anthropocentric bias has helped humans' direct modern science and technology to exploit nature, for selfish purposes.

The above thinking led moral philosophers, as Ben A. Minteer noted, to shift focus to "the articulation of a new nature-centred (eco-centricism) or non-anthropocentric worldview and an alternative set of moral principles able to account directly for the good of non-humans and the natural world as a whole" (Minteer 2009: 4). This implies that nature-centred or non-anthropocentric ethicists think that the discrimination found in *anthropocentricism* is not a sound moral position, as they argue in favour of equal moral worth for all beings. Hence, non-anthropocentrism (eco-centricism) plays down human's higher role in the environment, sees all members of the environment as equal and the environment as the common good. In connection with the above, S. Rowe (1994: 106) concludes that "logic points to the eco-centric proposition that people exist solely for the sake of the world". This work certainly agrees that biotic life and the world existed long before human beings, for billions of years; and there is the likelihood that both the world and abiotic life will continue even if human species goes extinct. But if humans exist only for the Earth as the eco-centrist suggests, what then is the Earth as well as life purpose for its continuality despite the major mass extinction of species? R. Paden's (2003: 54) attempts to answer this question when he avers that, "nature is not goal-directed and, therefore [...] it can have no interests". R. Paden's (2003) argument is true because environmental *stability* is not a goal of the ecosystems but rather a result of the goal-directed behaviour of the beings within them, i.e. plants and animals. Hence, if natural systems have no goals, then they also have no interests.

This research is strongly aware that R. Panden's (2003) statement sounds very much similar to I. Kant (2019) argument, which reckons humans as the only beings with interest, but this research also admit here the major difference. While I. Kant (2019) thinks *only* humans have goals, R. Paden extends it to *all* sentient beings who possess goal-oriented behaviour, making them morally relevant to the environment. Although this research admits that eco-centrists have inspired many radical environmental groups, e.g. the Earth Liberation, and Front and Earth First, it should be

noted that eco-centrist ideology has often provided a weak foundation for policies governing human interactions with the non-human environment, most especially in the agricultural domain. This research also strongly based on the presumption that the well-being of the Earth's present and future biotic systems strongly rests on human actions, specifically, policy-based action, which is human-cantered and this becomes one of the major flaws of eco-centrism.

Judging from the foregoing, this research deduces that one fundamental problem in contemporary environmentalism comes from an ideological divide in principle – the divide between the anthropocentricists, i.e. human-centred (those who regard nature as a mere means to human ends) and the non-anthropocentricists, i.e. non-human-cantered (those who decries humans' impact on what they believe seems untouched, intrinsically valuable nature). Thus, this research suggests that when the basic tenets of both schools of thought (anthropocentricism and non-anthropocentrism) are being probed, it becomes apparent that the divide is unnecessary as both are necessary for environmental conservation. The reason for this is not far-fetched as any attempt to construct a completely non-anthropocentric value scheme is likely not only to be arbitrary but also will be projecting certain values which are selected by a human course. This human-centredness goes against any endeavour to wipe out anthropocentrism from any theory in environmental ethics. The above statement has made some philosophers attempt to humanise environmental worldview to show these basic phenomena. Some philosophers, e.g. B. Norton (1984), A. Light, E. Katz (2003) and E. C. Hargrove (1992), argue that humans do not need a new non-anthropocentric environmental ethics for environmental conservation. B. Norton (1984) specifically argues that non-anthropocentric perspectives are conceptually flawed because they advance the idea that all anthropocentric perspectives are of harm to the environment. B. Norton goes on to underscore that the commonly perceived chasm between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists is largely overstated, claiming that both philosophies embrace values that essentially depend on the long-term health of ecological systems.

In providing a way forward, B. Norton (1984) then introduced the concept of *weak anthropocentricism* into environmental literature as against the conventional an-

thropocentric stance he considered strong. Thus, he became critical of the traditional notion of the term *anthropocentricism*, arguing that anthropocentricism has often been seen from one angle but must be seen from two angles: strong anthropocentricism and weak anthropocentricism. To B. Norton (1984), *strong anthropocentricism* holds that all valuations are described by reference to *human felt preferences*, which comprises any occurring human inclinations, whether it is being "rational" or not. What this implies is that *strong anthropocentricism* is the traditional notion of anthropocentricism that is geared towards fulfilling *any* "human felt" desires, inclinations, preferences to the detriment of the environment, hence not environmentally or environment friendly. In contrast, weak anthropocentrism discards possibly irrational "felt preferences" and accepts only rationally "considered preferences" as relevant. Thus, *weak anthropocentricism* tries to put into consideration humans' felt preferences, thereby taking environmental conservation into account before attempting to fulfil them. To explain this in bare terms, *weak anthropocentricism* sees humans as the centre of moral concerns like *strong anthropocentricism* but considers environmental conservation in its deliberations and actions. For instance, the first principle of the *Rio Declaration Conference* states that: "Human beings are at the centre of concerns"; though the major motive of the conference was to draw attention to the increasing aggregate of environmental problems the world faces and to seek solutions. Here, *weak anthropocentrism* can be seen as a position which provide sufficient reasons for the protection of nature, despite holding on to an ideology of humans being at the centre of moral concerns. This paper submit that such justification for the protection of the environment is more defendable compared to non-anthropocentric theories.

Nonetheless, in this paper it is aware that (weak) anthropocentric explanations on why the interests of humans are always before the interests of non-humans are not always convincing enough. One of such reasons is that many ethicists are worried that in the case of conflict of interests, the *weak anthropocentrism* will automatically take sides with humans' interests, not with the non-humans'. Such an ideology can be rightly accused of speciesist behaviour because preference is given to the members of the human species at the expense of other species for morally arbitrary reasons. The eco-centrists would argue that if it is wrong to inflict avoidable physical suffer-

ing on humans as they are sentient beings, then it would surely be morally arbitrary to inflict avoidable suffering on other sentient beings. For this reason, giving special preference to human species against other sentient beings is condemned as speciesist. This is one of the major problems inherent in B. Norton's *weak anthropocentricism*.

Consequent upon the above criticism, in an earlier by the present author (Bassey 2019) had attempted to reconstruct the concept of *weak anthropocentricism* to mean those human-cantered approaches (human obligation, inclination and value system) that help for environmental conservation. Since human beings tend to value the things around them, they are prone to protect what they consider as valuable, and this capacity for valuation can help humans extend values to nonhuman parts of nature. Expressing a similar line of thought even more candidly, R. de George (1994: 23-24) emphasizes that "considered preferences extending morality, which is a human institution to the land, to animals, to species, is something that we humans can do. And in extending our ethics in this way, all we are extending is a human ethic. Ethics must place humans at the centre, at least in the sense that ethics is a human institution".

To further elucidate this paper point, E. Hargrove's account of anthropocentricism as meaning human-cantered, in a sense referring to a human-oriented perspective (human obligation, inclination and value system), seeing things from the human viewpoint (Hargrove 1992: 175), then should become the new conception of *weak anthropocentricism*. This argument is also supported by R. Watson (1983: 65) when he avers that: "Human interest in survival is the best ground on which to argue for an ecological balance which is good both for human beings and for the whole biological community". The above statement embodies S. Bassey concept of *weak anthropocentrism*, which this paper is believed to provide the best approach to future environmental ethics, action and policy.

Likewise, it is argued in this paper that *weak anthropocentricism* is not enough for environmental conservation because as B. Norton suggests, an adequate environmental ethic must be holistic (Norton 2003: 167). Here, the present author believes that the holistic ethics enshrined in the African communitarian worldview (Ubuntu) grand statement: 'I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am' (Bassey, Bubu,

2019). Applying this statement to ecological terms, *I* stands for the human species, and *we* signifies the collective environment, including all existence. Therefore, the phrase can be interpreted as: the human species (I) exists because the environment (we) does exist since the environment (we) does exist, the human species (I) exists. This African communitarian phrase "I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am" is in contradistinction to the Western philosophical disposition found in R. Descartes' (1641) dictum: *cogito ego sum*, which implies "I think, therefore I am". The *cogito ego sum* dictum alludes to a selfish proof of the existence of a single species of being enshrined in *strong anthropocentric* connotations of the Western school of thought.

The above reasons, among others, gave birth to *anthropoholism*, environmental ethics, which is hinged on the reformed *weak anthropocentricism* (human obligation, inclination, and value system) and the holistic environmental framework "I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am" of the African communitarian worldview. *Anthropoholism* is defined as "the ethical worldview that acknowledges man's (anthropo) value in conservation and his role in the eco-system but holds that despite his position, man is just a part of nature, such that he cannot exist independently of the environment (holism)" (Bassey 2019: 1). *Anthropoholism* reveals environmental ethics, which recognized the intrinsic worth and moral standing of all beings in nature while at the same time acknowledging the unique place of humanity as caring for nature in the universe. The four basic principles of anthropoholism are listed below:

(1) humans are members of the earth's community of life on the same terms as all the non-human members are;

(2) the earth's natural ecosystems are seen as a complex web of interconnected and interdependent elements;

(3) each organism is conceived of as a teleological centre of life, pursuing its good in its way;

(4) humans are important, not superior to any other beings in the environment.

The four basic principles show the importance of man to both environmental conservation and environmental ethics, while also alluding to the fact that humanity is in a connected *whole* with all other existence in the environment. The place of man cannot be jettisoned because morality is necessarily a human institution (does this statement not contradict what environmental ethics represents – Remember that Environmental Ethics suggests that morality is beyond the human species); hence, human beings must necessarily be at the centre of morality. Also, any environmental ethics or environmental sustainability theory just like *anthropoholism* which accepts human beings at the centre of morality must recognize the idea that non-human beings have a value of their own and hence have moral standing.

Furthermore, *anthropoholism* as an ethical view rejects any attempt to put at par human *moral worth* and that of nonhuman beings. This follows from the argument that if humanity has a responsibility to care, tend and is being regarded as the "chief priest" of nature, it then follows that some higher moral worth should be afforded. However, it should be cautioned that this higher moral worth does not imply a supreme position or make humans more important than all other beings in the environment. This can be explained with the analogy of a "complex building" (environment), where tenants (different species of being) live. Among these tenants (different species of beings) is one tenant who serves as a caretaker (humans). Though, all individuals (different species of beings) have equal rights to live in the building (environment), as they pay the same rent and live by the rules and regulations laid down by the owner of the building (presumably God). However, the tenant-caretaker (humans), with more responsibility and duty has more moral worth. Moral worth is defined by B. Herman (1981: 375) as "an action required by duty and has as its primary motive the motive of duty". Following B. Herman's (1981) definition, this paper avers that though all tenants (species) in the building (environment) are duty-bound to uphold the laid down principles of the building (environment), the caretaker (humans) has more *moral worth* because of the delegated responsibility as they are responsible for looking after individuals, assets, at the request of an owner. Following the above, *anthropoholistic* ethical view establishes that when humans operate on a higher pedestal of responsibility, i.e. wisdom, the possibility of this wisdom de-

volving into better treatment of nature is enhanced. The ethics of *anthropoholism* emphasizes that such sensibility recognizable in humanity rationality will help lead humanity into harmony with nonhuman nature, and fellow human beings, both present and future generations. It is also important to point out that ethics is not a matter of taste; it must be a self-evident truth analogous to the reasoning of mathematics or logic. This self-evident truth should cut across all worldviews and should be universal before it can be advocated as authentic environmental ethics.

N. Osuala (2019) and G. Asuquo (2020) had attempted a critique on *anthropoholism*, questioning its ontological foundations – the worldview where it is built on. It can be argued that both *weak anthropocentricism* and *holistic ethics* which are the basic tenets *anthropoholism* is evident in the ontological foundations of many environmental worldviews. For instance, through the Judeo-Christian worldview, the Holy Bible advocates that humanity acts as a steward of the environment and also averred that the earth is the Lord's and everything was created for His (God's) glory. Since, humanity is a creation of God just like all plants, animals and other beings within the environment, it is expected that humans respect nature because it is God's. A negation of this commandment implies "sin", hence, against the divine given mandate. The African communal ontology is also *anthropoholistic* because it advocates and agrees that humanity has a unique place in the environment as a caretaker or chief priest of nature and also argues that humanity is one with nature (holism) – (Bassey, Mendie, 2019). B. Norton (1984) in explaining his concept of *weak anthropocentricism* had already demonstrated that oriental religions, including Jainism and Buddhism, contain elements of both *weak anthropocentricism* and *holistic environmental ethics*. This can also be said of many other ontological foundations on which worldviews are built. If this is the case, *anthropoholism* seems to be a valid environmental worldview that cuts across many, if not all, worldviews.

The present author believes that humans adopting the ethics of *anthropoholism* will provides an ethical, logical and effective means of addressing environmental issues. It neither separates humans from nature, but allude to the moral importance of human. Anthropoholism does not morally justify human abuses of natural resources

but rather advances the notion of humans as a part of the natural world while giving assigned value to the ecological health of nonhuman natural systems.

4. Environmental sustainability and ethics of anthropoholism

It can be argued from the position of this work that morality is agent-centred and therefore humans must be morally responsible to the environment. Thus, R. Sylvan and D. Bennett (1994: 14) support the above when they aver that "the environment remains […] mere backdrop to actions of agents". Also, the holistic ethics found in African communitarianism "I am because we are since we are I am" reveals "live and let live" attitude of tolerance which helps to ensure fairness and equity in the distribution of resources by humans, including future generations.

In the specific sense of furthering anthropoholistic environmental ethics, this aspect of the communalistic principle helps to put under check human-nonhuman nature conflicts by keeping to the barest minimum undue competition by humans over natural resources. In essence, the inevitability of human use of nonhuman nature for their purpose is recognised but is also furthered under the guide of a moral system, which operates on the principles of need rather than the desire for accumulation. Besides, the communalistic or holistic principle ensures communal responsibility towards nonhuman nature. Human beings are obligated by a moral system to be accountable to their God, to nature and to the community in their interaction with nonhuman nature. The principle of stewardship embodies an attitude of caring for nonhuman nature. It is further grounded on a concern for future generations. *Our Common Future* defines environmental sustainable development as "a process in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change [will] […] all […] [be] in harmony, and enhance both the current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations" (Roberts 2010: 57).

Sustainable development is said to be the growth that meets the needs of the present without compromising the capacity of future generations to meet their needs too. Everything humans need for their survival depends on the natural environment. Environmental sustainability makes the conditions with which both humans and na-

ture can exist in productive harmony with one another while still being able to maintain social and economic requirements.

Sustainable development is commonly understood to require a balanced pursuit of three goods: ecological health, social equity and economic welfare (Njar, Enagu, 2020). It is grounded on the ethical commitment to the well-being not only of the present generation population but also the well-being and enhanced opportunities of the future generation. Sustainable development is about ethics because it calls on present people not only to consider the condition of the current impoverished population but also the potential condition of future populations who are the responsibility of production and consumption patterns today. Environmental ethics is interlinked with a sustainable environment and development as a whole. It teaches humans to be healthy and reciprocal to the global environment and development. The ethics of *anthropoholism* is in line with environmental sustainability because it involves rational acceptance of not only human's limitations as human beings but also a call on human beings to make certain sacrifices for the good of both nonhuman nature and its specie-being. In practice, this will demand radical changes in human attitudes towards nonhuman nature, moderation in consumption mannerism and generally in human lifestyles. This is premised on the overall understanding that sustainable fulfilment of human needs is inextricably connected with sustainability in ecological balance; hence nature provides the material context within which human needs are fulfilled. The principles of *anthropoholism* are evident in the definition of *environmental sustainability* as J. Palmer (1992: 182) avers that "it calls for a collective responsibility for our earth, today and for the future […] such a cooperative spirit may highlight the importance of a shared ethic of sustainability and its contribution deepening of understanding of the role of human life".

Also, humans cannot deny the fact that technology needs ethics as new emerging technologies to give humans additional power to act, which implies that humans need to make choices they did not have to make before. While, in the past, human actions were involuntarily constrained by egocentric weakness (strong anthropocentricism) and this has led the earth to a state of environmental degradation. In view of so

104

much technological power at disposal, humans have to learn how to be voluntarily constrained by their judgment: their ethics, if the environment must be sustained.

5. Conclusion

Since the 1970s, the topic of ethical obligations to future generations has been of interest to philosophers, economists, environmentalists and others. While the context for application differs for each field, the central issues are the same: whether a current generation has moral obligations to non-contemporaneous future generations, the nature of those obligations, and whether those obligations require an earlier generation to make sacrifices for a future generation. Many scholars agree that humans ought not to make the world a less pleasant place for future generation than they have inherited from their ancestors by dumping wastes into rivers, lakes and oceans, cutting down forests indiscriminately and polluting the atmosphere with noxious gases. As temporary inhabitants of this planet, human beings do have certain duties to perform for future generations such as not to pollute the atmosphere, to protect threatened plant and animal species, to preserve the beauty of the wilderness areas, and artistic treasures of earlier human civilisations. This can be done when humans embrace an ethical worldview that aids environmental sustainability. As argued in this work, ethical context can be understood from the concept of sustainability, because the sustainability of the environment means taking into account the effectiveness, moral values and goals of environmental conservation. Hence, sustainability cannot be achieved without attention to its ethical dimensions. It has been proposed in this work that humans should accommodates the *anthropoholistic* worldview: an ethical worldview that reflects how society should live and interact with nature to attain sustainable development. The ethics of *anthropoholism* sees all beings within the environment in an interconnected web in which all beings cannot survive without one another. This implies that man must acknowledge the *right to live* of other beings in the environment. It further implies that man in his quest to satisfy his wants and desires must consider the environment and its inhabitant's existence, hence, use technology in a more sustainable way to attain ecological balance.

6. References

Akpan B. S., Leonard, N., 2018: *Environmental ethics: from philosophy to movement*. "Bulletin Social-Economic and Humanitarian Research", 2, 1, 12-22.

Akpan O., 2013: *Man or the Machines – Who is in Control? A Re-valuation through Philosophical Buffers.* "Interactions in the History of Philosophy. PHILHIST'13 Conference Proceedings", 5, 6, 152-166.

Asuquo G., 2020: *Live and Let Live: Making Sense of Samuel Bassey's 'Anthropoholism' as Ethics for Environmental Management.* "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XII, 1, 34-42.

Aunger R., 2010: *Types of technology.* "Technological Forecasting and Social Change", 77, 5, 762–782.

Bankole-Medina K., 2019: *The Traditional African Worldview and Medicine*. Oxfordshire United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Publishers.

Basl J., 2019: *Challenges to Biocentrism.* New York: Oxford UP.

Bassey S. A., 2019: *'Anthropoholism' As An Authentic Tool For Environmental Management.* "International Journal of Environmental Pollution and Environmental Modelling", 2, 3, 160-168.

Bassey S. A., Bubu N. G., 2019: *Gender inequality in Africa: a re-examination of cultural values.* "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 3, 21-36.

Bassey S. A., Mendie J. G., 2019: *Alexis Kagame's Ontological Categories.* "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 1, 23-32.

Bassey S. A., Pimaro Jr. T. M., 2019: *Enyimba's Notion of Madukaku and The Question of Anthropocentricism in African Environmental Ethics.* "International Journal of Environmental Pollution and Environmental Modelling", 2, 3, 129-136.

Beall J., 2015: *Eco-Logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood, by Dominic Hyde.* "Australasian Journal of Philosophy", 93, 3, 619 -621.

Cockcroft J., 1965: *The process of technological innovation.* "Proceedings of the Institution of Electronic and Radio Engineers", 3, 3, 89–94.

Dassman F., 1972: *Towards a System for Classifying Natural Regions of the World and their Representation by National Parks and Reserves*. "Biological Conservation", 4, 4, 247-255.

Davis R. A., 2018: *Jacques Ellul*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Descartes R., 1641: *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Eyo U. E., 2019: *Between religion and agriculture: A roadmap to revamping Nigeria's economy*. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis", 2, 1, 62-70.

Fisher C. L., 2005: *Animals, humans and X-Men: Human uniqueness and the meaning of personhood*. "Theology and Science", 3, 3, 314-291; https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700500317289.

George R. de, 1994: *Modern. Science, Environmental Ethics and the Anthropocentric Predicament*. Nairobi: Acts Press.

Goeller L., 1996: *Generating understanding of technology*. "International Symposium on Technology and Society", 2, 4, 491–494.

Gottlieb R., Fisher A., 1996: *"First feed the face": Environmental justice and community food security*. "Antipode", *28,* 2, 193–203.

Guichard J., 2020: *Editorial: Ecological crisis – anthropological crisis*. "African Journal of Career Development", 2, 1, 43-48.

Hargrove E. C., 1992: *Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value*. "The Monist", 75, 2, 187-201.

Humphreys R., 2020: *Suffering, sentientism, and sustainability*. "Environmental Management" 36, 1, 49 - 62.

Ikegbu E. A., Bassey S. A., 2019: *Ahamefula: discovering leadership gaps of the African being*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 4, 75-89.

Jensen J. F., 2010: *Computer culture: The meaning of technology and the technology of meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant I., 2019: *The Metaphysics of Morals.* New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kirkpatrick G., 2008: *The Meaning of Technology*. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Kolb R. W., 2018: *Anthropocentrism*. California: SAGE Publications.

Layton T., 1974: *Technology as Knowledge*. "Technology and Culture", 15, 1, 31-39.

Leigh-Lawrence J., 2017: *Eco-Centrism*. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell publishers.

Leucht K. W., 2018: *How NASA will use robots to create rocket fuel on Mars: The year is 2038*. "IEEE Spectrum", 55, 11, 34–39.

Light A., Rolston H., 2003: *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Manzini N. Z., 2019: *African Environmental Ethics as Southern Environmental Ethics*. Berlin: Springer Publishing Company.

Minteer B. A., 2009: *Nature in Common? Environmental Ethics and the Contested Foundations of Environmental Policy*. Philadelphia: Temple UP.

Nehrenheim E., 2018: *Energy and Natural Resources the Energy System*. New York: Oxford UP.

Nelson M. P., 1996: *Holists and Fascists and Paper Tigers... Oh My*! "Ethics and the Environment", 1, 2, 103–117.

Nelson O. A., 2019: *How 'Holistic'is Anthropoholism? A Critique of Samuel Bassey's Environmental Philosophy*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 4, 23 -32.

Njar B., Enagu D. A., 2019: *Development and Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria: An African Perspective*. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis", 2, 1, 37-47.

Norton B. G., 1984: Environmental Ethics and *Weak Anthropocentrism*, "Environmental Ethics", 6, 2,131-148.

Norton B. G., 1991: *Toward Unity among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford UP.

Norton B. G., 2003: *Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism*". Malden, MA: Blackwell.

O'Neill J., Holland A., Light A., 2007: *Environmental values*. London: Routledge.

Ogungbemi S., 1997: *An African Perspective on the Environmental Crisis*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Okeke J. C., Akpan C. O., 2012: *An Inquiry into the Moral Question of Xenotransplantation*. "Online Journal of Health Ethics", 8, 1, 1-13.

Oruka O., 1992: *Ecophilosophy: An Essay on Environmental Ethics*. Nairobi: Act Press.

Osuala N., 2020: *New Twist to Political Corruption in 4th Republic Nigeria given Non-Human Animals stealing millions: A Case for the Defense of Animal Rights*. "GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis", 1, 2, 15-37.

Ozanne L. K., Smith P. M., 1995: *A profile of forest values: Biocentric vs. anthropocentric orientations*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Paden R. 2003: *Two Kinds of Preservationist Ethics.* Belmont: Wadsworth.

Palmer A. J., 1992: *Towards a Sustainable Future*. London: Routledge.

Piso Z., 2019: *A Sustainable Philosophy: The Work of Bryan Norton*. "Environmental Values", 28, 6, 766–768

Regan T., 1987: *The Case for Animal Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roberts J., 2010: *Environmental policy*. London: Routledge

Routley R., 1973: *Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic*. "Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy", 1, 1, 205-210.

Rowe J. S. 1994: *Ecocentrism: the Chord that Harmonizes Humans and Earth*. "The Trumpeter", 4, 1, 101-113.

Ryder M. L., 1996: *Fibres and fashions of a Stone Age man*. "Textiles Magazine", 25, 2, 12-14.

Saha A., 1998: *Technological innovation and Western values*. "Technology in Society", 20, 4, 499-520.

Sylvan R., Bennett D., 1994: *The Greening of Ethics*. Cambridge: White Horse Press.

Tangwa G. B., 2007: *Some African reflections on biomedical and environmental ethics*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Ugwuanyi O., 2011: *Advancing environmental ethics through the African worldview*. "Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences", 2, 4, 107-107.

Veer D. van de, Pierce C., 2003: *The environmental ethics and policy book: philosophy, ecology, economics*. California: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Wambari K., 1997: Natural Environment. New York: Garlland Publishing Inc.

Whitney E., 2013: *The lynn white thesis: Reception and legacy*. "Environmental Ethics", 35, 3, 313-331.

Artykuły
Articles

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

SARS-CoV-2 pandemic as an anomie

Marek A. Motyka

Institute of Sociological Sciences, University of Rzeszów

al. Rejtana 16c, 35-959 Rzeszów, Poland

mmotyka@ur.edu.pl

Ahmed Al-Imam

CERVO Brain Research Centre, Faculty of Medicine, University of Laval

2601 Chemin de la Canardière, Québec, QC G1J 2G3, Canada

ahmed.al-imam.1@ulaval.ca

Mustafa H. Ajlan Aljarshawi

College of Medicine, University of Baghdad

Bab Al-Muadham 10047, Al-Rusafa, Baghdad, Iraq

Mustfa54@yahoo.com

Abstract

SARS-CoV-2 is a pathogenic viral infection that was identified in Wuhan, China, in late 2019. After just a few weeks, further viral infections have also been detected in other countries. In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared a pandemic, and in April 2020, numerous infections and deaths were reported in almost all parts of the world. The dynamic development of this virus infection and the COVID-19 disease caused by it have led to restrictions and new regulations being introduced in almost all countries to halt the exponential growth of infections and protect the health and life of citizens. The most common restrictions are the closure of places of education, culture and work until further notice, breaks in tourist traffic and forced social isolation. The new restrictions make many people fear the possibility of illness and death, economic crisis, and the uncertainty of the future, but they also adopt attitudes of rebellion or rejecting the possibility of danger. Some may try to take advantage of the new circumstances to make money from trading in rare goods. The pandemic, and in particular the experiences and behaviours that accompany it, has led to the disintegration of ex-

isting rules within society while introducing new rules that are necessary to achieve new goals: survival, avoidance of infection and maintenance of social order.

The research was conducted among students from Poland and Iraq. The aim was to determine different ways of adapting to the anomie (according to Robert Merton's theory) among students. The research was conducted from the 30th of March to the 16th of April 2020. The research tool, a survey questionnaire, was distributed via the internet. A total of 502 students participated in the survey. The results showed that conformist behaviour is the most common among the respondents, while deviant ways of adaptation to new conditions were noticed only incidentally. Students from Iraq followed rules that can help to reduce the infection more than students from Poland. Medical students much more practised the principles associated with quarantine and personal hygiene than by students of other faculties. Moreover, these principles are more often observed by residents of large cities and rarely by those living in the countryside.

Keywords: social change, coronavirus, anomie, methods of adaptation, Poland, Iraq.

1. Introduction

COVID-19 is a pathogenic viral infection caused by the coronavirus of severe acute respiratory syndrome SARS-CoV-2, which was identified in the city of Wuhan, China, in late 2019 (Park 2020). On the 31st of December 2019, the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention reported numerous cases of pneumonia of unknown causes among Wuhan residents (Lu et al., 2020). Based on patient samples, a new coronavirus was identified (Paraskevis et al., 2020).

Observations in the first months of 2020 confirmed human susceptibility to the spread of this virus all over the world. The infection occurs because of close contact with an infected person who, by coughing, sneezing or simply breathing, excretes aerosols containing the virus that may infect others around the infected person (Shereen et al., 2020). Besides, the virus can spread when a healthy person touches objects infected by an infected person and then transfers the virus by touching the mouth, nose or eye. It is also possible that the virus spreads through ways not yet recognised (Bablani et al., 2020).

On the 11th of January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) called the infection Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) – (Park 2020). It has been established that SARS-CoV-2 is spreading around the world at an exponential rate, much faster than other dangerous viruses. Data as of the 25th of April indicated almost 3 mln con-

112

firmed cases of infection in almost all countries, and complications related to the disease led to the deaths of almost 200,000 people globally (Coronavirus cases, 2020). The pandemic revealed weaknesses in both the global approach to health and the preparations for unexpected but possible diseases (Gudi, Tiwari, 2020). To date, there is also no vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 (Bakar, Rosbi, 2020).

2. Pandemic as a period of sudden social changes

The dynamic spread of the virus and the increase in COVID-19 morbidity and deaths has led governments in many countries to introduce restrictions to reduce new infections from the first months of 2020. The first of such measure already introduced in Wuhan was the isolation of people with symptoms of respiratory failure (Huang et al., 2020), followed by the introduction of a city blockade by suspending all means of transport, including bus, rail and air transport (Wu et al., 2020). Then, meetings in public places were restricted, schools, some workplaces and offices were closed, people were ordered to wear face masks, and people who might have contact with an infected person were ordered to be quarantined (Tabish 2020a).

In many countries where SARS-CoV-2 infections have been identified, blockades, curfews, and compulsory social isolation have been introduced, schools have been closed and substituted with e-learning via the internet, and many jobs have been closed until further notice (Armitage, Nelluns, 2020; Tabish 2020b). In some countries, e.g. Poland, a ban on leaving home for minors without adult supervision was introduced, parks and forests were banned, cultural institutions (cinemas, theatres and others) were closed (Snoch-Pawłowska 2020). Significant sports events were also cancelled, including football, Euro 2020, Olympic Games, and tennis tournaments (Hawkins 2020; Lytvynenko 2020; McCurry, Ingle, 2020). In many countries, authorities recommended the voluntary isolation of people over the age of seventy (Armitage, Nelluns, 2020). The most important objectives common to all during a pandemic are to survive without infection, to help the infected, to support the medical services and to impede the economic recession of countries.

However, the blockades introduced by governments have disorganised the functioning of societies to date, causing a growing economic collapse and a record

rise in unemployment (Bakar, Rosbi, 2020). The pandemic was defined as the most prominent global crisis of the century (Tabish 2020b), not only in economic terms but also affecting the mental condition of entire societies. In addition to a state of a permanent health threat and fear of death, changes in behavioural patterns, and cessation of normal daily functioning that can lead to serious mental health consequences (Galea et al., 2020). The introduction of total quarantine, closure of schools and workplaces, prevention of travel, increased the fear of illness, fear of losing loved ones, and depression after the loss of friends and family members, represent essential factors contributing to the mental health condition (Fardin 2020).

3. Pandemic and social space

Social space is produced by people living and operating in real social structures (Jałowiecki 1988). It is the result of relations between the actors who produce it, and it is a sphere of co-existence of many trajectories of changes taking place, and – what is essential – it is always in the process of becoming. Social space reflects the preferences and aspirations of the social group for which it has exceptional value and is considered by that group as its own. However, the same physical space may have a completely different value for different groups (Rykiel 2008).

It should be noted here that there is a fundamental difference between geographical and social space. Geographical space is a part of the universe that man tries to know, tame, describe but does not necessarily intend to arrange or transform it. The overriding concept is the universe, which has a superhuman scale. Geographical space is an element of the universe; it has a human dimension, available in a physical, worldview and intellectual sense. The dualism of the natural world and the world of culture permeating it determines the most critical plane of relations: social space. This space is a derivative of culture, a derivative of the value system of the group that creates it. It is the result of a relationship and thus is a relational space (Rykiel, Pirveli, 2005).

Creating a space of shared culture, values and experiences is a process that requires commitment and respect for the ideas familiar to people create the space. However, events and processes that cause fear and uncertainty make it possible for each individual to experience these events in different, difficult to predict ways (Rid-

dell 2020). The pandemic has affected the mental condition of people under quarantine or mandatory homestay. Fear of isolation, racism, discrimination and marginalisation with all its social and economic consequences are fundamental phenomena observed with the identification of a new outbreak coronavirus (Dubey et al., 2020).

During the development of the pandemic, significant changes could be observed which the relational nature of constructing common spaces suffered. The relational space of citizens was reduced to houses, flats and roads to work. Permanent public places, where both work and leisure time have been spent so far, where values constructing a given community were produced and nurtured, were closed (Zaremba 2020); cultural, entertainment, catering and commercial activities were limited (*Ograniczenia...,* 2020).

In social discourse, the notions of distance (in this context keeping a distance of about 2 m from other users of public places), isolation and quarantine have grown in importance, which began to define the limits of interpersonal contacts, the necessary resignation from a bunch of cultural events (concerts, sporting competitions, joint stays in cinemas, theatres and others, but also playgrounds, kindergartens, schools, and universities). There were also calls for voluntary isolation from other participants in social life as part of infection prevention, as well as the introduction of mandatory institutional isolation for people suspected or diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 infection. The preventive measures were introduced include moving work to home, closing schools and switching to online education, cancelling or postponing the dates of conferences and other large meetings (Maragakis 2020). The coronavirus pandemic has become a test of cooperation between social groups and entire nations in the face of a common challenge (Bachelet, Grandi, 2020).

However, already during the first weeks of the pandemic's development, social production of *social ghettos*, i.e. environments that are socially conditioned and exclude individuals living in a given space, could be observed (Pirveli, Rykiel, 2007). These were observed both in the form of institutional activities: full lockdown of cities, districts, creating specialist hospitals for Covid-19 patients, as well as non-institutional activities resulting from irrational anger towards the infected, ostracism

towards foreigners (Matys 2020) and also towards people working with Covid-19 patients, or only those suspected of being infected (Dubey et al., 2020).

Fear and uncertainty over the developing pandemic caused people of Asian origin to be treated as "scapegoats" to whom anger and hostility were directed (Bachelet, Grandi, 2020). In Poland, since the middle of May, the Silesian voivodeship has become a place covered by the stigma of the plague in the consciousness of many people, and the pandemic itself triggered a wave of internet hate on miners and more broadly Upper Silesians (Turecki 2020). Similar behaviours could be observed in many places around the world (Dedgaonkar 2020; Ryall 2020; Sharma 2020). The scale of social exclusion increased with the increase in the number of infections (He et al., 2020), especially towards ethnic minorities and people from marginalised environments (Kantamneni 2020).

Positive behaviours have also been observed, which are conducive to a collective experience of a "hard time". For many people, the realisation of goals, personal needs and social contacts has been transferred to the virtual world, which has become not new, but a particularly important place of "becoming" a new social world. An essential role in nurturing values should be attributed to the creation of opportunities for remote learning, remote working, contacts via the internet, but also to the creativity of people who have been obliged or forced to isolate and, at the same time, creating balcony spaces of joy, hope, community, support and exchange of experienced emotions; concerts and balcony events (Bliss 2020; Sós 2020; Traverso 2020; Werf 2020). However, these behaviours were rare, and every manifestation of the community was widely commented on in the media, which suggests, on the one hand, the rarity of such behaviours and, on the other hand, confirms the readiness to tame a new, stressful situation and create new important spaces, especially in such unforeseen circumstances.

4. Pandemic as an anomie

Culture and society are inextricably linked categories. Just as the culture would not be able to be created without the participation of the human factor, the functioning of man among other people without the patterns that culture produces would be full of chaos, emptiness and uncertainty.

Anthony Giddens points out that culture, as one of the most widely used concepts in sociology, includes all types of human activity and refers to the lifestyle of both individuals and groups within which they function. Culture defines important community ideas contained in recognised values and norms, provides a model of interaction with the world, sets rules of behaviour according to these values, introduces order and gives a sense of security in mutual relations (Giddens 2001). Other authors presented a broad analogous approach to culture. According to Edward B. Taylor (1871), culture is a complex whole consisting of knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, law, customs and other skills and habits acquired by people as members of society. According to Jonathan Turner (1994), culture provides patterns of behaviour, indicates the right types of interaction between people and directly influences the creation of structures in contemporary societies (Turner 1994). Culture contains everything an individual should know in order to participate in social life in a way that is acceptable to members of a given community (Goodenough 1964).

In other words, the culture of a given community consists of a set of cultural norms (goals) and sanctioned possibilities of achieving them. Objectives are ordered in the hierarchy of values adopted in this community, and they are the basic principles of group life. The second element of the cultural structure determines and regulates how to achieve these goals. In each social group, their achievement is determined by rules rooted in customs or institutional regulations (Merton 1938).

According to Ruth Benedict (1971), however, an essential element of human nature is the fact that the whole of the created culture consists of endless combinations of its components. Taking into account the fluidity and dynamics of society, it can be assumed that the relationship between behaviour and the products of culture is also being transformed; patterns of behaviour are continually being modelled, some views and attitudes are being accepted, and others are being criticised and rejected until new products are transformed again (Benedict 1971). Thus, in the event of a sudden change caused by various factors (including wars, natural disasters, economic diversification and political system changes), cultural goals or ways of achieving them, or both, maybe transformed (Merton 1938). For example, as in the case of a pandemic, the cultural objectives remained somewhat similar to those before the

pandemic, but new ones have also emerged (e.g. stopping a pandemic threatening the whole of humanity, avoiding infections or survival). Some individuals or groups with the ability to adapt to new circumstances have no difficulty in doing so (e.g. have good access to medical facilities, have a permanent job, are young and resistant to infections, have commercial facilities). However, for people so situated in society that they do not have full access to the possibility of achieving these goals, criticism of previously unaccepted attitudes may change, which may result in the search for other ways to achieve the updated goals. As a consequence, this may lead to the breaking down or dramatic weakening of social bonds that are the source of morality (Merton 1938).

According to Raphael de Oliveira Reis (2020), the social consequences resulting from the spread of COVID-19 are an exemplification of the anomy, a progressive social disintegration and the intensification of numerous problems, including the economic crisis, unemployment, inflation, taking up behaviours resulting from atavistic life protection instincts. The collapse of the global economy may result in the sense of helplessness, permanent sadness, lack of perspectives which may encourage suicidal behaviour, breaking law, including the use of weapons, seeking relief in drugs, especially by individuals who have lost a stable source of income due to unemployment or a deepening recession (Auerback 2020).

The etymology of the term *anomy* is derived from the Greek language; it denotes a state of "lawlessness" and serves to describe the situation in a given society where, as a result of the fall of generally accepted norms and principles, the sense of instability, uncertainty and alienation increases (Garfield 1987). In sociology, this term was first used by Émile Durkheim (1893) in his work *De la division du travail social*. This author defined society as a set of ideas, feelings, beliefs and values that define patterns of social interaction. He argued that order and stability in society are maintained through social integration and balance, in the maintenance of which the developed and respected patterns of behaviour in each nation play a key role. He also noted that the intensive changes occurring in a developing society are influencing the emergence of new problems. As a result of the development of modernity, the traditional points of reference and norms set by religion have collapsed, which

means that many members of modern societies are doomed in their everyday lives to a sense of nonsense (Durkheim 1893). Considering society as a whole, which is affected by all processes occurring within, É. Durkheim noted that the inability to satisfy the needs arising in social systems (e.g. the need for stability, predictability and sense of security) might contribute to the emergence of anomie states (Durkheim 2003).

Robert K. Merton continued É. Durkheim's analysis. The anomy in R. Merton's view (1938) relates to a state in which, because of the changes taking place, members of a given community have been deprived of the possibility of achieving culturally imposed goals through socially accepted means. Deviant behaviour, according to this theory, is a "normal" reaction to anomalous states for people undertaking such behaviour (Merton 1938).

Two terms are essential in explaining the origin of the anomy: *social structure*, i.e. an organised conglomerate of social dependencies, and a *cultural structure* that consists of goals, values and norms common to the members of a given society, as well as the commonly respected means of achieving them (Merton 1938). The culturally imposed *rules of the game* within a society's transformations can lead to an increase in strong motivation tension among its members, especially when "there is a strong discrepancy between cultural norms and objectives and the socially structured capacities of its members according to these norms" (Merton 2002: 225-226). According to R. Merton, the tension associated with experiencing an anomy must be reduced; the methods of adaptation to the transformations taking place may be correct or incorrect (leading to deviation). In his considerations, he indicated five available adaptive solutions, each of which leads to achieving the goal (tension reduction) in different ways, depending on the acceptance or rejection of both cultural goals and available institutionalised means necessary to achieve them.

The symbols in Table 1 indicate acceptance (+), rejection (-), abandonment of existing values (+/–), and replacement with new ones (+/–).

Table 1. Modalities of individual adaptation to anomie

Adaptation methods	Culture goals	Institutionalised means
conformity	+	+
innovation	+	–
ritualism	–	+
retreatism	–	–
rebellion	+/–	+/–

Source: Merton 1938: 676

Summing up the theory of social anomie, É. Durkheim wrote that its source is chronic normative deregulation, while R. Merton visualised it as the outcome of the gap between the norms and goals of the community and the means available (or not) to achieve them (Bernburg 2002). In the conducted and presented studies, theoretical assumptions, according to R. Merton, were used.

5. Participants and methods

5.1. Aim

The present study aims to determine the ways of adaptation of the respond-ents to the circumstances related to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The theoretical framework of the research was Robert K. Merton's theory of anomie. Referring to the assumptions of this theory, current cultural goals were presented, and the institu-tional means to achieve them were indicated, as well as indicators of five ways of adapting to changing conditions were established. The cultural objectives presented in Table 2 have been defined based on observations of the changes occurring due to the development of the pandemic; the increasing number of infections, the incidence of Covid-19, the lockdown many cities, mandatory quarantine and the need to help both the sick and those who help them in their treatment. Institutional methods of achieving the indicated objectives established both based on the introduced re-strictions and the opportunities offered (e.g. online education and online work).

Table 2. Cultural goals and individual adaptation to anomie
during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic

Cultural goals	Institutional means to achieve them
Stopping the pandemic, reducing the development of infections, helping the sick, supporting medical services, protecting self and others, stopping the economic recession, maintaining the social order.	Government regulations, restrictions on the purchase of goods, closing of malls, closure of cultural facilities, limiting the number of customers in shops, restriction of gatherings, the possibility to participate in religious rituals through the media, restrictions on public transport, quarantine, online education, remote working.
Indicators of ways to adapt to the anomie	
Conformity	Acceptance of regulations, enhanced hygiene, avoidance of gatherings, acceptance of quarantine, volunteering to help the sick and senior citizens.
Innovation	Willingness to pay for the virus tests even though they are not available to others, e.g. medical services, buying large quantities of food and hygiene products.
Ritualism	Participation in liturgical rites, visiting parents.
Retreatism	Indifference to the objectives and the means available to achieve them.
Rebellion	Disregard of objectives and findings, breach of the quarantine status, orientation towards financial benefits, attending public places without the necessary protection (masks, gloves), failure to apply the rules.

Source: Own list

Indicators of adaptation methods (according to R. Merton theory) were determined arbitrarily based on observations and review of publications. Details are presented in Table 2.

5.2. Questionnaire

Based on the adopted indicators of conformism, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion, a questionnaire form was constructed, which was used to know the ways of adapting the respondents to the pandemic. The prepared form consisted of 31 questions (26 single-choice questions, two questions with the possibility of indicating several answers and three metric questions (gender, the field of study and place of residence).

5.3. Sampling procedure

A purposeful sample selection was used, which was conditioned by the availability of respondents, and a survey was conducted among students from Iraq and Poland. The decision to make a deliberate and therefore not random selection was made due to difficulties in direct contact with the respondents resulting from the introduced quarantine and the lack of possibility to apply random selection (not every student has access to the internet, so units which could not participate in the sample could be drawn). The participants were mainly students of medicine (the University of Baghdad and other medical universities from Iraq), sociology, and social work (the University of Rzeszów in Poland) and students of several universities from Cracow in Poland. Using this selection, the aim was to identify relationships in attitudes resulting from cultural differences (Iraqis and Poles), as well as identifying differences associated with the field of study of the respondents. Students were sent information about the implementation of the research via e-mail with a request to consider participation in the project. In the next message, a link to the questionnaire was sent, which was available for electronic completion. A total of 502 students participated in the research, including 237 from Iraq and 265 from Poland. The survey was distributed from 30th of March to 16th of April 2020, via the Google Forms internet platform, and the students were informed about the voluntary participation in the project while being anonymous.

5.4. Research questions

The following research questions were formulated:

(1) Do the respondents use institutional ways of adapting to the pandemic?

(2) Do the respondents undertake deviant methods of adapting to a pandemic (innovation, ritualism, retreatism, rebellion)?

(3) Are there statistically significant differences in compliance with the new rules related to the reduction of infection risks between students from Poland and Iraq?

(4) Are there statistically significant differences between the field of study and observing the basic rules for reducing infections?

(5) What is the relationship between the gender of the respondents and observing the basic rules for reducing infections?

(6) What is the relationship between the place of residence and observing the basic rules for reducing infections?

5.5. Statistical analysis

The data were coded and analysed using IBM SPSS Statistic 20. The statistical significance of the relationship between variables was determined using the chi-squared test (χ^2 test) while implementing Cramér's V coefficient as the measure of the strength of association. The values of $p \leq 0.05$ were assumed to be statistically significant.

6. Results

6.1. General data

A total of 502 people participated in the research, 53% of whom were students from Poland, and 47% from Iraq. Females prevailed, accounting for three-quarters of the research sample (75%). Taking into account the field from which the respondents were recruited, almost half (47%) were students of medicine, 33% of social work, 10% of sociology and 10% represented other faculties (mainly philosophy, economics, law and psychology). One-third of the respondents (33%) were residents of cities sized over one million inhabitants, the second group in terms of numbers were respond-

ents living in rural areas (28%), followed by residents of cities between 50,000 and 500,000 people (18%), residents of small towns – up to 5,000 people (12%), and living in cities between 0.5 and 1 mln people (9%).

Most respondents (52%) followed the development of SARS-CoV-2 infections from the first information about the outbreak in China. Similar percentages were interested in this topic since the virus appeared in Europe (20%) or since the first infections in their country (21%). Others were those who drew attention to the epidemic when the virus appeared in their region (3%). Some students indicated that they were not interested in the topic (over 4%).

In the test sample, only two individuals (0.4%) reported that a member of their family was infected with the coronavirus, and the same number reported that a member of their family died of COVID-19. Seven percent admitted that they know people infected with SARS-CoV-2 in person.

Seven percent of respondents admitted that they were terrified of getting sick, 71% also confirmed their fears of the infection, but indicated that they were actively doing their best to prevent it from happening. One-fifth of respondents did not have such fears (these data are discussed in detail in further analysis).

The respondents most often found out about the current epidemiological situation by following the media (73%) or social media (61%). Obtaining information from friends was indicated by a quarter of the total respondents' sample (25%), and 15% using other sources of information. During quarantine, respondents most often browse social networking sites (62%), learn (58%), browse the internet (56%), spend time with their families (55%), watch TV (54%), clean (52%), cook (51%), read books (50%), play video games (26%), practice sports (15%) and do other activities, most often work-related (10%). The answers to the two issues do not add up to 100% because the respondents could indicate several answers.

Almost everyone (99%) agrees that it is crucial to comply with the introduced rules and regulations, but 28% of respondents believe that the government's actions to prevent the development of infections are inappropriate. Nineteen percent of respondents decided to help people in need of help (the elderly and the sick) as part of volunteering. Eighteen percent believe that the pandemic cannot be stopped.

6.2. Conformist behaviours: adapting to the new rules

According to the adopted assumptions (Table 2), the conformist behaviours are mainly the adaptation to the new rules introduced (observing physical distance of 1.5-2.0 m from others, quarantine or avoiding gatherings), and increased hygiene (wearing protective masks, disposable gloves, using disinfectants, washing and disinfecting purchases). Tables 3 and 4 show the answers to the questions on how to comply with these principles.

Table 3. Respecting with restrictions on contact with other persons

Restrictions	Answers			
Avoidance of deliberate meetings	Strictly	Meeting with friends		Disregarded
	88%	9%		3%
Compliance with the quarantine	Strictly	Shopping and helping others	Sports activities	Disregarded
	44%	48%	6%	2%
Avoidance of public places	Yes			No
	98%			2%
Leaving the house without a cause	Yes			No
	13%			87%
Recognition of the new rules	Yes			No
	72%			28%

Source: Own research

As can be seen in Table 3, the vast majority of respondents avoided meetings, and only a small fraction of them did not give up meetings with friends. Almost half of the respondents strictly observed quarantine, and the vast majority of respondents avoid public places. In their answers to the question about the current form of transport, they used to travel away from home, 2% indicated that they travelled by public transport, 42% indicated they used their cars, and 56% indicated they did not leave home.

In table 4, answers to questions are presented about preventive behaviour which can protect against pandemic development.

Table 4. Preventive measures to prevent infections

Forms of prevention	Answers			
Hygiene compliance	More than before the pandemic	As before the pandemic	If circumstances allow	Disregarded
	65%	26%	9%	1%
Use of protective masks	Always	When leaving home	Sometimes (shops, public transport)	Disregarded
	1%	25%	25%	49%
Use of protective gloves	Always	When leaving home	Sometimes (shops, public transport)	Disregarded
	3%	30%	37%	30%
Use of hand disinfectants	Always	After touching things outside	I do not use because I do not have	Disregarded
	29%	58%	10%	3%
Disinfection of purchases	Always	Sometimes		Disregarded
	46%	35%		19%

Source: Own research

As can be seen, most respondents follow basic hygiene rules more than before the pandemic. Similar percentages use masks and protective gloves; the vast majority are disinfecting their hands and shopping. With each question, one can also see answers confirming that these rules are not followed, suggesting that they are being disregarded. The data concerning the fact that a half of the respondents gave up wearing protective masks, the validity of which has been confirmed (Cheng et al., 2020; Phan, Ching, 2020) are particularly worrying. Conformist attitudes were also confirmed by more than half of the respondents (52%), who gave up participating in religious rituals in places of worship and fulfil their religious needs through the media.

When asked about maintaining direct contacts with their parents, the vast majority of the respondents (82%) confirmed that these contacts are maintained because they live with their parents, and 4% reported that they gave up direct meetings altogether, doing shopping for their parents without personal contacts with them. More-

over, 87% of the respondents confirmed that, in the last few weeks, they had not left home without special justification for doing so.

6.3. Other methods of adaptation to the pandemic

Tables 3 and 4 (in the right-hand columns) show the answers indicating non-compliance with the rules: 3% admitted that they do not avoid larger gatherings, 2% do not respect quarantine and move freely in public places, 13% leave the house without special justification, and 28% consider the restrictions to be unnecessary. In questions concerning preventive hygiene, only 1% of respondents indicated that they do not follow basic rules, and only 3% do not use hand disinfectants. However, almost a half admitted of the respondents not wearing protective masks, almost a third admitted not using protective gloves, and one in five did not wash or disinfect the purchases they brought home.

Twenty-two respondents (4.4%) admitted they are not at all interested in information about the pandemic and therefore do not follow the media describing the development of infections, while 23 people (4.6%) do not believe they can get COVID-19. Seventeen percent of the respondents also stated they are not afraid of the infection and the disease.

Forty percent of respondents admitted they have made stocks of food products and systematically replenished them, and 30% that they have stocks of hygienic and cleaning products, also systematically replenished. The others either did not see the need to make such stocks or used the goods they bought based on the *herd instinct*, after the first information about the pandemic in their region.

When asked about their views on the overpriced internet trading in safeguards, a vast majority (71%) agreed that the traders should be punished, 21% said they did not care, and 8% said it was an exciting way to make money.

When asked for their opinion on the idea of deliberately not restricting contacts so that society itself can acquire resistance to SARS-CoV-2 (i.e. the survival of the fittest) and leading to the status of a "herd immunity", 82% thought it should not be introduced, 7% said they did not care, and 11% said it was an excellent idea.

A quarter of the respondents (25%) were willing to pay much money for the possibility of testing for SARS-CoV-2.

When examining the behaviour adopted as indicators of ritualism, it was found that despite the attention paid to the risks to the elderly, 12% of respondents admitted they continue to visit their parents. Nearly one in eleven (9%) did not resign either from participating in religious rituals in places of worship, although this could be done virtually via the media.

6.4. Differences in respecting the new rules between students from Poland and Iraq

During the analysis of the results, it was found that Iraqi students are much more compliant with the rules of the current quarantine than students from Poland. Similar indications concern compliance with the rules of preventive hygiene. Detailed data and statistics concerning these statements are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Differences in respect of rules by countries

Rules	Poland	Iraq	p-value; Cramer's V
	%		
Quarantine	19	71	≤0.05; 0.531
Avoidance of being in groups	34	62	≤0.05; 0.289
Wearing of protective mask	6	46	≤0.05; 0.532
Wearing of protective gloves	20	42	≤0.05; 0.305
Hand disinfection	23	42	≤0.05; 0.204
Disinfecting purchases	29	64	≤0.05; 0.365

Source: Own research

6.5. Differences in respecting the rules between students of different fields of study

When checking the correlations between the respondents' field of study and compliance with the rules, statistically significant differences were also found. Medical students were much more likely to follow the introduced rules than respondents from other faculties. The differences and statistics concerning these statements are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Differences in respecting the rules in fields of study

Rules	Medicine	Sociology	Social work	Other	p-value; Cramer's V
	%				
Quarantine	73	22	15	29	≤0.05; 0.316
Avoidance of being in groups	63	27	29	54	≤0.05; 0.232
Wearing of protective mask	45	8	3	21	≤0.05; 0.308
Wearing of protective gloves	41	18	20	23	≤0.05; 0.178
Hand disinfection	35	16	23	33	≤0.05; 0.127
Disinfecting purchases	63	29	28	36	≤0.05; 0.282

Source: Own research

6.6. Differences in respecting the rules and gender of respondents

No statistically significant differences were found when checking the relationship between the gender of respondents and in correspondence with respecting the rules. Similar percentages of both women and men confirmed the rules were observed. Therefore, gender was not recognised as a variable differentiating the respect of the rules introduced.

6.7. Differences in respecting the rules and place of residence of the respondents

When checking the relationship between the respondents' place of residence and compliance with the new rules, statistically significant differences were found. Students living in large cities were much more follow the recommended quarantine than respondents living in smaller towns. Inhabitants of large cities also much more often than those of smaller towns and villages avoid being in larger groups of people and much often wear protective masks when leaving home. Similar indications apply

to wear protective gloves, as well as to disinfect hands, and wash and disinfect purchases brought home. Detailed results and statistics of these statements are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Differences in respect of rules and the place of residence

Rules	Village	City <50,000 inhabitants	City 50,000 to 500,000	City 0.5 to 1 mln	City >1 mln	p-value; Cramer's V
			%			
Quarantine	20	24	42	56	70	≤0.05; 0.256
Avoidance of being in groups	33	34	42	62	63	≤0.05; 0.186
Wearing of protective mask	4	3	26	35	48	≤0.05; 0.297
Wearing of protective gloves	17	24	32	26	45	≤0.05; 0.171
Hand disinfection	19	25	27	40	37	≤0.05; 0.121
Disinfecting purchases	32	25	45	51	64	≤0.05; 0.217

Source: Own research

7. Discussion

It should be noted that research in both Poland and Iraq was carried out at the beginning of the development of SARS-CoV-2 infections. On the 30th of March, the virus infected 2055 individuals and killed 31 (Medonet 2020). Epidemiological data from Iraq on the same day confirmed the detection of infections in 630 people, and the balance of deaths as of the 30th of March was 46 (Worldometer 2020). The situation, therefore, concerned the first weeks of the pandemic.

On the 24th of February 2020, the Iraqi Ministry of Health reported the first official case of SARS-CoV-2 in Iraq, although some data indicate that the first case of the virus in Iraq had been detected two days earlier (Al-Kuraishy, Al-Gareeb, 2020). As early as the 27th of February, schools, universities, and cinemas were closed in Baghdad, and public gatherings, including those of a religious nature, were banned throughout the country. In the following days, depending on the region of the country, further restrictions were announced, including the introduction of a curfew throughout the country until the 11th of April 2020 (Bhatia 2020). The restrictions

were also concerning the alternative methods of the burial of people who died as a result of COVID-19 (Karim 2020).

In Poland, the first case of infection was reported on the 4th of March. From the 14th to 20th of March, an epidemic emergency was in force in Poland: border controls and a mandatory 14-day quarantine for returnees were introduced, international air and rail connections were suspended, the operation of shopping malls was restricted, and catering facilities were closed (Świdrak 2020). On the 20th of March, the state of an epidemic was declared, under which the existing restrictions were maintained, and new ones were introduced (Kudelska 2020). The new regulations required the observance of quarantine, avoidance of gatherings, and maintaining a safe physical distance from others when having to leave home. Penalties were introduced for non-compliance with the new regulations, and even prison sentences of up to eight years for bringing about an epidemiological threat (Gmiterek-Zabłocka 2020).

Based on the results of the research, both Polish and Iraqi students were not too difficult to comply with the new rules and the required hygiene measures. The indications of deviant attitudes (other than conformist attitudes) occurred rarely, and the respondents usually strictly followed the introduced regulations. However, these attitudes could change with the prolonged duration of the restrictions. However, in order to verify this assumption, further research is necessary.

In China, the first study of social attitudes towards the COVID-19 epidemic was conducted in early 2020. In the sample covered by the study (N=6910), it was found that the introduced restrictions on movement throughout China, as well as the closure of cities and districts in the Hubei province, increased optimism and the level of confidence of the Chinese in the fight against the COVID-19. Most of them have abided to the strict prevention and control measures introduced by the authorities. However, it was found that some of the respondents acted at their discretion: 3.6% of the respondents were in crowded places, and 2.0% of those leaving their house did not use protective masks. These behaviours occurred mainly in men, people with a superficial knowledge of COVID-19 and students. Students who were more likely to stay in crowded areas and not to use masks when leaving home were associated with higher infection rates (Zhong et al., 2020). These results are, therefore, similar to

those in the current study and can be considered as potential behaviours that can occur in any community.

However, it is much more dangerous if behaviours that threaten social order begin to occur, and behaviours which can also encourage an increase in infections. The theory of anomie is illustrated by the experiences, behaviours and actions observed in many countries with increasing numbers of infections. Rajmund Klonowski conveyed the ideal message in its simplicity: "Times of crisis are connected with anomie – the phenomenon of the disappearance of social norms and institutions, caused by general confusion and change of prevailing relations. Antisocial behaviour always becomes more visible on this occasion. Nevertheless, one type of behaviour is that of the outcasts of society, who throw themselves with knives in quarantine, and the other is that of individuals who are so overwhelmed by prosperity in their heads that they think they are above society, so they do not have to follow its norms" (Klonowski 2020).

Examples of such behaviour can be observed in many parts of the world. Taking advantage of the chaos caused by the pandemic, the thieves robbed a gallery in Stockholm, stealing sculptures by Salvador Dali. At the beginning of March 2020, the robbers broke into the Singer Laren art gallery in the Netherlands and stole Vincent van Gogh's painting and, in mid-March, three other paintings were stolen from Oxford College (Dumas 2020). In some regions of the United States, the number of robberies, car thefts, and other minor crimes increased (Sheets 2020). An increase in domestic violence was also observed in many regions of the world (Young et al., 2020).

According to a survey by Retail Economics, one in ten consumers in the United Kingdom is stockholding (Wilson 2020). Moreover, according to Adobe Analytics, online shopping increased by 817% in February 2020 compared to the previous month (Murphy, Tyko, 2020). To stop the over-purchase of food and cleaning products, some retailers have introduced new rules, for instance, in the UK, a decision about the limited purchase of goods was introduced in the Tesco store chain (possibility to buy no more than five specific goods, including antibacterial gels, cloths and sprays, dry pasta, UHT milk and some preserved vegetables (Wilson 2020). Similar decisions were made in early March 2020 by US store chains, where they introduced

limits for the purchase of disinfectants, protective, hygienic and other products, the supply of which increased spectacularly (Murphy, Tyko, 2020).

The psychological consequences associated with the development of the pandemic have been described in only a few studies carried out, especially among the first infected populations. A study conducted among 1210 Chinese people from 194 cities at the beginning of the pandemic found that many of the surveyed reported moderate or intense anxiety (54%), depressive symptoms (16%) and stress (8%) (Wang et al., 2020). Observers also point to increasing fear toward people in contact with patients, especially medical services, as well as family members of infected people, about the risk of new coronavirus infection (Wyrwał 2020). Behaviour discriminating against such people, e.g. from the owners of the apartments they rent, as well as some employers forcing family members of sick people to stop working, has been described as *coronaphobia* (Haktaniyan 2020; Kumar 2020). In some European countries, and also in Australia and the United States, coronaphobia is combined with an increase in racist behaviour towards foreigners, especially those with the "Asian appearance" (Abbany 2020; Asmundson, Taylor, 2020; Manning 2020).

It is also dangerous for the social well-being to declare to the public that there is no threat, and to ignore the possibility of infection. The Brazilian President, a representative of the far-right party, believes that the pandemic crisis is a media trick (Phillips 2020). The behaviour of Alexander Lukashenka, President of Belarus, who publicly ridiculed the world's fears of a rise in COVID-19 by calling it "a mass psychosis", was also surprising. Before the hockey match in which he took an active part, he confessed to the reporter: "There are no viruses here. Did you see any flying around? I do not see them either" (Karmanau 2020). He also said: "It's better to die standing than to live on your knees" (ibidem). All of these attitudes and a lack of action represent confusing and irrational irresponsibility towards the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

8. Conclusion

Every sudden social change, in which both the aims of human activity and the ways of achieving them change, is perceived by society with different dynamics. Sometimes, the goals that are promoted socially exceed the ability of each member of

the community to achieve them and thus encourage all possible methods of achieving them, not necessarily per the generally accepted principles (Wrzesień 2019). A pandemic is a difficult time for society, and the difficulties in adapting to sudden changes in priorities vary in intensity. Common sense prevails, most people adapt to new circumstances and comply with new rules. However, some behaviours are an expression of rebellion and defiance, e.g. failure to comply with generally accepted rules (e.g. unwarranted leaving home).

Some behaviours may be an example of innovation in achieving new goals because they are achieved following their own rules (e.g. attempts to get rich by selling scarce goods). In Spain, where a ban on leaving home for no reason has been introduced, dog owners rent their pets to people who want to walk. Similar behaviours were observed in Poland (Chełmiński 2020). Some behaviours (visiting parents, participating in religious rituals in places of worship) confirm that it is difficult to get rid of existing habits. Since the introduction of restrictions, examples of such behaviour can be seen in many countries.

There are also examples of other behaviours that are positive and in line with generally accepted principles, and which are helpful to confirm social solidarity. Italians have been organised singing from their balconies across the country, to boost morale among citizens (Kearney 2020). Artists of the music scene offered their fans free online concerts (Gardner 2020). Many TV programmes, films and theatre performances have been made available online free (Keveney, Truitt, 2020). In many places in the world, there are also initiatives to help those in need of support during a pandemic. There are many attitudes of empathy and solidarity (Gallagher, 2020; Goldsmith et al., 2020; Kolirin, Khaliq, 2020).

The survey among Iraqi and Polish students show that compliance with the new rules is not a problem for most. Many of them are also involved in helping others. It should be noted, however, that the research among students was conducted during the first wave of the great fear of getting ill. As already mentioned, these are commonly observed behaviours. However, when such a state lasts too long, impatience, boredom and habituation to the state appear, which, in turn, may contribute

to another change in the methods of adaptation to new, admittedly dangerous, but already tame circumstances.

Authors of internet publications often express their longing for places considered before the pandemic as a friendly and safe social space where the individuals who created it combined trust and strong ties. There is also noticeable anxiety caused by uncertainty and anxiety about the loss of mental comfort and the space of normal functioning created, often for years. Therefore, projects are undertaken in which proposals are made, e.g. for a new arrangement of the space of shared living during work, which also pay attention to mental safety that fosters good social interaction (*Together Again...*, 2020).

The prognosis of the relationship between individuals and groups that have constructed the environment in which they meet suggests that the road to "normality" will be long and not smooth. One can count on the new rules, which were in force during the first wave of the pandemic, to become a permanent habit for a part of society. For the second part, however, the need to take part in sporting events, music festivals, collective worship, joint leisure, in general – staying together and sharing the same emotions – may be much more durable than the need to be cautious, and thus encourage the emergence of new outbreaks of infection, which may influence of negative on the space created – along with norms, prohibitions and restrictions that will have to be introduced again for the sake of safety (*Far from the...*, 2020). The social world created in the course of interaction faces significant challenges in which safety and avoidance of infections have got a priority.

9. References

Abbany Z., 2020: *Corona-phobia: Like SARS, coronavirus fear feeds racism*, 04.02.2020; https://www.dw.com/en/corona-phobia-like-sars-coronavirus-fear-feeds-racism/a-52252908 11.04.2020.

Al-Kuraishy H. M., Al-Gareeb A. I., 2020: *From SARS-CoV to nCoV-2019: Ruction and Argument.* "Archives of Clinical Infectious Diseases", 5, e102624; http://archcid.com/articles/102624.html.

Armitage R., Nelluns L. B., 2020: *COVID-19 and the consequences of isolating the elderly*. "The Lancet Public Health"; https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30061-X.

Asmundson G. J. G., Taylor S., 2020: *Coronaphobia: Fear and the 2019-nCoV outbreak*. "Journal of Anxiety Disorders", 70, 102196; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2020.102196.

Auerback M., 2020: *What Will the Post-COVID-19 Global Economy Look Like?*; 21.03.2020; https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/03/20/what-will-the-post-covid-19-global-economy-look-like/.

Bablani P., Sharma M., Shamsi Y., Kapoor P., 2020: *Emergence of the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) as a Pandemic.* "International Journal of Science and Research", 9, 4, 203-209.

Bachelet M., Grandi F., 2020: *The coronavirus outbreak is a test of our systems, values and humanity*; 12.03.2020; https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2020/3/5e69eea54/coronavirus-outbreak-test-systems-values-humanity.html.

Bakar N. A., Rosbi S., 2020: *Effect of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) to tourism industry*. "International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Science", 7, 4, 189-193.

Benedict R., 1971: *Patterns of Culture.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bernburg J. B., 2002: *Anomie, Social Change and Crime. A Theoretical Examination of Institutional-Anomie Theory*. "The British Journal of Criminology", 42, 4, 729-742.

Bhatia N., 2020: *Closures extended to curb Covid-19 in region*; 29.03.2020; https://www.meed.com/closures-extended-to-curb-covid-19-in-mena.

Bliss J., 2020: *Former Nashville Symphony musicians quarantined in Italy create community with balcony concerts*; 11.04.2020; https://eu.tennessean.com/story/news/local/2020/04/12/coronavirus-concerts-italy-nashville-symphony-musicians/2930404001/.

Cheng V. C., Wong S. C., Chuang V. W., So S. Y., Chen J. H., Sridhar S., To K. K., Chan J. F., Hung I. F., Ho P. L., Yuen K. Y., 2020: *The role of community-wide*

wearing of face mask for control of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic due to SARS-CoV-2. "The Journal of Infection", 81, 1, 107-114; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinf.2020.04.024.

Chełmiński J., 2020: *Koronawirus. Na spacer tylko z psem, i to krótki*; 22.03.2020; https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,25810971,koronawirus-na-spacer-tylko-z-psem-i-to-krotki.html?disableRedirects=true.

Coronavirus cases; 04.05.2020; https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus /coronavirus-cases/.

Dedgaonkar S., 2020: *People being ostracised for COVID-19 can now file FIR*; 16.03.2020; https://punemirror.indiatimes.com/pune/civic/people-being-ostracised-for-covid-19-can-now-file-fir/articleshow/74642864.cms.

Dubey S., Biswas P., Ghosh R., Chatterjee S., Dubey M. J. Chatterjee S., Lahiri D., Lavie C. J., 2020: *Psychosocial impact of COVID-19.* "Diabetes & Metabolic Syndrome", 14, 5, 779-788; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dsx.2020.05.035.

Dumas D., 2020: *Thieves Stole a Vincent van Gogh Painting Worth Millions Last Week. This Is What Happens Next*; 10.04.2020; https://www.esquire.com/ entertainment/a32098106/vincent-van-gogh-stolen-painting-art-heist-robbers/.

Durkheim É., 1893: *De la division du travail social.* Paris: Félix Alcan; https://archive.org/details/deladivisiondutr00durkuoft.

Durkheim É., 2003: *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Fardin M. A., 2020: *COVID-19 and Anxiety: A Review of Psychological Impacts of Infectious Disease Outbreaks.* "Archives of Clinical Infectious Diseases", 15, e102779; http://archcid.com/articles/102779.html.

Far from the madding crowd: social space after COVID-19; 20.04.2020; https://www.atb.com/company/insights/the-owl/large-events-and-covid/.

Gallagher S., 2020: *Coronavirus: how to help the elderly and other vulnerable people during the outbreak*; 15.04.2020; https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/coronavirus-update-help-elderly-people-support-food-banks-uk-a9408871.html.

Galea S., Merchant R. M., Lurie N., 2020: *The Mental Health Consequences of COVID-19 and Physical Distancing: The Need for Prevention and Early Intervention.* "JAMA Internal Medicine"; https://jamanetwork.com/journals/ jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2764404.

Gardner A., 2020: *Coronavirus: Every Artist Offering Free Online Concerts While You're Stuck at Home*; 15.04.2020; https://www.glamour.com/story/coronavirus-all-the-artists-offering-free-online-concerts-while-youre-stuck-at-home.

Garfield E., 1987: *The Anomie-Deviant Behavior Connection: The Theories of Durkheim, Merton, and Srole.* "Current Comments", 10, 38, 272-281.

Giddens A., 2001: *Sociology. 4th edition*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gmiterek-Zabłocka A., 2020: *Kary za złamanie kwarantanny już się sypią. „Trzeba zapłacić nawet wtedy, gdy ktoś się od niej odwoła"*; 02.04.2020; https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103085,25838503,kary-za-zlamanie-kwarantanny-juz-sie-sypia-trzeba-zaplacic.html.

Goldsmith A., Hosken O., Cantrell L., 2020: *How to Help Others During the Coronavirus Outbreak*; 09.04.2020; https://www.townandcountrymag.com/leisure/arts-and-culture/a31480409/coronavirus-how-to-help/.

Goodenough W. H., 1964: *Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics*; in: D. Hymes (ed.): *Language in Culture and Society.* New York: Harper and Row; 36-39.

Gudi S. K., Tiwari K. K., 2020: *Preparedness and lessons learned from the novel coronavirus disease*. "International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine", 11, 108-112.

Haktaniyan E., 2020: *'Coronaphobia' spreads quickly among people: Scientist*; 02.04.2020; https://www.aa.com.tr/en/health/coronaphobia-spreads-quickly-among-people-scientist/1789883.

Hawkins B., 2020: *Coronavirus: Champions League and Europa League 'to be SUSPENDED by UEFA after round-of-16 matches' due to COVID-19*; 23.04.2020; https://talksport.com/football/680575/coronavirus-champions-league-europa-league-suspended-uefa-covid-19/.

He J., He L., Zhou W., Nie X., He M., 2020: *Discrimination and Social Exclusion in the Outbreak of COVID-19.* "International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health", 17, 8, 2933; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17082933.

Huang C., Wang Y., Li X., Ren L., Zhao J., Hu Y., Zhang L., Fan G., Xu J., Gu X., Cheng Z., Yu T., Xia J., Wei Y., Wu W., Xie X., Yin W., Li H., Liu M., Xiao Y., Gao H., Guo L., Xie J., Wang G., Jiang R., Gao Z., Jin Q., Wang J., Cao B., 2020: *Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China.* „The Lancet", 395, 10223, 497-506.

Jałowiecki B., 1988: *Społeczne wytwarzanie przestrzeni.* Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

Kantamneni N., 2020: *The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on marginalised populations in the United States: A research agenda.* "Journal of Vocational Behavior", 119, 103439; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2020.103439.

Karim A., 2020: *In Iraq, no resting place for coronavirus dead*; 10.04.2020; https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/30/in-iraq-no-resting-place-for-coronavirus-dead.html.

Karmanau Y., 2020: *What virus? Belarus rejects strict measures against pandemic*; 02.04.2020; https://apnews.com/3f20af7942fee1bdcbd775824ebb3251.

Kearney Ch., 2020: *Italians sing patriotic songs from their balconies during coronavirus lockdown*; 14.03.2020; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/14/italians-sing-patriotic-songs-from-their-balconies-during-coronavirus-lockdown.

Keveney B., Truitt B., 2020: *'Disney on Broadway' joins other shows, comic books and audiobooks to enjoy in quarantine*; 17.04.2020; https://eu.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/tv/2020/03/18/coronavirus-free-tv-movies-stream-you-quarantine-home/5074254002/.

Klonowski R., 2020: *Społeczeństwo czasów zarazy.* "Kurier Wileński", 14, 40; https://kurierwilenski.lt/2020/04/11/spoleczenstwo-czasow-zarazy/.

Kolirin L., Khaliq A., 2020: *The people helping strangers during the coronavirus pandemic*; 26.03.2020; https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/26/europe/kindness-coronavirus-strangers-helping-gbr-scli/index.html.

Kudelska A., 2020: *Koronawirus – sprawdź co wprowadzenie stanu epidemii oznacza dla przedsiębiorców*; 23.03.2020; https://www.parp.gov.pl/component/content/article/59130:koronawirus-sprawdz-co-wprowadzenie-stanu-epidemii-oznacza-dla-przedsiebiorcow.

Kumar A., 2020: *Coronaphobia: Covid-19 warriors live in torment*; 28.03.2020; https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/coronaphobia-covid-19-warriors-live-in-torment-1660577-2020-03-28.

Lu H., Stratton C. W., Tang Y. W., 2020: *Outbreak of pneumonia of unknown etiology in Wuhan, China: The mystery and the miracle.* "Journal of Medical Virology", 92, 401-402.

Lytvynenko B., 2020: *Three Major Tennis Tournaments Cancelled Due to COVID-19*; 23.04.2020; https://thelinknewspaper.ca/article/three-major-tennis-tournaments-cancelled-due-to-covid-19.

Manning P., 2020: *Corona-phobia. All in this together, or in danger of turning on each other?*; 03.04.2020; https://www.themonthly.com.au/today/paddy-manning/2020/03/2020/1585889237/corona-phobia.

Maragakis L. L., 2020: *Coronavirus, Social and Physical Distancing and Self-Quarantine*; 25.06.2020; https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-social-distancing-and-self-quarantine.

Matys A., 2020: *Kwarantanna za ścianą. Ludzie się boją, że koronawirus może być u sąsiada*; 26.03.2020; https://poranny.pl/kwarantanna-za-sciana-ludzie-sie-boja-ze-koronawirus-moze-byc-u-sasiada/ar/c1-14882521.

McCurry J., Ingle S., 2020: *Tokyo Olympics postponed to 2021 due to coronavirus pandemic*; 24.03.2020; https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2020/mar/24/tokyo-olympics-to-be-postponed-to-2021-due-to-coronavirus-pandemic.

Medonet, 2020: *Zasięg koronawirusa COVID-19*; 04.05.2020; https://www.medonet.pl/koronawirus/to-musisz-wiedziec,zasieg-koronawirusa-covid-19--mapa-,artykul,54726942.html#sytuacja-w-poprzednich-dniach.

Mekala L., Kumar K. S., Mekala R., 2020: *Is nCov19 (SARS Cov2/ COVD19) A 3rd world war? A review the pros and cons in relation with immunity and LPG (Liberaliza-*

tion, privatisation and globalisation). "Journal of Entomology and Zoology Studies", 8, 2, 1552-1556.

Merton R. K., 1938: *Social structure and anomie.* „American Sociological Review", 3, 5, 672-682.

Merton R. K., 2002: *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna.* Warszawa: PWN.

Murphy C., Tyko K., 2020: *Coronavirus rationing: Target, Walmart limit purchases of hand sanitiser, disinfecting wipes, toilet paper*; 11.03.2020; https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/11/coronavirus-preparation-walmart-target-ration-limiting-hand-sanitizer-disinfecting-wipes/5020751002/.

Ograniczenia działalności gastronomicznej, rozrywkowej oraz funkcjonowania galerii handlowych; 13.03.2020; https://www.gov.pl/web/koronawirus/ograniczenia-dzialalnosci-gastronomicznej-rozrywkowej-oraz-funkcjonowania-galerii-handlowych.

Oliveira Reis R. de, 2020: *Modelo de redação sobre coronavirus*; 13.04.2020; https://www.estrategiaconcursos.com.br/blog/modelo-de-redacao-sobre-coronavirus/.

Park S. E., 2020: *Epidemiology, virology, and clinical features of severe acute respiratory syndrome -coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2; Coronavirus Disease-19).* "Clinical and Experimental Pediatrics", 63, 4, 119-124.

Paraskevis D., Kostaki E. G., Magiorkinis G., Panayiotakopoulos G., Sourvinos G., Tsiodras S., 2020: *Full-genome evolutionary analysis of the novel corona virus (2019-nCoV) rejects the hypothesis of emergence as a result of a recent recombination event.* "Infection, Genetics and Evolution", 79, 104212.

Phan T. L., Ching, C. T., 2020: *A Reusable Mask for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).* "Archives of Medical Research", 51, 5, 455-457; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arcmed.2020.04.001.

Phillips T., 2020: *Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro says coronavirus crisis is a media trick*; 23.03.2020; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/23/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-says-coronavirus-crisis-is-a-media-trick.

Pirveli M., Rykiel Z., 2007: *Enklawy i eksklawy społeczne późnej nowoczesności*; in: L. Gołdyka, I. Machaj (eds): *Enklawy życia społecznego*. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego; 95-112.

Riddel P., 2020: *Why coronavirus lockdown rules will not be obeyed by everyone*; 25.03.2020; https://theconversation.com/why-coronavirus-lockdown-rules-will-not-be-obeyed-by-everyone-134600.

Ryall J., 2020: *Coronavirus in Japan: Arson, ostracism, online attacks against medics, victims*; 14.05.2020; https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-in-japan-arson-ostracism-online-attacks-against-medics-victims/a-53434373.

Rykiel Z., *Koncepcje przestrzeni i teorie regionu a wzorce uprawiania socjologii*; in: Z. Rykiel (ed.): *Nowa przestrzeń społeczna w badaniach socjologicznych.* Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego; 13-38.

Rykiel Z., Pirveli M., 2005: *Przestrzeń a środowisko w geografii; ujęcie krytyczne*; in: W. Maik, K. Rembowska, A. Suliborski (eds): *Geografia jako nauka o przestrzeni, środowisku i krajobrazie*. Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe; 130-148.

Sharma N., 2020: *Stigma: the other enemy India's overworked doctors face in the battle against Covid-19*; 25.03.2020; https://qz.com/india/1824866/indian-doctors-fighting-coronavirus-now-face-social-stigma/.

Sheets M., 2020: *Burglaries and car thefts DOUBLE in Queens community hit hardest by coronavirus – while major crime rate across NYC plummets 33% during lockdown*, 10.04.2020; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8206783/Burglaries-car-thefts-DOUBLE-Queens-community-hit-hardest-coronavirus.html.

Shereen M. A., Khan S., Kazmi A., Bashir N., Siddique R., 2020: *COVID-19 infection: Origin, transmission, and characteristics of human coronaviruses*. "Journal of Advanced Research", 24, 91-98.

Snoch-Pawłowska A., 2020: *New restrictions in Poland due to COVID-19*; 11.04.2020; https://www.umcs.pl/en/noticeboard,17743,new-restrictions-in-poland-due-to-covid-19,89688.chtm.

Sós P., 2020: *Impreza w dobie koronawirusa. Kolejna dyskoteka balkonowa w Zielonej Górze (ZDJĘCIA)*; 25.04.2020; https://www.newslubuski.pl/spoleczne/item/8447-

impreza-w-dobie-koronawirusa-kolejna-dyskoteka-balkonowa-w-zielonej-gorze.html.

Świdrak K., 2020: *Stan zagrożenia epidemicznego – co to takiego?*; 13.03.2020; https://www.medonet.pl/koronawirus/koronawirus-w-polsce,stan-zagrozenia-epidemicznego---co-to-takiego-,artykul,26683367.html.

Tabish S. A., 2020a: *COVID-19 Pandemic: Calm before Storm.* "International Journal of Science and Research", 9, 4, 175-179.

Tabish S. A., 2020b: *COVID 19: the worst health calamity of the world.* "International Journal of Scientific Research", 9, 4, 1-4.

Taylor E. B., 1871: *Primitive Culture. Vol. 1.* London: John Murray.

Together Again: The Future of Shared Spaces in the Office; 01.07.2020; https://www.steelcase.com/research/articles/topics/post-covid-workplace/better-together-future-shared-spaces-office/.

Traverso V., 2020: *Why do balconies inspire us?*; 10.04.2020; http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20200409-the-history-of-balconies.

Turecki K., 2020: *A co będzie, jeśli lampka zgaśnie?*; 13.05.2020; https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/koronawirus-slask-kopalnie-i-gornicy-pod-ostrzalem/xf6msxz.

Turner J. H., 1994: *Sociology: concepts and uses.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wang C., Pan R., Wan X., Tan Y., Xu L., Ho C. S., Ho R. C., 2020: *Immediate Psychological Responses and Associated Factors during the Initial Stage of the 2019 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Epidemic among the General Population in China.* "International Journal of Environmental Research and Health Public", 17, 5, 1729.

Werf E. van der, 2020: *Watch: Quarantined Italians are singing their hearts out. It's beautiful*; 13.03.2020; https://www.vox.com/culture/2020/3/13/21179293/coronavirus-italy-covid19-music-balconies-sing.

Wilson B., 2020: *Coronavirus: Tesco limits sales of essential items*; 08.03.2020; https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51790375.

Worldometer – Iraq Coronavirus; 04.05.2020; https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/iraq/.

Wrzesień W., 2019: O *(de)kompozycjach współczesności.* „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny", 81, 3, 251-265.

Wu J., Gamber M., Sun W., 2020: *Does Wuhan Need to be in Lockdown during the Chinese Lunar New Year?* "International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health", 17, 3, 1002.

Wyrwał M., 2020: *Rozwija się koronahejt na medyków [OPINIA]*; 30.03.2020; https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/koronawirus-w-polsce-hejt-w-wobec-lekarzy-pielegniarek-i-ratownikow/des0mdw.

Young A., Fevrier C., Cheval S., 2020: *Domestic violence on the rise: Global surge since coronavirus lockdown*; 10.04.2020; https://www.france24.com/en/20200410-51percent-domestic-violence-on-the-rise-global-surge-since-coronavirus-lockdown.

Zaremba M., 2020: *Kina, teatry i muzea w Polsce zamknięte z powodu koronawirusa. Rząd podjął decyzję*; 11.03.2020; https://zdrowie.wprost.pl/koronawirus/10305822/kina-teatry-i-muzea-w-polsce-zamkniete-z-powodu-koronawirusa-rzad-podjal-decyzje.html.

Zhong B. L., Luo W., Li H. M., Zhang Q. Q., Liu X. G., Li W. T., Li Y., 2020: *Knowledge, attitudes, and practices towards COVID-19 among Chinese residents during the rapid rise period of the COVID-19 outbreak: a quick online cross-sectional survey.* "International Journal of Biological Sciences", 16, 10, 1745-1752.

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

The culture of slavery in traditional context and globalised society

Emmanuel Orok Duke
Department of Religious and Cultural Studies
University of Calabar
Calabar
Cross River State, Nigeria
e_duke2001@yahoo.com

Stella E. Osim
Department of Religious and Cultural Studies
University of Calabar
Calabar
Cross River State, Nigeria
stellaeosim@gmail.com

Abstract

The culture of slavery is a product of functional dynamics in human society that seeks to sustain unbalanced power relations among interacting persons for political, economic, social or intellectual benefits. This reality is part and parcel of human history and every epoch has to deal with slavery based on its cultural anthropological resources. This paper proposes the argument that in human history the dynamics of the culture of slavery is similar; but the difference consists in the material of domination at the behest of every age or civilisation. Consequently, this work seeks to deconstruct the culture of slavery in traditional African societies and the emerging global society so that their dynamics of slave culture may stand out. Robert Merton's theory of structural functionalism, and Orlando Patterson's theory on slavery and race theories are used as the theoretical frameworks for understanding the culture of slavery. With this, the x-ray of the dysfunctions of the culture of slavery is germane so that the various means of freedom or controlling it in the twenty-first century could be arrived at.

Keywords: slavery, cultural dynamics, globalised society, material of domination, traditional society.

1. Introduction

Slavery is an unjust institution and handiwork of humanly complex relationships. O. Patterson (1982) argues that at all times; these cultural dynamics force the weaker class to suffer injustice because of the inordinate desire of the powerful in society to seek socio-economic leverage over others. Driven by avarice and the desire to dominate the other person for certain unjustifiable reasons, human beings invented a social system of control in its history known as slavery. According to E. Reynolds (1993), this reality is an impulse of avarice and desire for dominion that has shaped the dynamics of slavery in every historical epoch. This instinct to control the other for personal or corporate interest has created a hierarchical and complex system of relationship among human beings that has metamorphosed into slave institution and slave society thereby giving birth to slaveholding population. Thus, E. Dal Lago and C. Kastari (2018) describe slavery as a historical process in all epochs whereby opportunistic individuals or systems intentionally control human resources for personal ends without paying close attention to the ethos of fairness, equity and justice.

The question of slavery is a perennial one and it seems this has come to stay with varied structural adaptation according to the self-perception of human beings. This is so because slavery in every age takes commodification of existence as its linchpin that constantly shifts the margins of that which could be generally accepted as social ethos. It is not an understatement to aver that slavery is the social burden of every epoch. Consequently, every age has to deal with its own burden of slavery with the human, moral and social capital it has. In the view of J. Miller (2012), this historisation of slavery explains how human actions are the defining factors in the dynamics of domination and exploitation in every generation. Despite the fact the 21st century has a globally sophisticated legal framework to tackle this retrogressive structure, the complexification of slavery makes the slaving strategies a difficult reality to deal with. And this necessitates an interdisciplinary investigation on this subject matter and a globally enforced ethical behaviour so that humanity may be truly free from it to an extent. Furthermore, J. Quirk (2011) demonstrates that these efforts have changed the reality of slavery from a marginal concern to a mainstream issue in contemporary world with primary focus on new forms of human bondage like child sex

trafficking, sex trafficking, trafficking of persons, forced labour, forced marriage, child labour, domestic servitude, debt bondage unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. In all these instances, there is domination of the other by the powerful class and the dispossession of what belongs to the weak and vulnerable persons in society.

In this research, the culture of slavery that shapes the economics of civilisation with weaker human persons being the ones who bear the brunt of this infamous commerce is worthy of expatiation. In view of assessing the culture of slavery in traditional context and globalised setting, it is pertinent to investigate the cultural dynamics of slavery so that one can delineate the historical string that connects this infamy in every age. In addition, the theoretical frameworks on slavery enables a better understanding of this concept and its operational strategies. With this purview, more light is thrown on the tapestry of slavery in traditional societies. Given that it is taken for granted that slavery remains a perennial culture in society, its new forms in the contemporary global world should be x-rayed. Since slavery is a social problem, it cannot be completely eradicated but controlled; hence the measures for doing this forms part of this work. Finally, the conclusion for this research remains that: the culture of slavery is sustained by unbalanced relational dynamics among classes of persons with unequal opportunities both in the traditional societies and global contexts. This reality ridicules the gains of the twenty-first-century civilisation together with its human rights claims; it therefore calls for concrete efforts towards assuaging the effects of the "slave culture" on society. The term *slave culture* as used in this work is different from what M. Childs (2001) referred to, viz. the culture of African slaves in America. Slave culture is used here as all forms of behaviours, attitudes and living strategies that promote domination, oppression, inequality and dehumanisation of persons. On a related note, E. Dal Lago and C. Katsari (2008) make distinction between society with slave and slave society. C. de Vos (2001) indicates that in the former, slaves are tangential aids in the organisation of society while in the latter; slavery is the nexus of its socio-economic life, which creates distinction between slaveholders and those who were non-slaveholders.

2. Cultural dynamics of slavery

Cultural dynamics of slavery connotes the various shifts that human beings have to make in their transactional lives because of changes in their socio-economic needs. Culture lives on through human beings, *ipso facto*, it changes because of factors that are controllable and uncontrollable. Slaving culture is part and parcel of earthly society and its dynamics adapts to perceived economic needs of human beings in various historical epochs. No matter how conservative a society might seem, social interactions can engender cultural dynamics that affects the life of the people and their perception of reality. The interactions of indigenous African societies with the Europeans and trajectories of trans-Atlantic slave trade changed the way Africans perceived the slave society. F. Kolapo and C. Koriech (2007) suggest that this changed African perception of slavery from domestication to commercialisation of human resources because the Europeans convinced African slave-masters that they could get more from selling their slaves to them.

The dynamics of slavery is also dependent upon cultural ecology which evinces the relationship between human beings and their environment and how these factors influence transactional culture of slavery. The neo-liberal culture and its economies reflect modern slave-master *cum* transactional dynamics. Thus, M. Lapka et al. (2012) aver that neo-liberal slaving culture does not really care about those in the chains of production and the environment that makes profit possible; it is the contemporary concretisation of how the master-slave mentality creates a dysfunctional society through the prioritisation of profit over human values and well-being. Since slavery is fundamentally a culture of domination and control, slaving at all times, notwithstanding the changes in cultural ecology remains an unjust system that human beings always struggle to be liberated from.

In slaving culture, the master-slave relationship is sustained through created asymmetric power relation and dependency that exist between them. The asymmetric power relations and dependency in question are not nature-given; they are products of humanity's sense of superiority towards its own kind. B. Behnam et al. (2017) indicate that these cultural dynamics make an individual or group of persons to arrogate to himself or themselves inherited social stature, economic advantage, epis-

temic and technological advancement in view of sustaining a stratified society. The asymmetric dynamics that characterises slaving culture remains the common denominator of slave systems at all times. The contents and the forms of their concrete expressions are dependent upon economic factors, ecological circumstances and the needs of the masters who control the affairs of society. This asymmetric power relation is equally evident in traditional societies. S. Langlois (2001) describes traditional society as a community firmly guided by customs and habits that were handed on in the past for organisation of society. In traditional societies where in attachment to customs and past cultural heritage are taken seriously, asymmetric power relation equally abounds: the perception and treatment of women, the poor and less privileged. The dynamics of these cultural patterns have metamorphosed into contemporary capitalist hegemony in socio-economic affairs globally, promotion of patriarchal systems and sustenance of patronage that remain enslaving in their fundamentals.

The contribution of Immanuel Wallerstein through his works on the analysis of world-systems fit into the hermeneutic principles of slaving culture. The world-systems are like a melange of social prisons that are products of slaving culture that is not slavery in strict sense of the word. Consequently, analysing world-systems could help one to navigate through them and enables the extrication of one's self from their shackles. I. Wallerstein (2004: 21-23) explains as follows:

> *For world-systems analysis, these actors, just like the long list of structures that one can enumerate, are the products of a process. They are not primordial atomic elements, but part of a systemic mix out of which they emerged and upon which they act. They act freely, but their freedom is constrained by their biographies and the social prisons of which they are a part. Analysing their prisons liberates them to the maximum degree that they can be liberated. To the extent that we each analyse our social prisons, we liberate ourselves from their constraints to the extent that we can be liberated.*

In explaining I. Wallerstein analysis of world-systems, W. Robinson (2011) sees contemporary capitalist world-economy as networks of production and marketisation processes that bring all people in the globe into its logic and single line socio-economic structure. This globalising structure leaves those who belong to the lower socio-economic strata in a kind social prison. These persons await their liberation

from the neo-capitalist enslaving culture through the analysis of their socio-economic contexts and strategic innovative thinking that are crucial to a future with less slaving constraints. That being said, it is pertinent to turn to some theoretical frameworks on slavery.

3. Theoretical frameworks

Theoretical frameworks are heuristic instruments that aid the understanding and interpretation of social realities. They give perspectival approaches to reality thereby improving epistemological assessment of social concepts. Structural functionalism, slave theory and race theory are used in this work for a better understanding of slavery. Structural functionalism seeks to interpret society from the binoculars of interactions that go on among its constituent elements namely: institutions, norms, customs and traditions. This theory posits that when any of its constituents is dysfunctional, the effective organisation of society will be affected. And it is equally the case that not all the components of society work towards organic unity of its system. Because of this, some institutions and structures in society may have effective functions while others are dysfunctional in the long run. Furthermore, J. Holmwood (2005) avers that Robert Merton made the dynamics of power and conflict the key issues in functional theories. Following this line of thought, slavery is a dysfunctional institution that affects an integral progress of society. It endures because of unbalance dynamics of domination exerted by opportunistic individuals for their selfish interests. Consequently, for it to be properly managed, human beings must establish legal rules of engagements that minimise slave culture and dysfunctional feudalism. As response to this slaving culture, R. Merton (1938) encourages every society to see itself as an organic reality, *ipso facto*, the need to deal with social genesis of deviant behaviours that threatens the stability of its social structures is always paramount if social tensions are to be controlled. For this reason, J. Henslin (2005) indicates that R. Merton's logic of structural functionalism aids a holistic understanding of the changes in human societies so that their negative unintended effects could be controlled by adjustment those social structures that dehumanise and enslaves members of the community. With a holistic interpretation of one's context, the frame work of

R. Merton (1968) shows that there in every creative and thinking human person specific tendencies as desire for liberation and protest against all forms of oppression. This innate desire sustains the struggle of human beings, in every age, to extricate themselves from dehumanising shackles.

Furthermore, slavery can be explained using parasitism framework of Orlando Patterson. In this regard, O. Patterson (1982) argues that slavery remains human parasitism sustained by relational and asymmetric domination. Therefore, understanding slavery from the framework of human parasitism enables society to critique the asymmetry of unequal relations – whereby the host is always destroyed – that characterises this institution at all times. O. Patterson's framework shows that the slaving culture always benefits those who control power relations to their advantage and in doing this the host is always impoverished. This partial dependence of the parasite on the host reveals the complex web of dependency in the theorisation of slavery. The individual or group of persons with domination advantage depends on the subjugated ones for survival because without their resources, the latter cannot exist. Similarly, those subjugated by slaving structures owes their survival on the slave institution to an extent because of the patronage system that is tangential to it. Within this framework and in the long run, freedom can be negotiated or earned through effective struggles since the "parasite" is conscious of its dependence on the host.

L. Parker and C. Roberts (2005) state that the critical theory of race and ethnicity explores the connection between unequal opportunities and conflicts in society both at traditional and global level. These unequal opportunities could be historically inherited or arrogated by certain individuals or group of persons in society. Fortunately, conflicts arise when successive generations of "disadvantaged" persons are no longer satisfied with established *status quo* that is always for the advantage of particular race or ethnic group. But those who profit from race and ethnicity-based inequalities struggle to maintain the *status quo* because of the material and non-physical benefits they derive from it. Unfortunately, stabilisation of this slaving *Sitz im Leben* contributes to unfair socio-economic structures that strengthen the socio-political dominance of individuals or group of persons over others in society that are based on race or ethnicity.

Consequently, for T. Allen (1994), racism and ethnicism are forms of slaving mentality that grow from the psycho-social dominance that human beings create within a particular culture for the purpose of gaining the upper hand in the struggle for power and relevance. Critical race theory and ethnicity have one thing common: the unjust stratification of society and the attendant conflict these hierarchical dynamics create. Liberation from the slaving structures of racism or ethnicism primarily consist in the revision of narratives and establishing the fact that every human person is born equal as well as the enforcement of this truth with functional legal framework that engineers it. For instance, manumission was consequent upon change of narrative that makes the master to see his/her slave differently and thus grants him or her freedom. Similarly, the freedom narrative that is established on the fundamental equality of all human beings in various nation-states can go a long to liberating people from slaving mentality regardless of its ramifications.

4. Slavery in traditional context

In traditional society, constituent indigenous communities have limited number of persons. In this society, everyone knows his or her neighbour. For this reason, E. Adeyi (2005: 68) describes traditional societies as "those societies or elements of societies that are small scale, derived from indigenous and often ancient cultural practices. The production in these societies is mainly for subsistence, with strong co-operation among the simple division of labour (age, sex) and units of production are family, clan, and village, with consumption purpose is to satisfy basic need or ritual". Given that these societies are populated by small number of persons, the economic system of traditional societies are not complex and highly commercialised. With its sizable population, relationships within traditional societies are more personal and the legal system is informally maintained through the elders of the various family heads that make up the community in traditional societies.

Preindustrial societies were largely traditional in the context as explained above because their economy was subsistent. Thus, for T. Wiedemann (1981), in ancient traditional context, domestication of human resources through slavery was legally permissible. This explains why slavery was acceptable in the New Testament

era and the Letter of Paul to Philemon, one of Judeo-Christian sacred text, should not be read anachronistically. From what has been discussed so far, traditional context as used in this work refers to societies that hold unto past customs and heritage with regard to culture and the culture of slavery in particular. Since the judicial system in the traditional societies was not institutionalised, freedom of slaves was left in the hands of the masters' manumission or their rebellious escape.

In ancient traditional societies, slaves were kept or acquired for various reasons. S. Akpan and N. Bubu (2019) mention that, for example, in pre-colonial traditional societies within the African continent, slaves were kept for domestic chores; as a sign of prestige; objects of sacrifice for idols, means of procreation, etc. Also, in some African traditional societies, the idea of slave society is transtemporal. This was exhibited in the burial rituals of kings whereby slaves of Efik regents (in Cross River State, Nigeria) were buried, sometimes alive, with their masters. They held this erroneous belief that in the land of the ancestors, the asymmetric power relation still holds sway. On another note, concerning procreation, T. Allen (1994) points that the status of the slaves is often changed via legal integration: marriage or adoption so that they can share in the privileges of kinship. Consequently, the status of slaves undergoes mutation according to the needs of those who own them or out rightly through manumission. In these dynamics, what matters most is the convenience of the opportunistic ones who have an upper hand in the asymmetric power relation. In addition, J. Derrick (1975) posits that this pattern sometimes continues in patron-client relationship whereby the client depends on the master for some benefices. However, a question may be asked if the globalised society is really different from the traditional society with regard to slavery.

5. Neo-slavery in globalised society

Globalised society is characteristically a modern one with largely populated mass of people connected together by complex socio-economic relationships. It is morphologically different from traditional society with the mantra of interdependence among nations of the world as its buzzword. The means of production within globalised society normally aim at commercialisation of produce in view of meeting

the demands of its teeming population, the web of interdependence (military, economic, cultural, etc.) and maximisation of profits. From the analysis of M. Hardt (1998), as well as E. Dal Lago and C. Kastari (2001), the global society is the new empire through which the West seeks the control of the public and private space in contemporary and emerging international communities with the apron strings of neo-liberal economies, technologies and cultures.

Contemporary process of globalisation is a complex cultural phenomenon that has revolutionised the commodification of human existence. M. Hardt (1998) argues that in historical precedents of globalisation, the Hellenistic, Roman, Parthian and maritime European empires controlled the social, economic, political and cultural commodification of human life with weaker nations providing the capital for the world's growth. The present-day globalising society equally operates via the slave society dynamics found in the traditional contexts as explained above, but its power relation is rather driven by market economy of various capitalist systems that control it. According to M. Friedman (1962), this market economy oscillates with neoliberal spirit which hinges on the basic assumption that economic transactions will benefit the parties involved in them in as much as they enter into these commercial activities voluntarily after being reasonably informed. This is not the entire truth because *ab initio* its transactional framework is unbalanced and some of the technologies sold within the neo-liberal context create patron-client relationship that makes one part quasi-dependent on another. This happens whenever transfer of technology is not part of the commerce. Therefore, in globalised society, the pretext of homogeneity and free access to the new *highway of everything still* creates unequal power dynamics between those who control the system and their dependents. As long as greed or avarice or self-interest remains the default *cum* existential mode of present-day neo-liberal and capitalist culture, the globalised society remains the creation of the so-called developed countries that sustains the new exploitative and class relations which has become the new world order.

Despite the benefits of modernisation and globalisation, the fact remains that the asymmetrical relationship which existed between the parasitic empires and the host-colonies has taken a new form. These dynamics favour the former rather than

the latter. This asymmetrical relation, that can equally be destructive to the host, is rooted in avarice and sustained by it. In contemporary processes of globalisation, foreign aid is an example of a system that encourages neo-economic slaving structures which maintains the asymmetric functions of Western domination over developing nations. Z. Rodriguez (2011: 269-270) argues that: "[c]ritics of foreign aid have maintained that the system represents a form of neo-colonialism in which creditor nations can maintain rigid economic control over debtor states without having to cope with the messy appearances of the old colonialism". Thus, for F. Clairmont (1992), the dynamics of neo-slavery at work here is economic control of poorer nations by the West through its global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There are also other forms of neo-slavery evident in the cultural, political and educational spheres, human trafficking, immigration related issues, etc.

During the modern period of Western civilisation, the efflorescence of sympathy in humanity was largely responsible for the discourse on rights when human suffering caused by unfair power relations became unbearable. Therefore, after the modern era, human dignity upon which its rights were enshrined, was considered inviolable. Regrettably, at the global public squares, it is difficult to enforce concordant and legal agreements that promote human rights and dignity. According to F. Rodriguez (2011) and S. Moyn (2017), there is no gainsaying that the consciousness of the need for global ethics and the affirmation of human rights amidst the slaving culture of the contemporary world is a plus for contemporary civilization. Yet, M. Frost (2002) avers that the politicisation of global affairs seems to be gradually eroding this sympathy in humanity because of those who seek the control of the world order with their apron strings. For the above reasons, the reversal of slaving structures in the global context remains a cultural utopia that awaits the resurgence of not just sympathy but empathy among those in the global public space and its discourse so that the absence of global sovereign might not continue to be the reason for neo-slavery or neo-colonialism here and there. From the foregoing, the task of realistically arriving at a world with truly free citizens is an onerous one.

6. Towards controlling slave culture in the twenty-first century

The overarching line of thought in this paper shows that the culture of slavery in the traditional context and global world are fundamentally hinged on the dynamics of domination and control fuelled by misplaced sense of superiority, human arrogance and avarice. In addition, the neo-slavery structures of contemporary world are part of the enslaving sub-culture that is entrenched in human history and civilisations. According to F. Mueller (1984), the fallen state of human nature and the dysfunctional consequences of this reality are responsible for social problems that cause the disorganisation of society. Slavery being a social problem that could be traced to human arrogance and avarice can only be controlled but not eliminated from society.

First, the slaving and enslaving narratives of the globalising parlance need to be changed. The globalisation agenda that is cloaked with neo-liberal garb promises development and uplifting of those at the margins of development to prosperity and better wellbeing. This can hardly be entirely the case because the neo-liberal economic structure is inconceivable without the desire for domination and profit-making on the part of financially stronger partner. Concerning ethnic and racial related domination, similar slaving dynamics is at work. Hence, the counter-narrative of equality, fairness, and mutual respect should be promoted in the contemporary traditional, local, global and international relations. For M. Crossley (2000: 47), this is because the counter-narrative of ethically just society is founded on the claim that effective descriptive principle "guides human thought and action [...] hopes, dreams, fears, fantasies, planning, memories, loving, hating, the rituals of daily life". This counter-narrative can hopefully persuade developing nations and the advanced societies to reconstruct mutual imaginations that are not based on domination but collaborative agenda that benefit the interests of all the parties involved regardless of race and ethnicity.

Narratology used as a liberating tool was instrumental to the abolition of slave trade in the overseas countries. M. Oshatz (2012) notes that an important text on the slavery and freedom reveals that the abolitionist's preachers and advocates used counter-narrative phraseologies not found in the Bible to speak against slavery as social vice. In this narratology, they were guided by their conscience towards a deeper

understanding of divine revelation concerning slavery that was not condemned in the Bible. Similarly, the slave culture lurked in ethnic or racial domination demands counter-narratives and thinking outside the box in a compelling way so that new rules of engagement can pave the way for policies that promotes equality of citizen everywhere in the world.

Second, those who belong to the social class that promotes slaving culture, those who own the institutions that sustain this injustice and the oppressed must speak out against it. This social activism has the power of changing social imaginations in the long run. D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson (2008) argue persuasively that historical changes in the world have been successful in resistant societies because of the deconstructive campaign activities and this programme calls for collaborations by people who are ready to advocate for unfettered freedom that promotes justice and humanity. Therefore, all forms of communications media: social and mass media should be used in exposing the mechanisms of slaving cultures in the globalising world.

Third, Civil Liberty Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations have a crucial role to play in controlling the spread of slaving culture in contemporary society. Since they are not part of institutions that promote social inequality and injustice, their interventions in challenging the *status quo* as well as holding corporate persons and bodies accountable for the dehumanisation processes maintained by the culture of slavery remain credible and effective means of liberation. C. Welch (1995) is correct to observe that since sustainable democracy is the fertile ground for the flourishing of Civil Liberty Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations, the effects of their advocacies will not be phenomenal in countries, like Nigeria, with weak democratic institutions. Nonetheless, these organisations should not cease to create awareness and sustain the fights against neo-slavery as well as race/ethnic related social injustices that are still holding the world captive.

Fourth, the reorganisation of power relation is instrumental to the control of bondage that slavery unleashes upon those under its shackles. And education of the mind is pivotal to the eradication of mental slavery that still encumbers some free citizens in various ways. T. Lockley (2011) indicates that pro-slavery writers knew the

liberating power of education hence they supported the denial of universal rights concerning education to black slaves. Thus, one should not underestimate the capacity of education to control the slaving structures in a global scale. It does this by unmasking the lies of racial, ethnic, neoliberal claims thereby giving every human person the ability to defend himself or herself whenever the occasion arises. Education gives cultural, social and economic empowerment to human beings so that they can, *inter alia*, reverse the unbalanced power relations in the world. Consequently, governments of the world should make universal rights to education a prioritised reality so that the slavery index of the world might be reduced.

7. Conclusion

The slave culture and its vestiges are still discernible in traditional contexts and the global societies of the contemporary world. As a by-product of dysfunctional society wherein asymmetric relationships favour the opportunistic few, slavery is antithetical to deepest human desires such as freedom and prosperity. Furthermore, destructive parasitic relations are not sustainable in a world that embraces fairness and promotes human dignity. Therefore, new rules of engagements are needed in the emerging global order so that the damage caused by slave culture might be controlled. In view of this, there is a dire need for new narratives backed by good will and political willingness that promote new cultural policies for the world of the future if humanity truly desires to live in freedom and harmony. This ought to be the case because the human spirit will not cease to rebel against every intruder that occupies its space forcefully and, *ceteris paribus*, enslaving culture is a trespasser in the world given to humanity a gift from the Creator.

The perpetual chains that hold free human beings as captives are products of human civilisation in every historical epoch. Consequently, every society has to deal with the menace of slavery by listening to the voice of its conscience that wails when the human person is dehumanised. It is through listening to this sacred voice that a new narrative of existence will be born. The birth of new narratives can effectively engineer and sustain the desired freedom and social justice in a democratic world where there are strong institutions of governance and firm political will as humani-

ty's faithful witnesses to peace and progress. This is an urgent task because the culture of slavery only changes its contents but the dynamics remain unchanged at all times, viz. unjust domination and control of others for socio-economic reason.

8. References

Acemoglu D., Robinson J. T. 2008: *The persistence and change of institutions in the Americas*. "Southern Economic Journal", 75, 2, 11-23.

Adeyi E., 2005: *Perspectives on the impact of modern society on the indigenous/traditional society of Nigeria*. "Journal of Humanities and Social Science", 20, 4, 54-58.

Allen T. 1994: *The invention of the white race: Racial oppression and social control*. London: Verso.

Bassey T., Bubu N. G., 2019: *Gender inequality in Africa: re-examination of cultural values*. "Cogito: Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 3, 21-36.

Behnam B., Azimi F., Kanani A., 2017: *Slave-master relationship and postcolonial translation and teaching*. "Journal of Language Teaching and Research", 8, 3, 11-23.

Childs M., 2001: *Slave culture*; in: T. Burnard, G. Heuman (eds): *The Routledge history of slavery*. London: Routledge; 170-186.

Clairmont F., 2012: *Globalization: Purgatory of delusions and reflections on imperial pathology.* Sungai Pinnang, Malaysia: Citizens International.

Crossley M., 2000: *Introducing narrative psychology: self, trauma and the construction of meaning.* Philadelphia (PENN): Open University Press.

Dal Lago E., Kastari C., 2008: *The study of ancient and modern slavery system: setting an agenda for comparison*; in: E. Dal Lago, C. Kastari (eds): *Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern*. Cambridge: University Press; 3-31.

Derrick J., 1975: *Africa's slave today*. New York (NY): Schocken Books.

Frost M., 2002: *Constituting human rights: Global civil society and the society of democratic states.* New York (NY): Routledge.

Hardt M., 1998: *The global society of control*. "Discourse: Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture", 20, 4, 64-70.

Henslin J., 2005: *Essentials of sociology: a down-to-earth approach;* (6th ed.). New York, (NY): Pearson.

Holmwood J., 2005: *Functionalism and its critics*; in: A. Harrington (ed.): *Modern Theory: An Introduction*. Oxford: University Press; 87–109.

Kolapo F., Korieh C., 2008: *Introduction*; in: F. Kolapo, C. Korieh (eds.): *The aftermath of slavery: transitions and transformation in South Eastern Nigeria*. Eritrea: African World Press; 1-16.

Langlois S. 2001: *Traditions: Social*. "International Encyclopaedia of Social and Behavioural Sciences", 1, 1, 32-38.

Lockley T., 2011: *Race relations in slave societies*; in: T. Burnard. G. Heuman (eds): *The Routledge history of slavery*. London: Routledge; 248-264.

Friedman M., 1962: *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago (IL): University Press.

Lapka M., Vávrai J., Sokolickova Z., 2012: *Contemporary understanding of the relationship between humans and the environment*. "Journal of Landscape Ecology", 5, 2, 11-20.

Merton. R., 1938: *Social structure and anomie*. "American Sociological Review", 3, 5, 672-682.

Merton, R., 1968: *Social theory and social structure*. New York (NY): The Free Press.

Miller J., 2012: *The problem of slavery as history: A global approach*. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press.

Moyn S., 2017: *Human rights and its uses of history*. London: Verso; 117-220.

Mueller F., 1984: *The Church and the social question*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Oshatz M., 2012: *The fight against slavery and the rise of liberal Protestantism.* New York (NY): Oxford University Press.

Parker L., Roberts L., 2005: *Critical theories of race*; in: B. Somekh, C. Lewin (eds): *Research methods in the social sciences*. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage publications; 74-80.

Patterson O., 1982: *Slavery and social death: a comparative study*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Quirk J., 2011: *Modern Slavery*; in: T. Burnard, G. Heuman (eds): *The Routledge history of slavery*. London: Routledge; 331-346.

Reynolds E., 1993: *Stand the storm: a history of the Atlantic slave trade*. Chicago (IL): Elephant Paperbacks.

Rodriguez J., 2011: *Slavery in the modern world: a history of political, social and economic oppression*. Santa Barbara (CAL): ABC-CLIO, LLC.

Robinson W., 2011: *Globalization and the sociology of Immanuel Wallerstein: a critical appraisal*. "International Sociology", 26, 6, 723-745.

Vos C. de, 2001: *Once a slave, always a slave? Slavery, manumission and relational patterns in Paul's letter to Philemon*. "JSNT", 82, 1, 14-21.

Wallerstein I., 2004: *World-systems analysis: introduction*. London: Duke University Press.

Welch C., 1995: *Protecting human rights in Africa: roles and strategies of nongovernmental organizations*. Philadelphia (PENN): University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wiedemann T., 1981: *Greek and Roman slavery*. New York (NY): Routledge.

**Artykuły
Articles**

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Centrope as a laboratory of cross-border cooperation
– lessons from 17 years of the Centrope region (2003-2019)

Milan Husár

Spectra Centre of Excellence of the EU, Institute of Management,

STU in Bratislava,

Vazovova 5, 812 43 Bratislava, Slovakia

milan.husar@stuba.sk

Matej Jaššo

Spectra Centre of Excellence of the EU, Institute of Management,

STU in Bratislava,

Vazovova 5, 812 43 Bratislava, Slovakia

matej.jasso@stuba.sk

Thomas Dillinger

Faculty of Planning and Architecture, Vienna University of Technology,

Augasse 2-6, 1090 Wien, Austria

thomas.dillinger@tuwien.ac.at

Abstract

The idea of Centrope (Central European Region) was launched in September 2003 with the aim to profile the Central European Region as a framework for increasing wealth and sustainable development in area of living and working space for about 6 mln people. Cities, counties and other territorial subjects in Austria, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia took part in this initiative. With its size, complexity of relations and thematic scope, Centrope became a laboratory of cross-border coopera-

tion. Innovative solutions based on cross-border cooperation in all fields, including economy, politics, culture and education, were included in its vision and main objectives. The authors are looking into the development of this region over the past 17 years of its existence. Using semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, the initial expectations, its strengths and weaknesses as well as what lessons can be learned from this initiative for other cross-border areas in Europe are evaluated. Special attention is paid to the role of the two largest cities of this region, Vienna and Bratislava, and their cooperation, as well as their role for the region as a whole. Regional cooperation within the Centrope, its marketing communication as well as overall current state of art of the region and its future perspectives, are other thematic highlights of the critical revision, presented in this paper.

Keywords: CENTROPE, spatial development, vision, regional identity, sustainable regional development, multilevel polycentric governance.

1. Introduction

In 2003, in a small Austrian municipality of Kittsee, located on the border or Austria and Slovakia, very close also to the Hungarian border, mayors and heads of the regions from four European countries met and symbolically signed a document known later as the Kittsee declaration, in which they pledged to work closer together. This document was later deemed as the basis for the Centrope region, a cross-border initiative aiming at improving the quality of life in the region consisting of parts of Austria, Slovakia, Czechia and Hungary. The region includes two capitals, Vienna and Bratislava, which create its development poles, as well as numerous smaller towns with vivid connections among each other.

After 17 years of Centrope, the project had its ups and downs and currently is rather dormant. Centrope, with its unique position and high potential, is considered as a laboratory for cross-border cooperation and, in this paper, the objective is to critically evaluate the past development and how it influenced its current state. The paper discusses the main expectations, how these were played out, what were the successes as well as limitations and, crucially, what are its future perspectives. It is based on a set of semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018 and at the beginning of 2019 with key stakeholders (former/current mayors, academics and administrative officers) where they were asked to comment (anonymously) on the past 17 years and discuss their perspectives. Many of the interviewees are retired and were offered an op-

portunity to look back at what they were working on and reflect as well as debate the future of Centrope.

2. Centrope as laboratory of a cross-border cooperation

Cross-border areas are specific areas on the interface of two or more countries having different administrative rules and regulations. The area of Centrope is unique as four countries meet in this territory with different political and administrative systems as well different history, culture and traditions. The events of early 1990s launched the processes of globalisation as well as economic and social transformation, which, together with the EU integration, led to diminishing role of national borders and this led to a change in how the border areas look like. Earlier, border areas were rather empty areas without strategic infrastructure and industry and with mostly agricultural land (e.g. Austrian region of Burgenland) while afterwards these areas became attractive for residents of all these countries. With increased mobility and softening of the national borders, Centrope became an opportunity to become a laboratory for cross-border cooperation and governance systems considering that governance is one of the main keys to the success of the process of European integration (CoR, 2020).

A multilevel polycentric governance is a concept describing the processes of re-location of authority away from central states (Schakel 2016) and enables more open and inclusive forms of governance. Not only the system begun to be multi-level with different decision-making centres at different levels (Hoodge, Marks, 1993), but it is also characterised by an increasing tendency to invite actors outside the hierarchical administrative arrangement (Jordan 2008). The multilevel polycentric governance is characteristic of flexibility and adaptability (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961; Ostrom 2010), self-organisation, spontaneous development and experimentation (McGinnis 1999) and dealing with fuzziness – managing increased mobility of citizens and their belonging (Finka et al, 2015). In this paper, Centrope is presented as a laboratory of multilevel polycentric governance as it complies to many of these characteristics and what were the results of the cooperation activities is examined. The overall vision of the region was to become competitive on the European level us-

ing the potential of newly created attractive space for people where the polycentricity also represented the underlying spatial logics of hierarchy and complementarity (Humer, Granqvist, 2020) using the geographic and political opportunities of this area.

3. The Central European Region CENTROPE

3.1. What is Centrope?

A key feature of the multilevel polycentric governance is experimentation and self-organisation and, in this paper, Centrope is perceived as a laboratory of cross-border cooperation. The objective is to track how the activities of actors in Centrope were played out and evaluate their impacts based on the interviews with key stakeholders, performed in 2018 and 2019. Twelve interviews were performed and the respondents included former and current politicians, academics and public officers who had been directly and indirectly working on the Centrope projects. They had the opportunity to look back and reflect on what had been done, what was the initial idea, the successes and limitations, then the specific issues, e.g. financing, and, lastly, the future of Centrope.

Centrope was always an umbrella term for common vision, based upon common Central European heritage, merging Austrian, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian cities and regions in one mental concept backed by certain values. The perception of Centrope has been continuously evolving. Centrope is a vision based upon the common Central European historical and cultural heritage integrating territorial subjects from four countries and giving them a common cooperative perspective (Fig. 1). This region was long split into different political systems and its spatial development was more influenced by national policies and specifics than a common Central European identity. However, it was still rooted in mental maps of inhabitants as a region which was never ripped off from its multicultural character, even during the times of hardest communist regime. The integrating elements were still present, even sometimes in deep historical memory or in unconsciousness in every-day practice (river Danube, Czech-Slovak close relations, legends about tram between Bratislava and Vienna). CENTROPE is also considered as an interesting tool how to help and coordinate

cooperation between left and right bank of the Danube or the Danubian cooperation in general.

"Partners from Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary got an access toward highly developing common region in the heart of Europe and the Vienna as a international hub and the peripheral parts of Austria (Lower Austria, Burgenland) got new impulses for their development" (politician 1, Austria).

Figure 1. The Centrope region (CentropeMap, 2019)

CENTROPE is an attempt to define core area between Vienna and Bratislava, one of the most perspective areas placed on the intersection between both of the former edges of divided Europe. The initial libretto of "Europe divided by the Iron Curtain" could not be written more tangibly; one could see Austrian pedestrians on the other bank of Danube from Devín Castle in Bratislava. Mental barrier between the two worlds could hardly be more concrete and more absurd than in the Austrian-Slovak borderline. On the other hand, partnership between Bratislava and Vienna (and in lesser extents also Brno and Györ) was always obvious and its advantages were plentiful. The harmonisation process of the "old" and "new" EU countries was also highly motivating agent in the regional policy and was attractive enough (at least in first years) also for perception of general public. This was intensively reflected in the initial marketing activities and vocabulary ("we are growing together").

Centrope is an interesting platform for cooperation of the cities. In the beginning, the regions might have played more vital role, but later the scope of cooperation was shifted towards the major cities as they were the key economic and political players. This gradual shift in the political driving force corresponds to the changing nature of cooperation and experimentation on the run, adjusting to the changing conditions and always looking for effective solutions.

"You hear word Centrope especially in politics talking about this big territory with Bratislava, Vienna, Brno and the Hungary part, because there is no word for this very functional related territory, so Centrope is somehow trying to define this area" (public officer 3, Austria).

"The iron curtain imposed a feeling of uneasiness of those living on the other side (Austrian), after its tearing down need for new direction in sense of making a common Central European region on a place that always was Central European hub, merging culture and traditions of Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic" (politician 1, Austria).

3.2. Beginnings of the Centrope initiative and its key characteristics

Centrope was formally announced in 2003 when a political declaration was signed in Kittsee, a small Austrian municipality located on Slovak-Austrian border, by mayors and heads of the regions (counties of Vienna, Lower Austria, Burgenland, Southern Moravia, Southern Bohemia, Bratislava, Trnava, Györ-Moson-Sopron, Vas and cities of Brno, České Budějovice[1], Bratislava, Trnava, Györ, Eisenstadt, Sopron, Szombathely and St. Pölten).

The interviewees characterise Centrope as something unique, with great ambitions, trying to connect the states of the former Eastern and Western blocks. It was reflecting the new political geography in which three of the four member states regained their geopolitical independence from the Soviet Union and were in the process of economic and social transition. On the Austrian side, as told by high positioned Austrian politician, the idea was to share the experience of good governance and learn from the mistakes Austrian had made in the past and foster good cooperation in economic, social and environmental terms.

---

[1] The region of Southern Bohemia and the city of České Budějovice later withdrew from the initiative, due to the fact that their cross-border functional ties are rather directed to Bavaria and Upper Austria.

The objective of this initiative was not only theoretical, as there have been functional relations developing since the 1990s but were missing institutionalisation. The location is unique, two capital cities located 60 km apart, position at the intersection of two axes of European significance – the Danube axis and the Pontebanna axis that leads from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea (DIANE 2003). Centrope was trying to define this area and create its vision and strategy to achieve these goals. But the geographical scope was much wider, it included the wide space between and around the capitals and the vision was covering this larger space encompassing this wide complexity of functional relations.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, there were several cross-border projects between Austria and Slovakia, Austria and Czechia and so on (Table 1) and these were looking into particular areas of life in this land. However, larger vision and strategy was absent and there was no forum where the city of Vienna, strong economic and political player was actively present. Centrope is a reflection of this state and is an answer to these issues. Many of the projects were funded by the European Union, and at that time it was clear that the three countries will soon join the EU and the EU was supporting projects to help these countries for smoother and less painful transition.

Table 1. Centrope – Key Dates

1989	Fall of the Iron Curtain
1995	Austria's EU entry
1997	Austria's Schengen entry
1990s / 2000s	Projects JORDES, JORDES+ (GrüneMitte)
2002	Austria introduced euro
2003	The Kittsee Centrope declaration
2003-2006	Interreg IIIA project "Building a European Region"
2004	Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia's EU entry
2004-2006	Project CentropeMAP – CentropeSTATISTICS
2007	Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia's Schengen entry
2007	Opening of Austria's A6 highway
2008	Cross-border bus line 901

2009	Slovakia introduced euro
2009-2012	Centrope Capacity project (OP CE)
2011	Opening of Austria's labour market
2012	Strategy Centrope 2013+
2012	Opening of the Bridge of Liberty
2015	BAUM city planning study
2017	BAUM 2020 project – opening of the office

Source: the authors

3.3. The idea of CENTROPE and its milestones

The name Centrope was created as a result of schoolchildren competition back in 2002, organised within the project CERNET, a cross-border cooperation educational project, and it stands for an acronym of the Central European Region consisting of areas within the quadrangle formed by the Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria. More than 100 schools took part in this proceeding and the winning proposal was brought by the students of secondary school "KMS Josef Enslein-Platz" in Vienna. The name Centrope is sticking the basic semantic characteristics of region – CENTRAL and EUROPE. Under this name, the first cross-border Interreg III A project was launched.

The first milestone, as agreed on during the interviews, was the political declaration adopted in Kittsee in September 2003 (Centrope 2003), stressing the common goals, raising prosperity and sustainable development of newly established region. There have been defined several sectoral development perspectives including communication and public relations, labour market and qualification, tourism, science, research and innovation, culture and society, as well as cooperation management (cf. Krajatis et al, 2003; Jaššo 2009). The Kittsee declaration (2003) stressed the following statements:

(1) establish Centrope as a common region of growth and prosperity and support all measures towards the attainment of this goal;

(2) create an attractive, internationally respected quality location covering all areas of life and improve the frame conditions for cross-border cooperation; and

(3) intensify cooperation by networking existing initiatives, communicate the future potential of the region to the public at large and strengthen the social and entrepreneurial commitment to the Central European Region.

Furthermore, the Kittsee declaration (2003) reflects the EU enlargement as a unique chance for ongoing cooperation with the main goal to build up a cooperative and robust framework for cooperation of institutions, companies and other bodies located within the region. After the initial Kittsee declaration in 2003 ('Building an European Region'), a series of political memoranda followed (cf. Centrope 2006; Jaššo 2009). The memoranda and common meetings of stakeholders predestined future vectors of the Centrope development and were clearly dominated by optimistic, future-oriented and progressive attitudes of main actors. A series of political memoranda significantly contributed to the building the capacity, outlining the structures and defining the context of the CENTROPE region activities (political memorandum 'We grow together, Together we grow', 2005, St. Pőlten; conference 'We Shape the Future – CENTROPE 2006+', 2006, Vienna City Hall; political conference Bratislava 2007 – 'Ready for Take-off').

However, the interviewees had a hard time naming any of these conferences after the initial one in 2003, which was nearly by all noted as the first and the key milestones. None of them considered any of these as a break-through with the lasting impacts until now. As milestones, they named pilot projects, e.g. Centrope Map or other EU funded projects which were implemented under the Centrope headline and then some mentioned the important events for the member countries, e.g. the EU and/or Schengen accessions, which considerably shaped the region. One respondent critically commented that signing a document is no true milestone and that real milestones were rather absent in the Centrope initiative as that would be some break in the quality of cooperation (e.g. establishment of a coordination centre or a governance body). This is a sign of lacking a long-term impact of the initiative as the first milestone is clear and from then on it is somehow intangible and hard to name, mimicking the decreasing momentum of Centrope over time.

The years 2003-06 were predominantly dedicated to the building of sectoral networks and political structures (cf. Fertner 2006: 76-77). Additional boost and dy-

namics was gained after 1st May 2004, the day of accession of Slovakia, Czechia and Hungary toward the European Union. This act has delivered an elimination of almost all restrictions and increased economic convergence.

One of the most significant competitive advantages of the Centrope region is its scientific profile. More than 25 universities and academic bodies are based in the region and their cooperation with the business institutions is intensively promoted in all the four member countries. Centrope is striving to maintain its identity as a sustainable region, stressing its natural landscape potential.

3.4. Initial expectations for Centrope initiative

Centrope was always considered a part (or at least closely related process) of the EU enlargement. Established on the eve of the EU accession of Slovakia, Czechia and Hungary (2004), this initiative reflected not only the general mood of public and its pro-European stances of that era, but was (openly or unspoken) considered as "the lab" testing mutual merger processes of the old and new EU member countries. Despite the intensive cultural compatibility among the participating regions and cities, the degree of economic convergence was rather low, especially between Austria and the newly accessed states. Centrope was also considered as an opportunity to test whether such a kind of cooperation is able to deliver win-win solution for all sides. From accessing countries, it was also perceived as a helping tool for integration of these regions/cities into the EU.

"Basically, the idea of Centrope was to prepare these regions for joining the EU. And everybody also expected a lot of support from the EU to these regions" (a private planning consultant, Austria).

"The expectations were pretty high. Due to the abolishing of physical barriers, it was supposed that national borders will diminish its role and the ties between the regional centres will be intensive. But I don't think these expectations were fulfilled" (public officer 2, Slovakia).

Centrope was – especially in the beginning – more a vision reflecting cross-border related social and political atmosphere than a concrete development plan for certain region. The first years of new millennium were times when participating

partners did already have some experiences from bilateral cross-border cooperation and this cooperation yielded some distinctive results. Most of the actors realised that, in this territory, there is a lot of options going beyond simple bilateral cross-border cooperation activities and might create unique synergy pattern helping the actors to achieve new quality in terms of international competitiveness, quality of life, sustainability and other relevant issues.

"In the beginning, Centrope was a visionary approach, not so much linked to the territory it refers to" (public officer 3, Austria).

"New bridges have been built and the 'mental landscape' of the people has got completely new shape. Nobody is now 'on the edge' or 'on the periphery' anymore" (politician 1, Austria).

Several respondents expressed the opinion that the initial expectations related to Centrope initiative were flying high, but reality delivered an array of setbacks and some kind of delusion. The initial optimistic idea was not strong enough to be carried into continual efforts of all parties. It was reflected in many other topics targeted in the interviews and might be the confirmation of the general trend of high emotional involvement in the beginning, which was later fading away or was transformed into more pragmatic approach based upon rather incremental field, specific range of activities. High political/emotional capital of the Centrope idea has been continuously somehow melt down and new vision is still lacking.

"There was big engagement and somehow exaggerated expectation in the beginning[…] till the delusion that it is nor working anymore, it was too ambitious" (public officer 2, Slovakia).

"Of course, we wanted to, for keeping the balance, our interest was that the economic situation improves as quick as possible, also on the side of the wages. So this gap on the Hungarian-Austrian, Slovak-Austrian was to disappear as quick as possible. Nowadays this appears in the city of Bratislava mainly and in some other core places alongside the Austrian-Hungarian border, but not for the whole country" (politician 2, Austria).

3.5. Changes over the past 17 years

The overall very enthusiastic atmosphere from the first post-millennial years (2000-2005) has somehow faded away. It was transformed to "everyday business" atmosphere, even with some setbacks and delusions. Dreams were transformed into particular projects, initiatives and cooperation and some of them slowed down or even petered out. Despite smooth and friendly mutual relations, the strong "pro-European" feeling has been replaced by more pragmatic and even critical approach.

"We are much more careful and we consider thoroughly what has some added value and what does not […].We all are growing up and we have more experiences and we can compare things" (public officer 1, Slovakia).

"I think the atmosphere of common cross border initiative was something special in the founding years of Centrope. Meanwhile, it depends on the issue. For example in cross-border mobility between Austria and Slovakia, there are still many issues unsolved, for example the connection between capitals and it's the same towards the Hungarian part and so on, but some things are rather normal, for example in tourism" (an academician, Austria).

"We had at the beginning a rather euphoric situation. The expectation to become a member of the EU on the one side, our experience is, and I remember the days when we started to negotiate with the EU back in the late 1980s, beginning of the 1990s" (politician 2, Austria).

National borders started to play a (limited) role again – not in the former extreme scale, but borders and national interests became again topics of political discourse (at least from the peak of migration crisis in 2015). Overall political shifts in society (in all the four participating countries) tend to favour "national approach" again, though it was not transformed onto any cross-border disputes or controversies.

"Creating of the V4 cooperation was something that was rather disrupting the continuous process of EU integration. It stopped the integration process and ended up with a sort of new opposition on the EU level. That, of course, makes cooperation more difficult" (politician 2, Austria).

"At many of political parties they do not fight against this, rather they use this atmosphere for their politics and it could have been even an advantage this kind of anti-European

atmosphere for the Centrope initiative[…]. The common enemy EU" (public officer 1, Austria).

"*When Györ should have taken over the presidency in Centrope they were stopped by the national government, they were not allowed to. That was actually the breakdown of very close cooperation*" (politician 2, Austria).

3.6. Successes of the Centrope

After more than two decades of relatively intense communication, at least at the very beginning of Centrope, it is difficult to state the tangible outcomes of the co-operation from the quantitative and objective point of view. The biggest successes are qualitative attributes of improved cooperation through getting to know other and introducing the idea that the people are not anymore living in separate countries, but they belong to one common space, which is difficult to measure.

Although it sounds perhaps as a minor thing today, the greatest success of the Centrope initiative is, arguably, launching the process of getting to know each other and beginning of cooperation via communication and mutual understanding, as one Austrian politician remarked. Centrope certainly played a key role in this process of convergence of nations. This is particularly crucial considering the second half of 20th century when all the previous communication channels and contacts between Austria and the former Eastern bloc countries had been intermitted and the process of re-familiarisation and gaining back the trust was particularly important and hinder-some. Though, even before 2003, there were some smaller project initiatives, but their reach was limited in thematic and geographical scope. It was the Kittsee declaration, a success on its own, which launched continuous communication on formal (political conferences) and informal (workshops and non-official meetings) level, which gave roots to communication until today.

"*We created the standards of communication and negotiation, we got to know the people which definitely led to better understanding in this region. In the past there was no real cooperation*" (public officer 1, Slovakia).

"*For other projects it is easier to call someone in Bratislava or development partner, we know some people there, they can help*" (public officer 1, Austria).

Another success, as perceived by Centrope stakeholders, was creation of the Centrope brand. Although Centrope as a brand is seen now rather critically (low diffusion towards the citizens, it is not recognized by businesses, etc.), it was the first time in the history when this territory was portrayed as one unit under a common brand which is accepted by partners from all countries. There is a long way to go if one attempts to further promote the Centrope brand to wider stakeholders or when you put efforts into making citizens identify themselves as Centrope citizens as there are issues of national sovereignty in contemporary climate, but this is not the goal anymore as people no longer identify themselves as trapped within national borders. However, in the early years of Centrope it smoothened the road to *Europeanship* and identifying citizens as part of the EU.

"The biggest success was to create this image at all, which is still very much alive" (an academician, Austria).

"Even if there are low cooperation fields, there is also the brand Centrope and the focus is that I am the member of this Centrope region" (public officer 2, Austria).

3.7. Limitations of the Centrope

During the course of the past 17 years since Centrope had been operating, some problems were occurring which revealed practical obstacles of the cross-border cooperation in this region. On the one hand, there had been several rather formal issues connected to daily operation of the initiative including language differences (four languages from three language groups) or various bureaucratic procedures differing according to the legal system leading to lack of understanding of the processes and a loss of cooperation dynamics. On the other hand, though, had identified three core problems were identified which are permeating until today. Firstly, there is a problem with political will and cooperation being on the political agenda. The declaration in Kittsee from 2003 is regarded as a great success due to the fact that all the members were able to find consensus and signed the memorandum of cooperation, but ever since, the political priorities had been changing. Obviously, one key driver of this change was the economic crisis in 2008-09 and later on changing of the political climate in the EU linked to the migration crisis of 2015 etc. and these shifts in

thinking of national and regional politicians was clearly readable within Centrope. Another issue linked to the politics was the fact that the Centrope representatives failed to make it attractive to wider audience in regional and local politics.

"One of the biggest limitations was the fact that you would have need a lot of political power and courage to get forward" (public officer 3, Austria).

"A lack of 'personal continuity' – new mayors, politicians" (politician 1, Austria).

Secondly, while the role of the borders had been changing and its importance had diminished in terms of their barrier effect, the differences among the Centrope countries remained. This was evident in terms of cultural and historical differences, as well as differences in the political and administrative systems (so-called multilevel mismatch – Telle 2017). This was clear not only between the old and new EU member countries (Austria vs the rest), but also between Slovakia and Hungary, etc. Closely linked to this issue was the matter of superiority or feeling of inferiority by representatives of Slovak regions when negotiating with their Austrian counterparts.

"Paradoxically, it is the borders of the nation states as well as distribution of competences, in Slovakia we have local, regional and national level and it works similarly in neighbouring countries and there is too many actors with different competences" (public officer 2, Slovakia).

"I think there is still this cultural difference, cultural-historical, some kind of, I don't want to say superiority or even snobbery[…] it took us more time and energy to convince partners about our truth [arguments], about our view. Sometimes we even had to bring it to the boil to push our ideas" (public officer 1, Slovakia).

Lastly, the PR activities and branding did not turn out to be as powerful when creating a common image and identity to overcome and sustain the rather narrow perception of sovereignty and *"nationalism"* (vs common European or Centrope identity). In the beginning, the branding was regarded as a priority and focal point, but despite the used finances it did not succeed in creating a common brand of Centrope that would be taken up by actors from public and private realm nor a sort of common identity among the citizens.

"Maybe it is a lack of PR to its local citizens" (public officer 1, Austria).

"We did not manage to successfully 'sell' the outputs and benefits, like the bridge between Schlosshof and Devínska Nová Ves – this is the Centrope in everyday life" (politician 1, Austria).

5. Key lessons

5.1. Flexibility in the reflection of overall socio-political climate (*Zeitgeist*)

Each period in time carries some trends which are reflected in the public spirit and has potential to impassion the people. In the case of Centrope, in 1990s the region was optimistic in research and technology bringing many research-intensive companies to this area. In 2000s, it was the EU integration that was raising the spirits in all the four countries and it was catalysing the differences among the nations. However, after the financial and migration crises this *Zeitgeist* is somewhat difficult to recognize and be strong enough to raise the public spirit. Without such an identification it is difficult to accomplish common projects and common vision as the incentive for common effort is missing and unjustified. Such a common notion is painfully absent and it is supposed to be a reason behind the growing nationalism and isolationism.

5.2. Mutual coordination of activities and vision

From the governance point of view, Centrope failed to make flexible and sustainable governance arrangements which would carry on the management of activities after the projects finished. The parties were not able to agree on common governance mode which would coordinate the activities in the region under the umbrella vision. Centrope was certainly serving its purpose in bringing the four countries closer together in 2000s and it created its visions, but these were not strong enough in the past five years to inspire cooperation and coordination of common activities. Inability to create convincing vision operating under appropriate and effective governance mode was the root cause of Centrope's inactivity in the recent years. In such a state, some parties are working on smaller projects, but are not organised and coordinated with objective to support the common vision.

5.3. Interactive work with the public

Lastly, Centrope failed to be transmitted into the public discourse and the support of its brand is absent. In early beginnings, when the idea was taking shape, there were participatory launching activities, for example the process of naming this region by schoolchildren, but afterwards, gradually, the target group became academia and political level, omitting the public, NGOs or businesses who would genuinely carry the brand and identify themselves with it. This is why among these actors the brand of Centrope is virtually dead, failing to carry any mental image behind. The support of the public and local businesses helps the region inwards (creating a sense of common identity) as well as outwards (these actors can carry this brand behind its borders and help to recognize it).

6. Conclusions

In 2020, the Centrope region will record its 17th anniversary and critical revision of this invaluable attempt to create a real European cross-border region became necessary. The region was closely related to the EU enlargement of the former communist bloc countries in Central Europe and was considered as 'unique laboratory' testing mutual merger processes of old and new EU member countries with all the used and missed opportunities, highlights and setbacks. With changing atmosphere and conditions in Europe, more laboratories like this are necessary together with stronger focus on disseminating the results and their diffusion to regional policies.

The birth of the Centrope idea reflected more than anything else the *Zeitgeist* of the first years of new millennium in Central Europe. The will to cooperate and synchronised effort to build up successful, competitive and sustainable region in the heart of Europe was obvious in almost all participating actors. The initial expectations related to Centrope initiative were flying high, but reality delivered not only substantial improvement of cooperation and overall competitiveness of the region but also an array of setbacks and some kind of delusion. The overall very enthusiastic atmosphere from the first post-millennial years (2000-2005) has somehow faded away. The attention of the politicians, regional decision-makers and the general public had been shifted to other different themes and scopes.

Centrope as a somehow academic and political idea was transformed to the "business as usual" atmosphere and national borders started to play a (limited) role again – not in the former extreme scale, but borders and national interests became again the topics of the political discourse. These overall modifications and shifts were rather smooth and continuous, without any substantial rifts of conflicts. In some respects, Centrope successfully delivered its contribution to regional development and transformed the area toward more mutually interlinked entity based on the common mutual trust but lost its momentum to adjust to newly formed conditions. In other aspects, some expectations were never met and dropped out from the formulation of further common strategic visions and goals. Almost two decades after its birth, Centrope is more pragmatic and day-to-day oriented than it once was. Centrope acknowledged its limits in the process of building the place attachment of the people, their territorial identification and feeling of togetherness as well as in the process of building a competitive external image worldwide. However, new impulse is needed; previously it was Vienna as the strongest player driving the cooperation and right now, as the other players caught up, a cross-border cooperation needs new driving forces. The seat is empty and awaits its new leader who learnt from previous mistakes and will build up the Centrope foundations.

7. References

Brunet R., 1989: *Les villes europeénnes: Rapport pour la DATAR*. Montpellier: RECLUS.

CENTROPE, 2003: *Politisiche Erklärung Kittsee – 'Building a European Region' – Declaration of Kittsee*; https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11599046.pdf.

CENTROPE, 2006: *Political Conference Vienna 2006 – "We Shape the Future"*; https://centrope.gysev.hu/story/political-conferences/vienna-2006/.

CENTROPE, 2015: *CENTROPE Vision 2015*; http://www.region-bsk.sk/SCR_IPT/ViewFile.aspx?docid=1109.

CENTROPE Agency, 2012: *Strategy 2013*; https://www.wien.gv.at/stadten twick lung/studien/pdf/b008393ap.pdf.

CentropeMap, 2019: *The Centrope Region at Glance*; https://www.centropem ap.org/cif/0-01-02.pdf.

Clark G., 2007: *Economic Collaboration Between Neighbouring Cities. Report Summary. Glasgow-Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative;* http://www.glasgow-edinburgh.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/economic-collaboration-report-greg-clark-august-2007-summary-final-dn.pdf.

Committee of Regions (CoR), 2020: *Charter for Multilevel Governance (MLG) in Europe;* https://portal.cor.europa.eu/mlgcharter/Pages/default.aspx.

DIANE, 2003: *Regional Analysis of the CENTROPE REGION.* Vienna.

Faludi A., 2018: *The Poverty of Territorialism: A Neo-medieval View of Europe and European Planning.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Fertner Ch., 2006: *City-regional Co-operation to strengthen Urban Competitiveness. A report on Cross-border Co-operation in the Regions of Copenhagen-Malmoe and Vienna-Bratislava.* Diploma thesis. Wien: Department of Spatial Development and Infrastructure & Environmental Planning, Faculty of Architecture and Regional Planning, TU Wien.

Finka M., Petríková D. (ed.), 2000: *Priestorový rozvoj a plánovanie v kontexte európskej integrácie.* Bratislava: Spectra – ROAD.

Finka M., Kluvánková T., Ondrejička V., 2015: *Concept of Polycentric Governance for Fuzzy Soft Spaces as a Challenge for Central European Peripheral Spaces;* in: *Understanding Geographies of Polarization and Peripheralization.* London: Palgrave Macmillan UK; 309-322.

Giffinger R. (ed.), 2005: *Competition between cities in Central Europe: Opportunities and Risks of Cooperation.* ARL Hannover-TU Wien-ROAD Bratislava.

Giffinger R., Hamedinger A., 2009: *Metropolitan competitiveness reconsidered: the role of territorial capital and metropolitan governance.* "Terra Spectra", 20 (1), 3-13.

Hooghe L., Marks G., 2003: *Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance.* "The American Political Science Review", 97, 233–234.

Humer A., Granqvist K., 2020: *The gradual city-ness and town-ness of public service locations: Towards spatially sensitive sector policies.* "Geoforum", 113, 81-91.

Husár M., Ondrejička V., Varış S. C., 2017: *Smart Cities and the Idea of Smartness in Urban Development –A Critical Review.* "IOP conference series: materials science and engineering", 245, 8, 082008. IOP Publishing.

Jaššo M., 2009: *Five years of CENTROPE region-Reflections and Perspectives*; in: *New Challenges of Globalization: Striving for Competitive Advantage and Sustainability*. Bratislava: Comenius University; Monclair State University; 390-397.

Jaššo M., 2015: *Regional identity and its management.* Habilitation. Bratislava: Institute of Management, Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava.

Jaššo M., Hajduk M., 2019: *Role of Social Media Concerning Public Participation and Promotion of City Identity*; in: B. Stojkov (ed.): *The e-Future of Cities. Between Temptations of Exponential Technology Growth and the Concept of Human City*. Belgrade: Conference Proceedings, Academy of Engineering Sciences of Serbia, University of Belgrade; 119-134.

Jordan A., 2008: *The governance of sustainable development: taking stock and looking forwards*. "Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy", 26 (1), 17-33.

Krajatis C., Neunteufl G., Steiner R., 2003: *Regional Analysis of the CENTOPE region.* Vienna: DIANE Project Interreg IIIA.

Lower Austria (Office of the Lower Austrian State Government State Office Directorate – Press Service), 2005: „*Centrope*"– *Memorandum in St. Pölten unterzeichnet*; [http://www.noe.gv.at/noe/46186_20-April-2005-09-57-aeCent rope-Memorandum-in-St-Poelt.html](http://www.noe.gv.at/noe/46186_20-April-2005-09-57-aeCent-rope-Memorandum-in-St-Poelt.html).

McGinnis M. D., 1999: *Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ostrom E., 2010: *Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems*. "American Economic Review", 100 (3), 641-72.

Ostrom V., Tiebout C. M., Warren R., 1961: *The organization of government in metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry*. "American Political Science Review", 55 (04), 831-842.

Schakel A. H., 2016: *Applying multilevel governance*; in: *Handbook of research methods and applications in political science*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Telle S., 2017: *Fuzzy and soft elements in spatial dimension of regional policy*. Dissertation thesis. Bratislava: Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava.

Tosics I., 2005: *Metropolitan cooperation as a precondition for international competitiveness. Special difficulties in preparing post-socialist cities for international competition: The case of Budapest*; in: R. Giffinger (ed.): *Competition between cities in Central Europe: Opportunities and Risks of Cooperation*. ARL Hannover-TU Wien-ROAD Bratislava; 78-88.

Artykuły
Articles

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

The role of the military to national development in Nigeria

Kemi Anthony Emina

Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy,

Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State, Nigeria

eminakemi@yahoo.com

Ephraim Ahamefula Ikegbu

Department of Philosophy,

University of Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

ikegbu.ephraim@gmail.com

Abstract

The broadened thinking of national security has reduced the efficacy of military strategy in dealing with all the various threats that face the world now. For instance, more than half of Nigerians are living in extreme poverty, hence the least deprived can easily sacrifice their lives for terrorist attacks and engage in crime to help relieve the rest of their families from continued suffering. These new actors now have various names, but in essence, they are among the disillusioned poor people. Nigerian militant groups, e.g. Niger Delta Militant, Boko Haram, and the Indigeneous People of Biafra (IPOB) have some undertones to these realities. Due to the above reasons, there is a need for the Nigerian military to re-strategise and rethink security and other economic related roles within the country. To find a solution that could lead to success in both tackling insurgencies as well as underdevelopment, this work explores the economic role the military force can play towards Nigeria's national development. The investigation focuses on the non-military and non-political role of the military. The conclusion of this research offers a framework for rethinking counterinsurgency, thus arguing that the traditional role of the military as the guardian of national sovereignty should remain unchanged because of the strategic uncertainties in the African region. This role has to be complemented with a new role, which is that of contributing to social projects as well as contributing its resources towards poverty alleviation.

1. Introduction

After the Second World War, followed by globalisation and within it, countries have become more interdependent than ever before (Bassey et al., 2019). This has a far-reaching significance in that the way the countries conducts international relations has shifted from the use of high politics to low politics. This implies that countries now prioritise issues regarding the economy, infrastructure development, labour markets, healthcare, education and the environment (low politics) over issues involving the military, national security, and diplomacy (high politics), and thus the use of the military in war is greatly reduced. The main challenge left to the militaries is to justify their legitimacy. Whereas is has been emphasised that the military should conduct their traditional business of securing the sovereignty and integrity of a country, the emergence of liberal democracy as the main political ideology in the international system calls for the re-evaluation of the military mission.

There is now an increasing awareness by Nigerians of their poverty and the very slow march toward progress. Modern means of travel have drastically reduced the distance between the rich and the poor nations into a matter of hours and this has made their awareness more pronounced. Aware of the wealth and great technological advances in wealthy countries, e.g. the United States, Russia, China, and Western Europe, Nigerians have become impatient over their slow rate of progress. They constantly demand concrete results from their leaders notwithstanding what cost and the Nigerian government responds by launching grandiose national development programmes. They do this with an urgency equal to the impatience of the people. They commit substantial slices of their scarce resources to support costly development projects. Despite this, they borrow money from rich countries and international lending institutions. In this process, they also copy development models that have been successful in these countries, ignoring the fact that the conditions under which said success was attained are very different from their situations. The results are cat-

astrophic, to say the least. Problems arise, exacerbating their difficulties. One such problem is the serious drain on their economic capacities.

The requirements of national development are simply tremendous and Nigeria does not have the kind of economy to sustain a drawn-out development programme. Consequently, costly projects could not be completed. Expensive equipment and infrastructure go to waste due to a lack of funds. For their huge investments, all that could be seen after they were started are half-finished or half-heartedly undertaken projects, all dismal evidence of the fact that development is a difficult process. R. Gill (1964: 94) aptly noted economic development described this resulting situation when he wrote that "a poor country, in trying to do more than it can afford can easily sap the strength of the forces which might make for permanent economic development". The frustrations and disappointment of the people over the failure of their government to steer the nation toward progress eventually assume political dimensions. Because it is very convenient to do so, people blame the government for their misery. Radical groups, military, economic and political elites clash on what alternative the country should take toward development. More dangerously, the people become more susceptible to the promises of an ideology alien or opposed to that of their country. The results may lead to political instability in violent forms, including military coups and insurgency. There are strong reasons for the claim that the military possesses certain attributes to enable them to play a crucial role in national development. These are a superior organisation, effective systems and procedures and disciplined mode of behaviour, to name a few. Many students of the development process argue that the military exhibited these attributes when it took an active part in national affairs in many countries of Asia and Latin America.

L. Pye (1966), for instance, views the military as a modernising agent, a vigorous champion of change and development in some countries. He observes that in many underdeveloped countries, and even in the industrialised West, armies played an important role in providing technical training in the development of their industries. In Germany, military personnel were designated foremen in steel mills and other industries (Devilbiss, Binkin, 1988). In the United States, military engineers played a central role in the development of the West (Ledlie-Klosky, Klosky 2013).

In Japan, the military were credited with providing the reservoir of manpower for its industries (Ledlie-Klosky, Klosky 2013). In India, Malaya and the Philippines, the military trained people in the operation and maintenance of vehicles and machineries (Avant 2006). In the light of the foregoing observations, this paper points to the fact that the military can play a major role in national development.

This study, therefore, examines the role that the military plays towards national development in Nigeria in the post-cold war era and the emergence of globalisation. Whereas the Nigerian military can be involved in many nation-building activities besides the core duties, e.g. limited construction of public utility infrastructure, relief supplies services, peacekeeping, search and rescue, restoration of water supply systems, rehabilitation of water dams for irrigation, sinking of boreholes for community use and other civil related activities. They should be looked at more closely and seen whether they should be included in the core duties of the Nigerian military. This study tries to answer the question of whether these activities constitute significant national development and whether they compromise the core role of the military in the maintenance of security from external aggression. It is hypothesised that the military has a direct role in national development and that much more development is achieved through military actions that are not directly core security issues.

2. Concepts of development

The concern for development grew radically after the Second World War, particularly among the new nations which suddenly found themselves not only free from their colonial masters but also in a sad state of poverty. There is now a proliferation of literature on the subject, many of which espouse a particular development model for underdeveloped countries to follow. There is, however, no sufficient agreement as to the definition of development. Various authors offer contrasting views on what development is. This has led to confusion, for the term "defies a precise definition which is both sufficiently specific in the identification of all the elements and can be held to have generic utility" (Falk 1997: 351). One definition is that development is a process that pertains to those changes in society's pattern of values, structure and action and those increments in social and physical technology which

will lead to more efficient utilisation of the society's resources and contribute more to greater social welfare (Doménech, Davies, 2009). A similar definition contained in the UN report to the Secretary-General defines the development as growth plus change, the change being socio-economic and cultural, as well as quantitative and qualitative (Artuso 1999). It is also defined as a series of interdependent changes (Redclift 1992).

Other authors prefer to use the term *modernisation* and define it as a process of change toward the condition of modernity, the elements of which were given by the experiences of societies in Western Europe and North America which have achieved this status (Finlayson 2017). It is also referred to as a series of economic, social and political changes which began in Europe toward the end of the Middle Ages and which have continued up to the present, a transition from a traditional society (Artuso 1999), a process which enabled historically evolved institutions to adopt rapid changes that reflect the unprecedented increase in human knowledge permitting control of the environment. Social scientists contend that development should be pursued in terms of its ultimate goal – the realisation of the potential of the human personality (Brown 1951). Development using this paradigm is measured in terms of poverty (food and other necessities), unemployment (jobs and other gainful activities), and inequality (income, compared to others) – (Glennerster 2010).

Closely related to the social scientists' definition are the economists' views. They see development as a process whereby the real per capita income of a country increases over a while, under the condition that the number of people below an absolute poverty line does not increase and that income distribution does not become unequal (Glennerster 2010). More often, the economic model is more attractive in the sense that indices of development, e.g. GNP, per capita income and mortality rate can be quantified.

3. Nigeria's insecurity and political violence

With a variety of both renewable and non-renewable resources, Nigeria has one of the largest economies in Africa, and it is classified as a mixed economy emerging market with lower-middle-income status (Mensah, Özer, 2016).

Before 1956, when crude oil was discovered, the Nigerian economy was heavily hinged on agriculture (Ebeku 2018). In fact, at one time, Nigeria was the world's largest exporter of palm oil, cocoa, groundnuts and a substantial producer of cassava, sugar cane, pearl millet, coconuts, yams, maize and citrus fruits. Since the late 1950s, however, petroleum has overtaken and played monumental roles in Nigeria's economy, accounting for about 95% of exports and 95% of its total foreign exchange earnings. Petroleum also contributes about 80% of the Nigerian government revenue and thus moving from the generation of about 5100 barrels per day in 1958, Nigeria has emerged the "10th largest oil producer in the world" (Onoh 2018: 970) the third largest in Africa and the most prolific oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. She now has crude oil production of 2.51 mln barrels per day and thus shares 2.95% of the world production. She also has a daily crude export of 1.02 mln barrels to the United States alone, and proven reserves of 37.2 bln barrels (Oduyemi, Owoeye, 2020).

Nigeria, on the one hand, is fortunate to have enormous mineral and natural resources; on the other hand, she is tormented with turmoil within and outside her borders. Although fractures along ethnic and religious lines have received perhaps the most sustained international attention, much more important to Nigeria's security is the underdevelopment and the underlying complex causes. The major threats to Nigeria's security include terrorism, ethno-religious violence, communal crises, militancy in the Niger Delta, piracy, health and infectious diseases.

Terrorism in Nigeria is mainly perpetrated by Boko Haram. The exact origin of Boko Haram is obscure, but its linkage with Nigeria's fanatical Maitatsine sect of the early 1980s seems to resonate in most literature. Boko Haram translates to English as "Western education is forbidden", a programmatic motto that well reflects one of the group's aims; the group prefers to be identified by the name *Jama'atu Alhus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) – (Ekhomu 2019). The group is religiously motivated and espouses a pan-Islamic or Jihadi ideology. It wants to see the creation of an Islamic regime in northern Nigeria, free from Western influences. Boko Haram came to the attention of the Nigerian media in 2003, when it attacked police stations and government buildings in Yobe because of police intervention in fishing-rights disputes. The

group then referred to as the *Nigerian Taliban*, also ultimately attracted the attention of the media and the U.S. embassy in Nigeria. Boko Haram's major campaign began in 2009 when members on motorcycles shot some traffic policemen enforcing the use of helmets (Zenn 2017). The event was followed by a series of attacks on police stations, punctuated by a video that the group disseminated in which Mohammed Yusuf threatened more attacks on police and government buildings. In response, the government security agencies launched a full-scale operation against Boko Haram in 2009. Ibn Tammiyah mosque was cordoned, several people were killed, and some were executed without trial (Ekhomu 2019). The Nigerian Army arrested and handed over Mohammed Yusuf to the police during one of its raids, in 2009. M. Yusuf died in police custody, but the police claimed he died during a shootout. The surviving members fled, while others blended into society. The period between late 2009 and 2010 was relatively peaceful, which appeared to mark a victory for Nigerian security agencies. In reality, however, the sect used this period to reorganise and train across the Sahel and North Africa.

Now under the leadership of M. Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau, the group is said to have trained with other extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, and the Tuareg rebels in Mali. A. Shekau organised the group into cells that have committed atrocities across Nigeria in the years since. The frequency, audacity, ferocity, and indiscriminate nature of Boko Haram's attacks have cast doubts on Nigeria's ability to counter terrorism alone. Boko Haram and its cohorts have resorted to kidnapping for ransom and intimidation (Zenn 2017). Boko Haram represents a particularly dangerous extension of Nigeria's ethno-religious violence and communal crisis, which continues to present great threats to Nigeria's security and stability, with huge ramifications in terms of lives and property. Since the early 1980s, Nigeria has witnessed several ethno-religious crises (Hinshaw 2012). Some of these crises include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances in Kano, the *Zangon Kataf* crisis in Kaduna State, the Ife-modakeke crisis in Oyo State, and the most current ethno-religious violence in Jos, Plateau State. Most of the ethno-religious conflicts have triggered retaliation against religious or ethnic minorities in other parts of Nigeria.

Militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria also remains a major national security threat despite the federal government of Nigeria's amnesty agreement in 2009. The major militant groups that existed before the amnesty were the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – (Aniche 2019). Even after the amnesty agreement, the erstwhile militants still see themselves as the defenders of the Niger Delta people who have suffered neglect for decades in spite of the region's huge oil resources. Indeed, the oil industry has inspired some of the militancy and violence among the groups, angry over environmental degradation from oil spillage and gas flaring that is connected to the destruction of fishery habitat and agricultural land – the main means of livelihood for the locals. The militants capitalised on these environmental problems and hazards to perpetrate all sorts of crimes in the name of righting wrongs, and these actions have had significant effects on Nigeria's oil production capacity. The crimes include damaging and destroying the oil pipelines, stealing oil, and kidnapping of foreign oil workers for ransom. Kidnapping is aimed at the foreign employees of multinational companies, who covertly or overtly pay huge ransoms to the Niger Delta militants.

Nigeria now ranks third, after Mexico and India, among the top 20 countries in the world with the highest kidnapping rate (Oluwadare 2019). In a move to stop this criminality, the government granted amnesty to all the militants. The amnesty agreement required the militants to hand over arms, ammunition, and equipment to the government and to give up criminal acts. For its part, the government promised reforms and other immediate benefits to the militants. The central government also inaugurated rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for the ex-militants. It is estimated that Nigeria spends more than 400 mln NGN (nairas), i.e. ca 907,607 EUR, every year for the amnesty programme (Oluwadare 2019). Despite these huge sums of money spent on the post-amnesty programme, militancy and criminality, especially oil theft and kidnappings, continue in the Niger Delta. Most of the criminality is blamed on disaffected militants who either are dissatisfied with the amnesty package or perhaps prefer to make easy money from oil theft instead of reintegrating into society. The ramifications of their activities are the further degradation of the environ-

ment from destroyed oil pipelines and the high loss of revenue to the country. Nigeria loses about 400 mln NGN (ca 907,607 EUR daily because of illegal oil activities (Wilson 2014).

4. Underlying causes of insecurity in Nigeria

Generally, the drivers of insecurity in a country can be categorised as either internal or external. H. Idris (2013) argue that internal sources are the key drivers of insecurity in Nigeria. The internal root causes that ramify most in Nigeria include poverty and illiteracy. Poverty is a major catalyst for insecurity in Nigeria. Despite enormous resources and wealth, most Nigerians still live in abject poverty. For example, World Bank data show that about 46% of the total population lives below the poverty line. As of 2010, about 50.2% of Nigerians live on less than 2 USD a day (Paulinus, Wonah, 2020). Notably, Nigeria's monthly living wage or minimum wage was about 7500 NGN (ca 17 EUR a day) until 2011 (Nkwatoh, Nathaniel, 2018). In 2012, the Nigerian Senate passed a bill increasing the minimum wage to 18,000 NGN monthly (ca 412 EUR monthly or ca 1.40 EUR a day) – (Paulinus, Wonah, 2020). However, most states, especially in impoverished northern, have not been able to comply with the provisions of the bill. The data from the National Bureau for Statistics in Nigeria shows that unemployment has increased from less than 10 mln people in 2006 to about 17 mln in 2011 (Paulinus, Wonah, 2020). Unemployment is closely related to poverty, as most of the poor people are either unemployed or underemployed. What is most worrisome is that most of those affected are the young. For instance, according to the National Bureau for Statistics, Nigeria, the percentage of unemployed persons based on age distribution is more than 35% of Nigerians aged 15-25 years and about 22% for those aged 25-44 years (Alumona, Onwuanabile, 2019). These statistics imply that the segment of Nigerian society that should be the most vibrant and active is unemployed. With the unemployment rate coupled with the high poverty rate, extremist groups brainwash the youth and entice them with promises of a better life than the government can provide. Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria used this strategy for recruitment. Additionally, most of the militants in the Niger Delta were unemployed or had menial jobs before joining the groups.

5. The Nigerian state and the formation of the Nigerian military

Like many African militaries, the Nigerian armed forces are the creation of the country's former colonial masters. During the colonial period, the Nigerian military remained relatively small vis-à-vis the total area for which it was responsible. Its responsibilities primarily focused internally as it served to accent the power, authority, and legitimacy of the British colonial rule (Manea, Rüland, 2012). Moreover, for most of its colonial history, the Nigerian military remained completely independent from the departments of the Nigerian colonial government. Internal control of the Nigerian forces was typically exercised through the commanding generals at district headquarters in Lagos where the governor-general of Nigeria was officially the commander-in-chief of the Nigerian Military Forces (Muffett, Luckham, 1972). The command, however, was largely nominal. As late as 1956, Nigerian units remained part of the West Africa Command under the British Army whose headquarters was located at Accra in the Gold Coast. Accordingly, the commanding generals of Nigerian units reported directly to the command in West Africa and hence to the war office in London and not to the government in Lagos. During the colonial period, the relationship between the Nigerian armed forces and the Nigerian people was characterised more or less by mutual antipathy.

The Nigerian people regarded the military for most of the colonial period as the instrument of colonial power, fashioned by the British Crown to destroy any political independence of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria (Agara 2006). The presence of Nigerian forces in villages, towns, or neighbourhoods was not seen as a positive sign by Nigerian people. Instead, many citizens felt the presence of Nigerian forces often signified trouble or outright disaster. The Nigerian people's negative perception of the Nigerian military was further exacerbated by unruly soldiers. Many soldiers often abused their authority by taking law into their own hands, imposing fines, and inflicting levies on inhabitants. These actions did not foster a good relationship between Nigeria's military and its people. However, things began to change after independence from Britain in October 1960; notwithstanding, it inherited a pattern of civil-military relations that was long entrenched in the British tradition of civilian control. However, British officers predominantly occupied most officer and non-

commissioned officer posts in the Nigerian armed forces at the time. In fact, by 1960, only 18% of officers in the Nigerian military were Nigerians, and most of them served in administrative rather than leadership positions (Agara 2006).

For the first years of independence, the Nigerian government made no decisions on the role of the armed forces. Instead, the country's armed forces remained relatively small and were largely left alone. The constitutional framework that the British put in place in Nigeria before it departed could hardly contain the ethnic cleavages in the country. In the years following independence, it quickly became clear that the Westminster-style parliamentary system that the British had left would fail. The differing agendas of the three main ethnic groups coupled with the deep-rooted social polarities and peculiarities of power politics in the region would prove detrimental in a country that needed a miracle (Auma-Osolo 1980). As the political elite postured to capture government power and resources, the Republican Constitution, which ushered in the First Republic in 1963, lasted only three years before it was overthrown by the first military coup in January 1966. Moreover, the Nigerian ministers lived extravagantly while they urged the people to accept austerity for the sake of economic development and starved the government of any moral authority amongst the public. When law and order collapsed to the point that the Nigerian government heavily relied on force to secure its perpetuation in office, the January 1966 coup 26 plotters believed that they were acting in the interests of all Nigerians to end a corrupt and discredited despotism by removing the civilian government.

One conspirator, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu stated: "We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system" (Agbese, Kieh, 1992: 7). Additionally, in a radio broadcast, the leader of the group announced: "The military has taken over to bring an end to gangsterism and disorder, corruption and despotism. My compatriots, you will no longer need to be ashamed to be Nigerians" (Agara 2006: 62). It is documented that the first coup was well received by the Nigerian people who believed that it was a legitimate instrument of regime-change in the country. General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi took over the government in 1966, promising the Nigerian people that the military's stay in power would only be temporary. His attempt to impose a military gov-

ernment in Nigeria, however, would turn out to be a disaster largely because of how the first coup took place.

During the first coup, many Northern officers and leaders were killed while Southern officers' lives were spared. As a result, heightened ethnic division fomented in the military and exacerbated the ethnic tensions, ultimately leading to a counter-coup later that year. This chain of events worsened the national crises. As the new head of state, Colonel Yakubu Gowon attempted to ease tensions; however, this too failed to pacify the mistrust and suspicions within the government and the military. Differences between the military governor of the Eastern region, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, and Colonel Yakubu Gowon sparked off another chain of events that led to the Eastern region seceding from the Nigerian federation and eventually to the Nigerian Civil War, which lasted from 1967 until January 1970 (Agara 2006). When the war ended, two important consequences would continue to influence civil-military relations in Nigeria. First, the Nigerian military increased largely in size after the war. Such a large armed force raised scholarly debate which questioned the legitimacy of such a sizeable military presence. Second, when the Nigerian military emerged from the war with the nation still intact, the military leaders came to see the armed forces as a symbol of the national unity. These leaders felt it was their responsibility to intervene whenever violent and fractious politics threatened the country's integrity (Muffett, Luckham 1972). Interestingly, however, the Nigerian armed forces saw military rule itself as an aberration and necessitated only by social crises. As such, in the period following the end of the civil war, Nigerians witnessed several transition plans by various military governments in which the military junta vowed to lead the country toward democracy and remove the military permanently from politics. In the post-civil-war period, the Nigerian military intervened in the polity of the country six times, of which only two led to a successful military-led transition to civil rule. Each time the military intervened, it justified its actions by stating that it was necessary to eliminate the massive corruption in the country by civilian leaders or that the previous military leader was not committed to the transition process to military rule. During the 1970s, scholars agreed with the popular opinion. They believed that the discipline in and the perceived absence of ethnic or regional divisions in the military

institution made the military the best alternative to ensure stability and economic development in Nigeria (Agara 2006).

6. The Nigerian army after the independence

At independence, the Nigerian Army's strength of about 10,500 all ranks was structured into four infantry battalions with the combat support units (Mensah 2019). Two infantry battalions and two artillery batteries were deployed in Northern Nigeria and the other two infantry battalions were deployed in the South. The strength of the Nigerian army rose up to 250,000 all ranks at the end of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970. By the time the civil war ended in 1970, the Nigerian Army had grown to some 200,000 men, among them many untrained recruits. Since then, there have been some violent incidents between army troops and civilians and police, mainly in the North (Mbanasor, Sampson, 2004). There has been vague talk of the need to demobilize, but the federal leaders are in no hurry to do so, and Nigeria seemed likely to have a relatively large standing army for some time to come. For economic reasons and Nigeria's threat perception, the strength was later reduced to about 150,000 all ranks and structured into three Infantry Divisions and Lagos Garrison Organization (LGO). In 1982, there was another structuring of the Nigerian Army (Mbanasor, Sampson, 2004).

Emphasis was placed on increased mobility and improved firepower. That exercise marked the beginning of the concept of mechanisation of the Nigerian Army. To make the structure effective, the Nigerian Army procured more sophisticated equipment and trained more personnel on operational and professional courses locally and overseas. The poor economic situation of the 1990s necessitated a review of Nigeria's defence policy and the restructuring of the Nigerian Army to match with the economic realities of that time. The period coincidentally witnessed more of the Nigerian Army's involvement in various Internal Security (IS) operations, participation in peacekeeping operations and the imbroglio with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. In addition to these, Nigeria was apprehensive of possible conflicts with her other neighbours. It would require a well-structured force with adequate manpower and equipment to meet these challenges. By the late 1990s, the Nigerian Army

was too large, but to downsize the army requires alternative employment for Nigerian soldiers to avoid social unrest. The military in Nigeria was very strong and very powerful. The question was not whether that military was going to be reduced in strength or effectiveness, but what attitudes will they have once the civilian government took place. The military had been the greatest threat to civilian stability in the country, and it needed to be trained by an army and a country that understands how a military ought to relate to a civilian government.

According to A. Omeni (2018), the Nigerian Army, the largest of the services, has about 67,000 personnel.

7. The emerging roles of the Nigerian military

There have been recent trends that have had an impact on the role of military establishments. One such trend is globalisation caused by the forces of liberal trade and technological advancement. These forces have shrunk the world to an unprecedented extent and have resulted in a high degree of interconnectedness and interdependence between states. At the same time, those forces that draw the country closer in the market place have fostered diverse security threats, e.g. environmental threats, transnational crime and terrorist acts. Many countries are finding it difficult to handle these security challenges on their own as such threats transcend borders. Security challenges have, thus, become more diverse and multifaceted in an interconnected world, political, economic and even environmental factors have an impact on the security of the nations. These new strategic realities dictate that closer cross-border cooperation and multi-dimensional responses are increasingly needed to ensure national and regional security. While the possibility of inter-state conflict cannot be ruled out, what is more worrisome is the increase in intra-state conflicts. Now, fragile states face secessionist, ethnic and various other intra-state tensions caused by a myriad of factors, e.g. the erosion of bureaucracy. This has an impact on both the state itself and its neighbours.

The strategic trends highlighted to make it imperative for regional defence establishments to rethink their security roles. However, the traditional role of the military as the guardian of national sovereignty and territorial integrity will remain un-

changed given the strategic uncertainties in the region. This role has to be complemented with a new role, that of promoting regional security. With greater security interdependence between states, regional militaries should see themselves playing a bigger role in contributing to regional peace and stability. In this new role, the Nigerian Armed Forces have contributed to regional peacekeeping missions, the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief, and undertaken various civic action activities to improve the living standards of the public.

Peacekeeping in the 21st century is a challenge for the military as such missions no longer deal with conventional inter-state conflicts where the role of peacekeepers is largely confined to monitoring the demilitarised zones. Peacekeeping now does not simply involve just military or police actions. Instead, peacekeeping has evolved to be multi-dimensional where peacekeepers, amongst their traditional roles, help to strengthen the rule of law and to monitor human rights violations (Pearson, Miner 1972). Peacekeepers also tackle issues related to disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration in particular of child soldiers, as well as repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Increasingly, peacekeepers are also working with NGOs in the peace-building process.

Humanitarian relief is an important area of concern for the modem militaries in view of the many large-scale disasters that may occur in a state. The bombing of the American Embassy is an example of a disaster where the military had to use their resources to minimise the level of suffering and save as many lives as possible. These unprecedented disasters require highly skilled teams that can be mobilised within minimal time delay, such kind of attributes are easily available in the military. These major disasters, man-made or natural, do not respect political boundaries, and have the potential to inflict damage on local and regional economies, as well as the social stability and security of states. The most recent tsunami disaster with its origin off the coast of Indonesia has brought damage up to the African coast with Somalia being badly hit (Burrows 2019). These disasters inflict more damage than any military invasion.

Besides disaster relief, the Nigerian armed forces in the region can contribute to regional security by engaging in navigational safety and security cooperation. The

use of the waters in drug trafficking and illegal fishing has adverse effects on the economy and therefore a need to safeguard our coastline. Given the fact that pirates, militant and Boko Haram are a real threat to the county's development, as a regional concern the Nigerian Navy should take charge to boost security in the region. Most of the trade in the world is conducted via the sea and thus the control of the West African and the Horn of Africa is of vital importance to the economic well-being of Nigeria and the countries in the region There is also the danger of a major ecological disaster involving oil spills if oil tankers are attacked and left unmanned.

The new strategic trends in the 21st century have also meant that the military needs to take on the added responsibility as a defence diplomat, a task usually performed by foreign affairs officers. Military officers can help to build the foundations for regional cooperation which is based on mutual trust and confidence. They can do so by forging close defence ties and promoting military exchanges and exercises. Defence dialogue and interactions will serve as additional channels for countries to resolve differences and misunderstandings. Such defence diplomacy and networking can help to reduce miscalculations, and promote a culture of peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. Defence diplomacy can be conducted through various means such as student exchanges, joint exercises and seminars.

Joint military exercises with foreign countries are one way in which regional forces can benchmark themselves against highly professional counterparts and at the same time serving to promote transparency and bilateral defence ties. Thirdly, seminars can facilitate interaction among regional militaries and serve as non-political forums for senior military officers to meet and discuss professional military subjects on a non-attribution basis. An important aspect of defence diplomacy is the development of multilateral programmes designed to promote understanding and trust among regional forces.

8. The Nigerian Armed Forces and poverty eradication

Nigeria survived these turbulent times but more democratic space emerged with calls for a multiparty system of government. Though the authoritarian regime retained power some consecutive terms, the desire for democracy has always re-

mained high among the Nigerian people. Many Nigerian believe that there is a need for significant changes in the new world order, where accountability and transparency are the panaceas to modern governance. In Nigeria today the state cannot feed its entire people and thus those hungry have nothing to lose if they committed suicidal attacks at the promise of some money to relieve the rest of their families from continued suffering. These single suicidal bombers are worse than any other military force in the world; you do not know who they are and where they are. These new actors in the international system have various names (terrorists, criminals) but in essence they are among the disillusioned poor people who have lost hope in this world. They can easily be bought with very little and since they have given up in life, they risk and even sacrifice their own lives, the consistent suicide bomb attack in the Northern part of the country continues to show this (Agara 2006). These threats and others discussed earlier offer some of the most critical challenges to the political leaders and military strategists. The broadened thinking of national security has therefore reduced the efficacy of the military strategy in dealing with all the various threats that face the world now. Therefore military strategists must go back to the drawing board and formulate such military strategies that will be able to defeat the enemy that is threatening the survival of the state. In Nigeria, the most existential threat has been identified as poverty and the political objective has been set as eradication of poverty. Consequently the military has to strategise bearing in mind that the main enemy of the state is poverty and therefore formulate military strategies that will assist in defeating the enemy. Poverty touches on all the instruments of national power in that, poor populace becomes unproductive thus stagnating economic growth, there is an increased crime as the poor use all means to satisfy their basic human needs and thus directly affect the security of the state when these two areas are touched it follows that the populace becomes ungovernable and could lead to the collapse of a state. This is not an easy task for the military given that since time immemorial; the military has been concerned with facing armed enemies mostly from the external borders. This form of threat calls for a complete paradigm shift in the operationalisation of the military strategy. Unlike in the traditional doctrines, enemies with sophisticated arsenals, the new enemy does not need conventional weapons to deal with.

First one needs to understand that governments need to be strategic in the poverty eradication and wealth creation as well as incorporate the policy statements into the military strategy and then operationalise them. There have been three main policy documents that outline the government objectives in the fight against poverty.

In Nigeria, involvement in poverty alleviation programmes is mostly through women association groups. These are groups composed of officers and servicemen's spouses in each service. There are the Army Women Welfare Association, Air Force Women Welfare Association and Navy Women Welfare Association, each charged with the responsibility of coordinating women's welfare activities in their respective services. The Armed Forces should be seen directly involved in these programmes. The Army Engineers have departments that deal solely with civil projects. Such projects are contracts awarded by the government. They are usually large projects requiring quick action and the government pays the Armed Forces for any contracts awarded. The cost of the project is usually lower than if it was undertaken by a civil contractor. Like the Engineers, the Army Signals has a department that solely deals with civil projects that are communications in nature. Again, such projects are large and require urgent action (Manea, Jürgen, 2012). Depending on circumstances, both the Engineers and Signals can carry out some government projects free of charge. Civil action units are separate from operational units and they are mainly staffed with civilians. Military officers are rotated between such units and operational units.

Like in the case of India, the Egyptian Armed Forces are large compared to that of Nigeria. Some key facts about it are: The Army Logistics has separate units that are also involved in commercial activities (Barany 2018). Such activities include the operation of supermarkets and farming in both agriculture and livestock. All proceeds from commercial activities go to the Armed Forces and not the Exchequer. The Force operates military industries that manufacture both military and civil products. The Military manufactures its uniforms, weapons, vehicles and other equipment. The Force is also heavily involved in research projects in collaboration with other institutions. Civilians are served in military hospitals at subsidised prices (Barany 2018). Unlike in Nigeria, they are served free of charge in times of crisis. The Nigerian Armed Forces can learn from and in cooperate into its programme.

9. Options available to the Nigerian Armed Forces

Lessons learned from countries with more advanced forces show that involvement of the Armed Forces in poverty alleviation and economic development programmes should not interfere with operational readiness. Therefore, four options are open to the Nigerian Armed Forces to be detached from poverty alleviation and economic development programmes and concentrate on its core function of ensuring security from external and internal aggression. This option has a major disadvantage in that it will isolate the Armed Forces from the rest of the community. There will also be a feeling that the Armed Forces are not doing enough for the country during peacetime. Another option is that the armed forces should be involved in poverty alleviation and economic development without any demarcation between the resources to be used for these programmes and those that are intended for operational readiness. In other words, maintain the current status quo. Substantial rehabilitation of the existing equipment will be necessary. There will be need for additional equipment. The main disadvantage of this option is that it will be difficult to avoid interference with operational readiness. Reaction to situations will also continue to be on ad hoc basis. The third option is that the Armed Forces should be involved in poverty alleviation and economic development programmes, but there should be a clear demarcation between the resources to be used for these programmes and those meant for operational readiness. This option requires a substantial injection of additional funds for rehabilitation and the sustenance of existing equipment and the introduction of new ones. It may also require a reorganisation of the Armed Forces. The fourth option is similar to the second one but calls for more radical changes. It involves the establishment of civil action units that are separate from operational units and mainly staffed with civilians. Military officers are to be rotated between such units and operational ones. The main disadvantage of this option is that it calls for a major reorganisation of the Armed Forces, as well as a large injection of additional finances for personnel recruitment and purchase of the necessary equipment.

The recommendation of this paper is a combination of options two and three with the following guidelines for implementation. Poverty alleviation and economic

development is a continuous process in which the role of the individual is important. It involves empowering an individual to meet basic needs. The individual has, however, to play a role in the whole process. While it is a good idea for the Armed Forces to be involved in poverty alleviation and economic development programmes, it should not be seen to be taking opportunities away from other Nigerians. To avoid such an eventuality, the Armed Forces involvement should be limited to those programmes that may be outside the reach of the civil enterprises due to insecurity and inaccessibility. Some projects can be more expensive if carried out by the Armed Forces than they would be if carried out by the civil enterprises which have existing infrastructure. The Armed Forces should, therefore, be involved in only those projects for which necessary infrastructure lacks in the civil enterprises. The projects to be undertaken by the Armed Forces should be limited to only those that have security implications and in those areas where civilian contractors cannot operate. These may involve the provision of water in areas where communities fight over it, provision of access roads in rural areas for food security and programmes involving disaster prevention/management. In the short-term, there should be a budget for disaster prevention/management that is separate from the operational budget. This should aim at rehabilitation and sustenance of the existing equipment. In the mid-term, it should be aimed at the procurement of more equipment for capacity building. In the long-term, it should be for the creation of units dedicated to civic action.

Though the Armed Forces should not be seen to be directly involved in competitive commercial activities, existing facilities such as the Nigeria Ordinance Factories Cooperation can participate in some income-generating activities. This can be achieved through the recruitment of competent management from the corporate world. There should be more involvement of the armed forces in research. This will enhance the production of more skilled manpower not only for the Armed Forces but also for the national economy. The Armed Forces involvement should not be seen to be in terms of individual services but in terms of a combined effort of the three services.

10. Conclusion

It is argued in this article that the Nigerian Military should welcome the challenge of participating in poverty alleviation and economic development programmes only to the extent that it does not interfere with operational readiness. The Nigerian Military should also not be seen to be taking away opportunities from civil enterprises. In this respect, projects undertaken should be limited to those in an insecure or inaccessible environment. There should also be continued support to disaster-related programmes and calamities. However, to be effective in all these undertakings, the Nigerian Military needs to be enhanced in terms of manpower and equipment. The Nigerian Military should be more involved in poverty alleviation and economic development programmes but should not be seen to compete with the civil enterprises. In this respect, civil-military operations should be limited to those with security implications and those that are in areas that are inaccessible to civil enterprises. In all programmes involving other government ministries or departments, the parent ministry or department should be the sponsor of the project. Armed Forces' involvement should be through detailed policies. The Armed Forces' capability to participate in civil programmes should be enhanced. This should be a gradual process that starts with the rehabilitation of existing equipment, followed by the acquisition of new ones to fill the existing shortfalls and then expansion through additional personnel and equipment. In the long-term, there should be a budget, personnel and equipment that are separate from operational resources. This should apply to Engineers, Transport, Medical, Air Force and Navy resources. A coordination centre should, however, be centralised at Defence Headquarters (DHQ) in the future, Armed Forces deployments of a battle group and above should be coupled with numerous civic projects. There should be a department, within the Armed Forces, that coordinates civic action. If well-coordinated, the Armed Forces can be involved in commercial activities without interference in its core functions.

11. References

Agara T., 2006: *The military factor in Nigerian Democracy*. "The Constitution", 6,1, 51-70.

Agbese P., Kieh G., 1992: *Military Disengagement From African Politics, the Nigerian Experience*. "Afrika Spectrum", 27, 1, 5-24.

Alumona I. M., Onwuanabile K. M., 2019: *Environmental Insecurity in Nigeria*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aniche E. T., 2019: *Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta Region*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aras G., Crowther D., 2009: *Making sustainable development sustainable*. "Management Decision", 47, 6, 975-988.

Artuso A., 1999: *Bioprospecting, Benefit Sharing and Sustainable Development: Linking Short and Long Term Strategies*. "The Journal of Environment and Development Economics" 7, 1, 74-86.

Auma-Osolo A., 1980: *Objective African Military Control; A New Paradigm in Civil-Military Relations*. "Journal of Peace Research", 17, 1, 29-46.

Avant D. D., 2006: *Private Military Companies and the Future of War*. "African Development", 26, 2, 337-366.

Barany Z., 2018: *Military influence in foreign policy-making: changing dynamics in North African regimes*. "Journal of North African Studies" 5, 4, 87-92.

Bassey S. A., Mendie J. G., 2019: *Alexis Kagame's Ontological Categories*. "Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal", XI, 1, 23-32.

Brown J. D., 1951: *The Discovery, Development, and Use of Social Scientists*. "The Journal of Higher Education", 22, 9, 459.

Burrows M., 2019: *Water access in post-tsunami Indonesia*. "Population and Environment", 40, 4, 411-433.

Devilbiss M. C., Binkin M., 1988: *Military Technology and Defense Manpower*. Political Science Quarterly, 103, 2, 393-402.

Doménech T., Davies M., 2009: *The Role of Industrial Symbiosis in Sustainable Development*. "The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic, and Social Sustainability: Annual Review", 5, 3, 173–188.

Ebeku K. A., 2018: *Cyprus Hydrocarbons: Lessons from the Nigerian Experience*. "European Scientific Journal", 14, 1, 75-84.

Ekhomu O., 2019: *History of Boko Haram. In Boko Haram*. Boca-raton, Florida: CRC Pres.

Falk R., 1997: *Muller on development*. "Theory in Biosciences", 116, 4, 349–366.

Finlayson A., 2017: *The meaning of modernisation*. "Soundings", 23, 3, 62–83.

Gill R. T., 1964: *Economic development: Past and present*. "Industrial and Labor Relations Review", 17,4, 646-678.

Glennerster H., 2010: *The sustainability of western welfare states Seminar paper The Sustainability of Western Welfare States*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Hinshaw D., 2012: *Nigeria Torn by Rising Religious Violence*. "Transafrican Journal of History", 19,5, 331-539.

Idris M., 2013: *Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria*. "Public Administration Research", 2, 1, 56-62.

Killingray D., Peters J., 1998: The Nigerian Military and the State. "The International Journal of African Historical Studies", 31, 1, 154-163.

Ledlie-Klosky J., Klosky W. E., 2013: *Men of action: French influence and the founding of American civil and military engineering*. "Construction History", 28, 3, 69–87.

Manea M. G., Rüland J., 2012: *Taking stock of military reform in Nigeria*. Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer

Mbanasor J. A., Sampson A., 2004: *Socio-economic determinants of Turkey production among Nigerian soldiers*. "Discovery and Innovation", 16, 4, 149-156.

Mensah C., Özer M., 2016: *Africa's Economy: Trends, Challenges, Prospects and Potentials*. "International Journal of African and Asian Studies", 26, 1, 53-63.

Mensah E., 2019: *The New Language Policy of the Nigerian Army: National Integration or Linguistic Imperialism?* "Journal of Asian and African Studies" 54,3, 331-345.

Muffett D. M., Luckham R., 1972: *The Army in NigeriaThe Nigerian Military*. "African Studies Review", 15,1, 137.

Muffett D. M., Luckham, R., 1972: *The Army in NigeriaThe Nigerian Military*. "African Studies Review", 15, 1, 137-142.

Nkwatoh L. S., Nathaniel H. A., 2018: *Effect of Insecurity on Economic Growth in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Management Sciences*, 1, 2, 69-75.

Oduyemi G., Owoeye T., 2020: *Oil price fluctuation and health outcomes in an oil exporting country: Evidence from Nigeria*. "International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy", 10, 4, 212-220.

Oluwadare A. 2019: *Militancy and Criminality in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill publisher.

Omeni A., 2018: *North-east and Chad Basin sub-regional COIN effort, 2014–2017*. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group.

Onoh J. K., 2018: *The Impact of Oil on the Nigerian Economy*. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group.

Paulinus J., Wonah, E. I., 2020: *Insecurity, Election and Democracy In Nigeria*. "International Journal of Research in Commerce and Management Studies", 2, 1, 11-17.

Pearson P. F., Miner N. J., 1972: *The Nigerian Army 1956-1966*. "Military Affairs", 36,3, 114-120.

Pye L., 1966: *Aspects of Political Development*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Redclift M., 1992: *The meaning of sustainable development*. "Geoforum", 23, 3, 395–403.

Wilson G., 2014: *The Nigerian State and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria*. "Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa", 16, 1, 69-81.

Yahaya J. U., Bello, M. M., 2019: *An Overview of the Challenges of Peace and National Integration in Nigeria Politics*. "International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research", 3, 8, 20-28.

Zenn J., 2017: *Demystifying al-Qaida in Nigeria: Cases from Boko Haram's Founding, Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings*. "Perspectives on Terrorism", 11, 6, 174-190.

Eseje
Essays

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Bez retuszu.

Wywiad z profesorem Kazimierzem Dziewońskim

Zbigniew Rykiel

Stowarzyszenie Naukowe Przestrzeń Społeczna i Środowisko,

al. Rejtana 16c, 35-959 Rzeszów

gniew@poczta.onet.pl

Abstract

Without retouching. Interview with Professor Kazimierz Dziewoński

Prof. dr Kazimierz Dziewoński (1910-1994) is a classic of modern Polish settlement geography. As a longtime employee, and at one time a deputy director of the Institute of Geography (and Spatial Organization), Polish Academy of Sciences, He created his own scientific school, which has gained widespread international recognition. He promoted 21 doctors, among whom the present author was the forteenth one. For his students and co-workers, Professor was an undisputed master and substantive authority, but also a hero of numerous anecdotes. This does not change the fact that the most prominent Professor's students undertook with his master a scientific polemic, which he bravely endured. The most important Professor K. Dziewoński's theoretical concepts are: the theory of the urban economic base, the theory of the economic region and the concept of the settlement system, which – despite having entered the canon of spatial research – are still a source of intellectual inspiration.

Professor's true format was manifested in the fact that he never rested on the intellectual laurels of his professorship, but not only worked intellectually, but also studied until the end of his days. Larry Bourne of the University of Toronto aptly wrote after prof. K. Dziewoński's death: "He was a great man [...]. I personally learned a lot more from Him than He ever thought" (cf. footnote 1). This last sentence can be repeated by many of us – Professor's students – who are aware that the criticism of the Master's works by those of us who dared to do so, was – to paraphrase Yi-Fu Tuan – the sincerest form of praise.

A formal, concise, biography of prof. K. Dziewoński can be found in the Polish edition of Wikipedia. The only foreign – English – language version strikes, however, with both a poverty of content and linguistic awkwardness. Despite an attempt to publish a volume devoted to Professor K. Dziewoński a few years ago, this undertaking – entangled in the modes of bureaucratic machine of institutional science – did not come to fruition. This text can therefore be regarded as a tribute to the Master on the 110th anniversary of His birth. The last two sentences of this interview are dedicated to those who understand anything of this: "scientific work, a good scientific work, defends itself. It will not die".

1. Wstęp

Prof. dr Kazimierz Dziewoński (1910-1994) jest klasykiem nowoczesnej polskiej geografii osadnictwa. Jako długoletni pracownik, a w pewnym okresie wicedyrektor, Instytutu Geografii (i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania) Polskiej Akademii Nauk stworzył własną szkołę naukową, która zdobyła powszechne uznanie międzynarodowe. Wypromował 21 doktorów, wśród których piszący te słowa był 14. z kolei. Profesor był dla swych uczniów i współpracowników niekwestionowanym mistrzem i autorytetm merytorycznym, co nie zmienia faktu, że wybitniejsi z nich podejmowali ze swym mistrzem polemikę naukową, którą znosił mężnie. Najważniejsze koncepcje teoretyczne profesora K. Dziewońskiego to: teoria bazy ekonomicznej miasta, teoria regionu ekonomicznego oraz koncepcja systemu osadniczego, które – mimo że weszły do kanonu badań przestrzennych – wciąż są źródłem inspiracji intelektualnej.

Szacunek, jakim cieszył się prof. K. Dziewoński wśród swych uczniów, nie zmienia faktu, że Profesor był bohaterem licznych anegdot. Charakterologicznie choleryk, co sam podkreślał, potrafił reagować (zbyt) gwałtownie na bulwersujące go zachowania, co następnie łagodził okazywaniem specyficznego zakłopotania, które jednak mieli okazję zauważyć tylko nieliczni. Urodzony jako osoba leworęczna, był – zgodnie z duchem epoki – socjalizowany do normatywnej praworęczności, czego skutkiem był fakt, że pisał prawą ręką, rysował zaś lewą. Urodzony pod Moskwą, nigdy publicznie nie mówił po rosyjsku, tłumacząc, że nie chce kaleczyć języka A. Puszkina. Kiedy w czasach pierestrojki kolejne seminarium polsko-radzieckie odbyło się we Lwowie, organizatorzy z Moskwy postanowili oprowadzić polskich kolegów po radzieckim mieście, co szło im niespecjalnie; prof. K. Dziewoński, który znał to miasto najlepiej z całej wycieczki, gdyż tam był studiował, rzekł wówczas do gospodarzy: „to może ja Was oprowadzę". Kiedy na innym seminarium polsko-radzieckim – we Wrocławiu – pewien członek delegacji polskiej przez kurtuazję próbował wygłaszać swój referat po rosyjsku, nie znając tego języka, Profesor rzekł: „niech Pan mówi po polsku, wtedy przynajmniej Polacy będą Pana rozumieć". Największy podziw obserwatorów budziła jednak umiejętność Profesora polegająca na

tym, że – przysnąwszy z brodą na piersi poczas nudnej prelekcji – potrafił nie tylko obudzić się w odpowiednim czasie, ale i zabrać sensownie głos w dyskusji.

Prawdziwy format Profesora przejawiał się w fakcie, że nigdy nie spoczął na laurach intelektualnych swej profesury, lecz nie tylko pracował intelektualnie, ale i uczył się do końca swoich dni. Trafnie ujął to Larry Bourne z Uniwersytetu w Toronto, który po śmierci prof. K. Dziewońskiego napisał: „Był wielkim człowiekiem […]. Ja osobiście nauczyłem się od Niego wiele więcej niż kiedykolwiek sądził"[1]. To ostatnie zdanie może powtórzyć niejeden z nas – uczniów Profesora, którzy mają świadomość, że krytyka dzieł Mistrza przez tych z nas, którzy się na to odważyli, była – by sparafrazować Yi-Fu Tuana, najszczerszą formą pochwały. W tym kontekście dwa ostatnie zdania poniższego wywiadu dedykuję tym, którzy cokolwiek z tego rozumieją.

Poniżej przedstawiono rozmowę z prof. Kazimierzem Dziewońskim z dnia 25 listopada 1987 r., będącą częścią znacznie dłuższej rozmowy jej uczestników. Zredagowana forma tego wywiadu, mimo drobnych skrótów paru wątków pobocznych, nie zmienia mówionej formy narracji i w żadnym razie nie poddaje wypowiedzi retuszowi. Piszący te słowa żywi nadzieję, że wywiad ten – opublikowany po 33 latach – okaże się nie tylko ciekawym świadectwem epoki, ale i inspirujący.

Formalny, zwięzły, życiorys naukowy prof. K. Dziewońskiego można znaleźć w polskim wydaniu Wikipedii[2]. Jego jedyna wersja obcojęzyczna – angielska[3] – poraża natomiast zarówno ubóstwem treści, jak i nieporadnością językową. Mimo podjętej kilka lat temu próby wydania tomu poświęconego profesorowi K. Dziewońskiemu przez były instytut Profosora i piszącego te słowa, przedsięwzięcie to – uwikłane w tryby biurokratycznej machiny nauki istytucjonalnej – nie doszło do skutku. Niniejszy tekst traktuję zatem jako hołd złożony Mistrzowi w 110. rocznicę Jego urodzin i minioną niedawno 25. rocznicę Jego śmierci.

---

[1] J. Kostrowicki, P. Korcelli, 1994: *Wspomnienia pośmiertne: Kazimierz Dziewoński (1910-1994)*. „Rocznik Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego", 57, s. 52.
[2] https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazimierz_Dziewoński.
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazimierz_Dziewoński.

2. Wywiad

Zbigniew Rykiel: Dzisiaj chciałbym rozpocząć naszą rozmowę od tematu światopoglądu. Mianowicie chciałbym rozpocząć od pytania, jakie środowisko kształtowało światopogląd Pana Profesora.

Kazimierz Dziewoński: Muszę powiedzieć, że bardzo różne środowiska. Najpierw środowisko rodzinne, a nawet gdy już podzielone na dwie części, bo ojciec reprezentował światopogląd przyrodniczy z końca XIX czy początków XX wieku, politycznie bardzo liberalny, może nawet lewicowy. Moja matka reprezentowała środowisko katolickie, może, powiedzmy, postępowe, ale też z końca XIX wieku. Wychowana była w klasztorze niepokalanek. Szkołę kończyła tam. Więc to były już podwójne, nie zawsze zgodne ze sobą, wpływy światopoglądowe. Ale największy wpływ światopoglądowy na mnie wywarła oczywiście praca w czasie akademickim, w stowarzyszeniu Odrodzenie, które było bardzo specyficznym środowiskiem, ulegającym wpływom dwóch zakonów: z jednej strony dominikanów, z drugiej strony – benedyktynów, i które się cechowało oczywiście wpływami filozofii tomistycznej, czy nawet, można powiedzieć, neoscholastycznej.

No a w szczególności na kształtowanie się mojego światopoglądu olbrzymi wpływ wywarły pisma Jacques'a Maritaina. Równocześnie później dosyć duży wpływ na mnie wywarła szkoła socjologiczna, która wywodziła się z poglądów Le Playa, którą reprezentowali, w wypadku moich zainteresowań, z jednej strony – Patrick Geddes i Louis Mumford. Tak że tutaj trudno mówić o jednym środowisku. Ja sądzę, że każdy zresztą w swoim życiu przechodzi przez różne środowiska i z każdego z nich czerpie jakieś elementy, takie czy inne. Problem polega na tym tylko, żeby stworzyć swoją własną syntezę tych różnych wpływów.

ZR: Właśnie. Następne pytanie, które chciałem zadać, dotyczyło tego, czy identyfikuje się Pan Profesor obecnie z jakimś systemem filozoficznym. Rozumiem, że to jest neotomizm, prawda?

KD: Oj, nie można powiedzieć neotomizm, bo neotomizm w jakimś sensie jest przezwyciężony. Może najbardziej by mi odpowiadała szkoła ojca Innocentego Bocheńskiego, która łączy zagadnienia tomizmu – ale nie neotomizmu, tylko tomizmu – z zagadnieniami logiki nowoczesnej, logiki matematycznej. Z tym, że ja nigdy nie

przeszedłem przez żadne regularne studia filozoficzne. To trzeba bardzo silnie podkreślić. Ja zresztą sądzę, że całe moje pokolenie, jeśli chodzi o urbanistykę i geografię, przeszło przez proces samouctwa. To jest… bardzo specyficzne elementy – z jednej strony, że się nie ma bardzo zdecydowanych mistrzów i jednego typu szkoły, z drugiej strony – jest pewna, że się tak wyrażę, poligeneza poglądów. Człowiek, tak z lektur i z własnych przemyśleń, czerpie takie czy inne elementy, które mniej lub bardziej owocnie, czy skutecznie, wiąże w jeden system. Ja muszę powiedzieć, że bardzo mi odpowiadają poglądy Wittgensteina, który twierdzi, że na świecie mamy do czynienia z całym szeregiem zespołów logicznych, które nie są między sobą uzgodnione, czasami są wręcz sprzeczne, ale które współistnieją i wzajemnie na siebie wpływają.

ZR: Czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że ten Pana system światopoglądowy – nie chciałbym powiedzieć filozoficzny w takim razie – znajduje odzwierciedlenie w działalności naukowej Pana Profesora, ewentualnie w działalności społeczno-politycznej? Rozumiem, że w działalności społeczno-politycznej swojego czasu znajdował odzwierciedlenie...

KD: Ja nigdy nie działałem właściwie w układzie politycznym; raczej w społecznym. Odrodzenie się bardzo ostro odcinało od wpływów politycznych. Przeprowadziło – jeżeli już chodzi o historię – bardzo ostrą walkę z poglądami nacjonalistycznymi, ale i w obrębie samego Odrodzenia odbywała się walka z ludźmi zbliżonymi do chrześcijańskiej demokracji. Tak że Odrodzenie zawsze chciało być właściwie apolityczne. Chciało być organizacją społeczno-religijną. Ale to już tylko tak nawiasowo. Natomiast jeżeli chodzi o moją działalność naukową, no to przypuszczalnie światopogląd powinien znajdować odbicie w działalności. Natomiast ja nigdy nie starałem się wiązać bezpośrednio światopoglądu z działalnością naukową. Taki, jaki ja jestem, to odgrywa rolę w działalności naukowej. Natomiast działalność naukowa ma swoje własne prawa i swoje własne elementy, i chyba należy unikać nawet usiłowań powiązań bezpośrednich. Ja sądzę, że niepowodzenia marksizmu polegały na tym, że właśnie zlekceważyły ten zasadniczy element, że w działalności naukowej wpływy światopoglądowe mogą tylko iść poprzez ukształtowanie umysłowości i kultury człowieka, który prowadzi badania naukowe.

ZR: Ale czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że jest możliwe uprawianie tzw. nauki wolnej od jakichkolwiek wpływów światopoglądowych? To znaczy, że światopogląd jest z jednej strony, a nauka – z drugiej?

KD: To nie chodzi o to... Oczywiście, że w każdej działalności światopogląd człowieka odgrywa rolę, ale on nie powinien być elementem..., on pośrednio, poprzez osobowość badacza, wpływa na wyniki. Natomiast w samym badaniu pracownik naukowy musi być całkowicie wolny od wszelkich wpływów zewnętrznych. On musi badać rzeczywistość i usiłować znaleźć odpowiedź w tej rzeczywistości. Jego umysłowość jest ukształtowana przez światopogląd, a nie jego praca naukowa.

ZR: Dobrze. W takim razie chciałbym z kolei zapytać, jaka była droga Pana Profesora do tego światopoglądu. Częściowo Pan Profesor o tym powiedział. Natomiast chodzi mi o to, czy były jakieś może większe przełomy światopoglądowe u Pana Profesora w procesie kształtowania się światopoglądu?

KD: Nie, chyba nie było wielkich przełomów. No, w pewnych momentach podejmowałem pewną tematykę, czy pewne zagadnienia, zapoznawałem się z nimi i one wpływały, ale żeby to miało charakter nawróceń, to nie mogę tak powiedzieć.

ZR: Czy mógłby Pan Profesor z kolei wymienić najbardziej cenionych klasyków. Częściowo to słyszałem przed chwilą, to znaczy Maritain, jeśli chodzi o neoscholastyków, prawda?

KD: Maritain nie był *sensu stricto* neoscholastykiem, no, ale mniejsza z tym.

ZR: Ale jeżeli pytanie dotyczyłoby klasyków, to właśnie Maritain by się pojawił w tym kontekście...?

KD: No, w jakimś sensie Tomasz z Akwinu. Trudno mi powiedzieć, żebym miał jednego mistrza. Raczej w pewnych fazach czerpałem inicjatywę, czyli myśli, czy koncepcję z określonego pisarza. Obawiam się, że moja odpowiedź tutaj nie odpowiada schematowi pytania.

ZR: Tak, schematowi nie odpowiada.

KD: A jak Panu chodzi o mistrzów, to miałem jeszcze jednego mistrza w młodości, do którego czasami tylko wracam, to jest Chestertona, a oprócz tego na mój styl wielki wpływ wywarł Cyceron, jak się uczyłem łaciny. To są takie zabawne ele-

menty wpływów, ale takie wpływy, moim zdaniem, można by prześledzić w mojej pracy.

ZR: Chciałbym z kolei zapytać o stosunek Pana Profesora do marksizmu, to znaczy czy marksizm oddziaływał i czy wpływał na Pana Profesora? Ja mam tutaj swoją hipotezę, ale poproszę o wypowiedź Pana Profesora.

KD: No więc będąc zawsze praktykującym katolikiem, mój stosunek do marksizmu jako światopoglądu był wysoce sceptyczny. Natomiast sądzę, że przeszedłem dosyć dobre seminarium z ekonomii marksistowskiej, pracując w Komisji Planowania i przez kilka lat biorąc udział w zebraniach kierownictwa Komisji, prowadzonych przez dra Jędrychowskiego – ówczesnego przewodniczącego. Muszę powiedzieć, że to były wysokiej klasy seminaria z ekonomii politycznej.

ZR: Czy uważa Pan Profesor, że jakieś wpływy filozofii marksistowskiej, czy marksistowskiego sposobu myślenia, są widoczne w pracach Pana Profesora?

KD: Ja sądzę że tak. Ja sądzę, że są widoczne oczywiście z okresu lat pięćdziesiątych, ale i później. Ja nie mogę powiedzieć, żebym nie przyswoił sobie pewnych koncepcji... Notabene ja, o ile raczej bybym niechętny do traktowania, czy zajmowania się marksizmem jako systemem filozoficznym, to uważam i cenię bardzo wysoko wkład marksizmu jako systemu socjologicznego. Mnie się zdaje, że się nie docenia jeszcze elementu socjologicznego w myśli Marksa. Z tego by wynikało, że mnie bardziej interesuje Marks niż Engels.

ZR: Jeśli wolno mi tutaj zdobyć się na własny komentarz, to całkowicie zgadzam się z opinią Pana Profesora, że się nie docenia elementów socjologicznych, natomiast ja z kolei bardziej cenię Engelsa niż Marksa, właśnie w tym samym kontekście zresztą.

KD: Różnica poglądów.

ZR: Tak, różnica poglądów; ale jedźmy dalej. Czy można prosić o wskazanie dzieł XX wieku, które Pan Profesor uważa za przełomowe i które ewentualnie najsilniej na Pana Profesora wpłynęły.

KD: Co to znaczy dzieł?

ZR: Które byłyby kamieniem milowym w rozwoju ludzkości.

KD: Nie, nie; nie oto chodzi. No, nie chciałbym szukać takiej analogii. Ja się pytam, jeśli chodzi o książki, czy chodzi o obiekty materialne? Za dzieło można uważać na przykład budynki.

ZR: Oczywiście. Raczej miałem na myśli książki.

KD: To jest bardzo trudno powiedzieć, dlatego że właściwie dopiero perspektywa czasu pozwala określić skalę dzieła. Tak że nie podjąłbym się tutaj odpowiedzi na to pytanie.

ZR: Rozumiem. Wracając do bardziej bezpośrednich wpływów – czy może Pan Profesor wymienić osobę, którą by Pan uważał za swojego mistrza, ewentualnie wskazać kilku swoich mistrzów?

KD: Właściwie odpowiedziałem. Ja się nad tym namyślałem. Właściwie nie mogę powiedzieć, żebym miał jednego mistrza, zwłaszcza takiego, którego bym chciał naśladować.

ZR: Czy wobec tego identyfikuje się Pan Profesor z jakąś szkołą naukową?

KD: No nie; też nie. Już właściwie na to odpowiedziałem. To znaczy, że ja z tomizmu zaczerpnąłem umiarkowany realizm, z późniejszych prac zaczerpnąłem zagadnienia nowoczesnej logiki matematycznej, które mnie interesowały i które wywarły – może zwłaszcza w ostatnich trzydziestu czy dwudziestu latach – wielki wpływ na sposób myślenia, czy prezentowania wyników, ale... Na końcu to, co człowiek robi, jest sumą tego wszystkiego, co poprzednio przeżył, czy spotkał. Mnie się zdaje, że nie należy szukać tutaj takiej jednoznacznej identyfikacji. Przynajmniej w moim wypadku. Zawsze byłem trochę kotem, który chodzi własnymi drogami, jeśli użyć porównania Kiplinga.

ZR: Chciałem z kolei zapytać o kolegów Pana Profesora w sensie naukowym. Którego z nich uważa Pan za najwybitniejszego i jaka byłaby motywacja tego wyboru?

KD: To jest bardzo trudno odpowiedzieć, dlatego że jeśli chodzi o moich kolegów, to oni się rozproszyli. Ja poza tym, jak Pan wie dobrze, pracowałem na pograniczu kilku nauk, skutkiem tego właściwie nie mam kolegów *sensu stricto*, to znaczy takich, którzy by szli w tym samym kierunku co ja. Poza tym... Ja muszę powiedzieć, że ja nie lubię klasyfikowania ludzi. Są ludzie bardzo wybitni, którzy potem nie mają

żadnego osiągnięcia, czy żadnych wyników. Tym samym okazuje się, że nie są tacy wybitni. Są ludzie, którzy się wydają bardzo mało wybitni, a skutkiem wielkiego nakładu pracy dochodzą do olbrzymich wyników i wtedy się okazuje, że są bardzo wybitni. Więc właściwie sądzić ludzi można dopiero po zakończeniu ich życia i to jeszcze z perspektywy pewnego upływu czasu. Potem zwykle jest taki element socjologiczny, że bezpośrednio po śmierci kogoś następuje okres jakby zapomnienia o nim i dopiero potem z powrotem on się wyłania jako pewna postać wysokiej klasy.

ZR: Rozumiem niechęć Pana Profesora do oceniania własnych kolegów, wobec tego może zapytam, czy poproszę, o ocenę najwybitniejszych uczniów.

KD: Nie, więc jeśli chodzi właśnie może... Na kolegach, to ponieważ oni się rozeszli w różnych kierunkach, więc jest trudność odpowiedzi, trudność porównań, który jest wybitny, który niewybitny. Czy można porównywać wybitnego fizyka z wybitnym geografem? Czy wybitnego architekta z wybitnym planistą przestrzennym? Natomiast jeżeli chodzi o uczniów, no to jest bardziej jednorodny zespół. Niemniej znowu tutaj wracam do tego – byli uczniowie, czy są uczniowie, których uważam za bardzo zdolnych, którzy w tej chwili właściwie jakoś nie mogą odnaleźć siebie. Są inni, którzy skutkiem powolnego rozwoju dochodzą do dużych wyników. Niezależnie od tego trzeba pamiętać, że są ludzie, którzy nagle zaczynają współpracować ze mną, ale w gruncie rzeczy są wychowankami innych ludzi. Inni ludzie, inne środowisko ich ukształtowało. I odwrotnie – moi uczniowie odchodzą do innych środowisk i tam podlegają innym wpływom. Tak że też nie chciałbym… Ja uważam, że tego rodzaju klasyfikacje są bardzo niebezpieczne.

ZR: Dobrze. Przejdźmy wobec tego w trochę innym kierunku, mianowicie na grunt już zdecydowanie geografii. I w tym kontekście chciałem zapytać, czy uważa Pan Profesor, że stworzył szkołę naukową?

KD: Bardzo by mi było przyjemnie, gdybym stworzył. Ale oczywiście to wszystko zależy od tego, co rozumiemy przez szkołę. Przez szkołę można rozumieć, że jest zespół ludzi, którzy zajmują się pewną problematyką. To jest zespół ludzi, który się posługuje określoną metodą, czy zespół ludzi, który reprezentuje pewien wspólny światopogląd, ale światopogląd naukowy, a nie ogólny światopogląd. Na końcu może być to zespół ludzi, którzy są szczególnie silnie związani przyjaźnią,

czy relacjami zaufania. No więc trudno mi powiedzieć, czy... Na pewno nie stworzyłem szkoły, jeśli chodzi o tematykę naukową. Jakkolwiek pewne wysiłki w tym kierunku robiłem, może to potem jeszcze będziemy o tym mówili. I na pewno nie stworzyłem żadnej szkoły, jeśli chodzi o metody stosowane, dlatego że uczniów cechuje wielkie bogactwo różnych, całkowicie odmiennych metod. Trudno powiedzieć. To dopiero można będzie za kilkanaście, czy kilkadziesiąt lat powiedzieć, czy uczniowie moi cechują się jakimś wspólnym światopoglądem naukowym, czy sposobem bycia. No, jeśli chodzi o ten ostatni element, to może stworzyłem rzeczywiście. W Zakładzie powstał pewien zespół ludzi, których łączy przyjaźń i mam nadzieję, że wzajemne zaufanie.

ZR: Muszę przyznać, że jestem trochę rozczarowany odpowiedzią Pana Profesora. To znaczy, może ona wynika ze skromności w tej wypowiedzi, natomiast kiedy przygotowywałem to pytanie, to właściwie uważałem, że to jest pytanie retoryczne, ponieważ uważam, że Pan Profesor stworzył taką szkołę. W związku z tym chciałem zapytać – jeżeli się zgodzimy, że taka szkoła istnieje, to czym ona się – Pana Profesora zdaniem – charakteryzuje. Właśnie tym poczuciem lojalności wzajemnej?

KD: No więc, stojąc na gruncie realizmu, można właśnie tymi pewnymi powiązaniami, to znaczy, że pomiędzy uczniami, czy ludźmi ze mną współpracującymi, powstała pewna więź osobistych stosunków. Wróćmy jeszcze do tego pierwszego pytania, bo może z tym się trochę wiąże, że zajmuję się pewną tematyką. Otóż ja w latach pięćdziesiątych, właściwie w czasie Osiecznej, czy bezpośrednio po Osiecznej, może przed – już w tej chwili dokładnie nie pamiętam – otrzymałem zadanie. Miał być przygotowany ten sławny podręcznik geografii Polski i ja miałem napisać rozdział o geografii osadnictwa. I jak podejmowałem tę pracę, to stwierdziłem, że właściwie nie jestem w stanie tego rozdziału napisać, ponieważ nie wiem, czy nie mam zbadanych szczegółowo poszczególnych zagadnień z geografii osadnictwa. I wobec tego, że się tak wyrażę, podjąłem studia sam i przez swoich uczniów czy współpracowników, bo miałem jeszcze zawsze w ręku pewne inicjatywy; byłem koordynatorem takim czy innym różnych badań, więc podjąłem inicjatywę wypracowania, czy zbadania, pewnych pól geografii osadnictwa.

Zaczęło się od tych studiów nad małymi miastami, które były elementem szkolenia pierwszej kadry, a z drugiej strony – były tymi elementami, które jeszcze w warunkach stalinowskich, czy postalinowskich, można było prowadzić badania bezpośrednie, więc wyszedł ten tom studiów nad małymi miastami. Potem przeszliśmy do badania – z jednej strony – zasięgu małych miast i do badania zespołów osadniczych w małej skali. Potem żeśmy zajęli się zagadnieniami średnich miast; potem miała przyjść kolej na badania aglomeracji miejskich.

Już przy średnich miastach okazało się, że jeden człowiek nie potrafi zbadać jednego średniego miasta, tylko że potrzebny jest zespół, więc potem przyszło do badania aglomeracji. I tutaj muszę powiedzieć, że mój program, czy dążenia, nie spotkały się z pełną realizacją. Niemniej cały zespół studiów dotyczących aglomeracji się pojawił. Z układu takiego powstało zagadnienie systemów osadniczych. Ja zresztą to zagadnienie rozwoju tematyki z geografii osadnictwa, a w szczególności z geografii miast, opublikowałem. Jest taki artykuł opublikowany, dający przegląd, jak ta tematyka się rozwijała.

W tym czasie, jeżeli by wziąć te wszystkie prace, które związane były z realizacją tego mniej lub więcej świadomie zarysowanego programu, wziąć pod uwagę, no to można powiedzieć, że powstała pewna szkoła dotycząca geografii osadnictwa. Do tego by trzeba jeszcze dołożyć zagadnienie studiów z geografii ludności. Tak że na końcu może właśnie dzięki temu, że zajmowałem się koordynacją badań, nawiązałem stosunki... Prawie wszyscy geografowie zajmujący się geografią osadnictwa w Polsce współpracowali w taki czy inny sposób ze mną. Od tej strony można mówić o szkole, ale – moim zdaniem – to jest przesada mówić w tym przypadku o szkole. Jest w Polsce dobrze rozwinięta geografia osadnictwa, w której rozwoju jakąś rolę odegrałem. To chyba wszystko, co można powiedzieć na to pytanie.

ZR: Doszliśmy w ten sposób w jakimś sensie do formalnej organizacji badań i w związku z tym chciałem zapytać, czy uważa Pan Profesor, że formalna organizacja nauki wpływała na kierunki badań Pana Profesora. Jeśli tak, to w jaki sposób, czy w jakim kierunku?

KD: No oczywiście że wpływała, dlatego że jeżeli postawiono przede mną zadanie, czy ja się podjąłem jakiegoś zadania, no to musiałem je rozwiązać. Tu najbar-

dziej typowym jest zagadnienie teorii regionalizacji. Profesor Leszczycki w związku z układami międzynarodowymi podjął to zagadnienie teorii regionu ekonomicznego, czy regionalizacji ekonomicznej, i na końcu na mnie spadło zagadnienie przygotowania całego materiału, a potem jakiegoś mniej lub więcej dołężnego sumowania materiałów, które napływały, czy poglądów, które były przedstawiane. Więc tu, można powiedzieć, wyraźny jest związek między tematyką badań naukowych a zadaniami. Podobnie zresztą w układzie geografii osadnictwa, z tym że geografia osadnictwa zawsze była najbliższa moim zainteresowaniom. Ostatecznie przecież doszedłem do geografii z urbanistyki i planowania miast, i zawsze chętnie do tej tematyki wracałem. Ale też w jakimś sensie ta tematyka była potem związana z zadaniami, z organizacją badań.

Tutaj oczywiście należałoby mówić coś na temat, czy można – i w jakim zakresie można i należy – organizować badania naukowe. Problem polega na tym, że... Jest rzeczą oczywistą, że nauka to nie jest wojsko i nie można wezwać do raportu uczestników i rozdać im zadania, i wymagać od nich wypełnienia tych zadań. W pracy naukowej musi być zawsze element uwzględnienia, co kto chce robić i co kto może robić. To jest ten szczególny element... i co kto potrafi robić. Koordynacja badań polega na tym, żeby te zainteresowania indywidualne konstruować z jakimś sformułowanym programem potrzeb społecznych i je wzajemnie powiązać.

W koordynacji badań naukowych moje doświadczenie właściwie świadczy, że największym problemem, a równocześnie może najważniejszym problemem, jest eliminowanie badań niepotrzebnych, czy nie gwarantujących wyników. I tutaj musi się oczywiście podejmować dosyć czasami trudne decyzje. Rola organizacji badań naukowych jest więcej negatywna niż pozytywna. Pozytywna jest w tym sensie, że oczywiście ona pozwala pobudzić pewne badania, czy wywołać pewne badania. Ale na końcu program badań składa się z takich prac, jakie ludzie mogą i chcą zrobić.

ZR: I jakie im się pozwala, prawda?

KD: No więc ja muszę powiedzieć, że nigdy właściwie nie byłem w sytuacji, żebym komuś nie pozwolił robić pracy, która obiecywała wyniki. Znaczy, jeżeli pewne prace eliminowałem, to dlatego że one były źle prowadzone, że nie gwarantowały... Proszę Pana, zagadnienie etyki badacza jest też bardzo ważne. Niemniej

z przykrością, ale trzeba powiedzieć, że są ludzie, którzy próbują wydostać pieniądze na to, żeby nic nie robić. To bardzo ostre powiedzenie, ale tak jest. Potem tacy ludzie zresztą mają największe pretensje i najczęściej mówią o tym, że im się nie pozwala prowadzić badań. Ja sądzę, że myśmy nawet robili pewne nadużycia w stosunku do przepisów prawnych, finansując badania, które nie mieściły się całkiem w ramach zadań naukowych, celów stawianych społecznie. Wracam do tego, że ja w moim życiu nigdy nie miałem poczucia, żebym odsunął, czy nie pozwolił prowadzić badań, które obiecywały wyniki, pozytywne wyniki badawcze.

Jest jedno zagadnienie, które mnie dużo kosztowało, bo opóźniło o osiem lat mój wybór na członka Akademii, że sprzeciwiłem się prowadzeniu badań terenowych geomorfologicznych bez podsumowywania. Znaczy, że w ramach I Kongresu rozwinęły się badania geomorfologiczne. One prowadziły do opracowania map geomorfologicznych. I w pewnym momencie te badania terenowe zaczęły być badaniami takimi, że się tak wyrażę, sztuka dla sztuki. To znaczy, że prowadzono badania, potem te badania nawet nie podsumowywano w postaci kartograficznej, tylko odkładano do akt i one się rozchodziły po prywatnych szufladach. Z tego nic nie wychodziło. I ja dosyć silnie ukróciłem. Powiedziałem: proszę bardzo, takie badania mogą być prowadzone, które prowadzą co najmniej do wykonania mapy. Równocześnie na to się nałożyło, że zaczął się odwrót od używania studentów do takich prac. Więc to nie była tylko moja decyzja, to był układ środowiskowy. W każdym razie w jakimś sensie odegrałem tę rolę obcinającego badania terenowe nie prowadzące do opracowań naukowych. O co zresztą profesor Klimaszewski zwłaszcza do dziś dnia ma wielkie pretensje do mnie.

ZR: Jak Pan Profesor ocenia swój udział w kształtowaniu oblicza geografii w Polsce? To znaczy zarówno z punktu widzenia instytucjonalnego, jak i intelektualnego?

KD: No, to jest już zagadnienie, które już inni muszą osądzać. Ja tylko mogę powiedzieć tak, że konferencja w Osiecznej była inicjatywą Kuklińskiego. Ja w niej wziąłem udział przez to, że opracowałem zagadnienie geografii osadnictwa. Ja potem podjąłem dwa razy inicjatywy takie scalające. Znaczy, w sześćdziesiątym bodaj siódmym czy ósmym roku doszło do tej konferencji w Jabłonnie, która miała być

otworzeniem, czy zielonym światłem dla stosowania metod matematycznych w geografii. Jaką ona rolę odegrała, mnie jest trudno mówić. Raczej się o niej nie wspomina. Ale to było niby świadome założenie i w jakimś sensie dało jakieś rezultaty, takie czy inne. I drugi raz zainicjowałem konferencję w Osiecznej, gdzie chodziło o, że się tak wyrażę, wobec fermentu występującego wśród młodszych chodziło, żeby dać im pole do sformułowania,   wystąpienia i sformułowania swoich poglądów. Równocześnie wyprowadzenia ich z pewnego takiego układu zniechęcenia, czy apatii po stanie wojennym.

ZR: Czyli mówimy o Rydzynie, Panie Profesorze?

KD: O Rydzynie. Przepraszam, nie o Osiecznej. Jakie ona dała rezultaty, trudno mi powiedzieć, bo na końcu odszedłem z Komitetu Nauk Geograficznych, przeszedłem do Komitetu Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju.

ZR: Chciałem z kolei zapytać o sposoby wyboru problematyki badawczej. To znaczy, czy było tak, że Pan Profesor sam sobie wybierał problematykę, czy była ona, że tak powiem, narzucona. Czy był Pan skłaniany do tego, żeby się zająć pewną problematyką, czy z kolei Pan Profesor nakłaniał innych, czy narzucał im problematykę?

KD: Właściwie na to pytanie już odpowiedziałem. To znaczy, że – po pierwsze – problematykę dobierałem według swoich upodobań, a przypuszczam, że równocześnie przyjmowałem pewne propozycje zajęcia się pewną problematyką. To bardzo wyraźnie wystąpiło z tą regionizacją ekonomiczną. Równocześnie propozycje do mnie skierowane podjęcia pewnej problematyki były w jakimś sensie związane na pewno z oceną moich możliwości badawczych. Więc sprawa jest złożona. Ale nie mogę powiedzieć, żebym kiedykolwiek był rzeczywiście zmuszony do prowadzenia określonych badań.

ZR: Rozumiem, z tego co Pan Profesor powiedział do tej pory, że właściwie nigdy, czy prawie nigdy, nie było tak, że się komukolwiek narzucało problematykł badawczą...

KD: Tak. To znaczy, jeśli chodzi o mnie i moje środowisko. To nie było tak, żeby było jednoznacznie narzucane badanie. Raczej były elementy eliminacji, czy odwodzenia, odprowadzenia kogoś od tematyki, którą nie uważałem za nienajszczęśliwszą. W wypadku tych współpracowników, którzy robili prace doktorskie, to

proponowałem im pewne tematy, względnie próbowałem określać, czy zawężać – najczęściej zawężać – tematy, które chcieli opracowywać.

ZR: Chciałem zapytać o zdanie Pana Profesora na temat tego, kto kierował rozwojem geografii polskiej. Czy było to tak, że istniała sobie po prostu korporacja uczonych, działająca na zasadach – w cudzysłowie przynajmniej – demokratycznych, czy jednak byli pewni liderzy, którzy kierowali rozwojem geografii? Pytanie jest trochę przewrotne właściwie, dlatego że w końcu domyślam się odpowiedzi. Ale bardzo proszę.

KD: Moim zdaniem, pytanie jest naiwne. To znaczy, że oczywiście, że przez długi okres czasu, zwłaszcza w latach pięćdziesiątych i sześćdziesiątych, dominującą osobowością w rozwoju geografii był profesor Leszczycki. To jest zupełnie jednoznacznie wiadomo. Równocześnie gdyby się z nim nie chcieli zespolić, czy współpracować inni, to do niczego by to nie doprowadziło. Było bardzo niewielu geografów, którzy pozostali poza zespołem, który się zajmował rozwojem geografii. Tak jest chyba do dziś.

Pod tym względem geografia jest w szczęśliwszym położeniu od innych nauk, że nigdy nie była rozdzierana na frakcje. Frakcyjność w geografii Polski prawie nie istniała w ciągu ostatnich czterdziestu lat. Ja w tej chwili już może nie bardzo wiem, co się dzieje, co w trawie piszczy. Były pewne odpryski z tego zespołu geografów. Ale to nie były odpryski ważne, czy które by potrafiły stworzyć swoją własną koncepcję, czy własny kierunek badawczy. Bardziej podzieleni byli oczywiście geografowie fizyczni, ale w geografii ekonomicznej podziały były znacznie mniejsze, ale były.

Ale tutaj trzeba powiedzieć to, co już Panu kiedyś powiedziałem, zdaje się, w tych rozmowach, że profesor Leszczycki miał takie stanowisko, że jak nie jest pewny konia, to stawia na kilka koni. A poza tym, mnie się zdaje, że jednej jeszcze rzeczy się nie docenia u profesora Leszczyckiego. Profesor Leszczycki był bardzo wymagający, jeśli chodzi o stosunki ludzkie, o kulturę stosunków między ludźmi. Ja sądzę, że jedyne wypadki, w których profesor Leszczycki był w sposób ostry przeciwny, czy – jakby można powiedzieć – tępił pewnych ludzi, może nie zawsze nawet sprawiedliwie, ale to były zawsze wypadki, w których nie że ktoś miał inne poglądy

naukowe, tylko że uważał, że nie zachował dobrego zwyczaju w stosunkach między-ludzkich. Mnie się zdaje, że tego ludzie nie doceniają.

A to właściwie była cała siła rozwoju geografii, że geografia właściwie nigdy nie była frakcyjna i że geografowie występowali jako zespół. Ja zresztą uważam, że w ciągu tych trzech lat, jak byłem przewodniczącym – drugi raz jak byłem prze-wodniczącym – Komitetu Nauk Geograficznych, usiłowałem temu zapobiec. Frak-cyjność geografii polskiej, czy podziały w geografii polskiej, zarysowały się w tym, że część geografów tak się związała ze stosunkami zagranicznymi, że zaczęła roz-luźniać swoje stosunki ze środowiskami krajowymi i, że się tak wyrażę, nastąpiła jakby pewna separacja między tych, którzy, że się tak wyrażę, działają w układzie krajowym, czy regionalnym. Geograf oczywiście na to, żeby się rozwijać naukowo, musi mieć dostęp i udział w życiu naukowym za granicą, równocześnie jednak po-winien sobie zdawać sprawę, że się nie może odrywać od swojego środowiska, od ziemi. Tu jest może pewna krytyka niektórych kolegów, ale, moim zdaniem, to jest dosyć ważna sprawa. Z drugiej strony, ci koledzy, którzy działają w układach regio-nalnych, może powinni mieć więcej zaufania, czy nie powinni się boczyć z tego po-wodu, że inni jeżdżą za granicę.

Stosunek do układów tych stał się elementem dzielącym środowisko geogra-ficzne. To jest zjawisko niebezpieczne, a równocześnie przecież geografia niesłycha-nie wzrosła. Porównajcie liczbę pracowników naukowych w dziewięćset pięćdziesią-tym i obecnie. Zobaczycie, jak się rozrosła. Zresztą jednym z kłopotów obecnie geo-grafii... polega na tym, że właściwie nastąpiła pewna stabilizacja w układzie stano-wisk. Na końcu w okresie międzywojennym pracownicy wybitni, młodzi geografo-wie, musieli czekać na wymarcie, czy na przejście na emeryturę starszych profeso-rów. Można mówić o ujemnych zjawiskach okresu międzywojennego. Byli profeso-rowie, którzy nawet nie habilitowali swoich słuchaczy, bo nie chcieli mieć konkuren-tów, czy wyraźnych następców. No, ale byli tacy, co habilitowali, ale niemniej ci do-cenci musieli czekać na stanowiska.

Ja obawiam się, że my wchodzimy obecnie w podobny układ i tego się nie do-cenia. To znaczy, że na początku to była radosna twórczość. Tyle było stanowisk, ilu było pracowników naukowych. Potem zaczęło się troszkę ograniczać. Z końcem lat

sześćdziesiątych przecież robiłem plany i się zakładało, że tam kadra wzrośnie w ciągu pięciolecia o 10%, a wzrosła o 2%, czy coś takiego. Zaczął się element wyhamowywania takiego bujnego rozwoju. A teraz możliwe, że doszło nawet do całkowitego zahamowania, jakkolwiek niby wróży się, że będzie ten wyż na wyższych uczelniach w połowie lat dziewięćdziesiątych i że to może spowodować ponowny wzrost zapotrzebowania na kadrę. W tej chwili jest bardzo wyraźna wymiana pokoleń, tak że w tej chwili nawet są braki kadrowe, wręcz nawet jest ponownie element przyśpieszenia awansu pracowników naukowych. Ale to jest jedno z takich zagadnień, o którym warto mówić. Moim   zdaniem, sukcesem geografii polskiej była właśnie zespołowość i duży duch solidarności międzybranżowej, czy naukowej. Może to uległo w tej chwili zachwianiu i to jest ten element jakiegoś kryzysu, który można widzieć.

ZR: Ja chciałbym jeszcze powrócić do stwierdzenia Pana Profesora, że profesor Leszczycki stawiał w pewnym okresie równocześnie na kilku geografów fizycznych. Moje pytanie jest takie: czy nie była to próba przeciwdziałania tej frakcyjności, o której mówiliśmy przed chwilą?

KD: No, można i tak powiedzieć. Sprawa polega na tym, że te podziały wśród geografów fizycznych wiązały się jednak z indywidualnościami naukowymi. Jest wiadomą rzeczą, że profesor Jahn i profesor Klimaszewski się nie lubią, że profesor Klimaszewski nie lubił profesora Dylika, a Dylik – profesora Klimaszewskiego, ale każdy z nich stanowił indywidualność naukową. Tak że może Pan powiedzieć – z jednej strony – że to była świadoma polityka profesora Leszczyckiego, ale to było narzucone sytuacją.

 ZR: Właśnie; nasuwa się pytanie, czy to nie była realizacja zasady *divide et impera*.

KD: Nie, nie, nie. To tak nie można powiedzieć. Właściwie autorytet, czy pozycja profesora Leszczyckiego nigdy nie była poważnie kwestionowana. Ja bym tutaj nawet poszedł dalej; profesor Leszczycki miał pewną pozycję polityczną i geografowie – ze względu na profesora Leszczyckiego... im wygodnie było, że jest taki geograf, który zajmuje pozycję polityczną, a który nie krępuje ich. Znaczy, że tutaj sprawa polegała na tym, że nie mieli ochoty sami zajmować sił polityką i było wygodnie

im, że mieli człowieka, który ich w jakimś sensie osłaniał. A ponieważ zarysowały się pewne indywidualności alternatywne, jeśli chodzi o politykę… Indywidualności polityczne oczywiście nie miały ciężaru gatunkowego naukowego, więc nie były w stanie rozbić tego układu, a – z drugiej strony – były całkowicie nieatrakcyjne.

ZR: Rozumiem, że nie będziemy mówić o nazwiskach...?

KD: Ja zdaję sobie sprawę, że Pan myśli o jednym nazwisku; ja bym mógł przytoczyć kilka – więcej niż jedno nazwisko.

ZR: Dobrze; skoro ten temat możemy uznać za wyczerpany, wobec tego przejdźmy może do osiągnięć i niepowodzeń. Chciałem mianowicie zapytać, jakie – zdaniem Pana Profesora – jest największe Pana Profesora dzieło, czy osiągnięcie. To znaczy, myślę tutaj o książce, ale – być może – nie jest to książka, tylko co innego – program badawczy? Jak to Pan Profesor ocenia?

KD: To jest zagadnienie, na które trudno odpowiedzieć. Znaczy, że przecież, kiedy coś robię, to wydaje mi się, że to jest moje największe osiągnięcie, bo na tym koncentruję swój wysiłek, a potem z perspektywy lat patrzy się trochę inaczej na to zagadnienie. Ja sądzę, że jeśli by tak próbować sądzić – co zresztą jest bardzo wątpliwe – to moim największym osiągnięciem było, że w całym szeregu wypadków zainicjowałem pewne kierunki badań, czy pewne ujęcia, które może nawet lepiej były rozwinięte przez innych później. Ja zresztą nigdy się nie dopominałem o uznawanie tego autorstwa, czy tej inicjatywy, ale – że się tak wyrażę – może największym moim osiągnięciem było to, że siałem drożdże.

ZR: Wobec tego spójrzmy na drugą stronę medalu. W związku z tym chciałem zapytać, czy jest takie opracowanie, pod którym Pan Profesor teraz by się nie podpisał. I – ewentualnie – jeśli tak, to dlaczego? Czy wynika to ze zmiany poglądów naukowych, czy może ideologicznych, czy metodologicznych? Czy jest takie opracowanie?

KD: Nie, ja nie sądzę. Jakby ktoś był złośliwy, to by mógł wyciągnąć pewne opracowania. Ale ja uważam, że to opracowanie w swoim czasie odegrało pewną rolę. Oczywiście ono jest szalenie schematyczne. To jest ta „Geografia miast i osiedli". Taka popularna, wydana w Wiedzy Powszechnej. Ale jedyną rzeczą, która tam mnie drażni, to jest to, że wydawnictwo dopisało w jednym miejscu jedno zdanie, że kiedy

ja napisałem tam, że Warszawa została wyzwolona przez wojska radzieckie, to tam dopisano: „przez niezwyciężone".

ZR: ... niezwyciężoną Armię Radziecką.

KD: Tak, niezwyciężoną, najlepszą i tak dalej.

ZR: Przypuszczam, że inteligentny czytelnik domyśli się, że to...

KD: No, nie wiem, czy się domyśli. Więc oczywiście to mnie drażni, że to jest pod moim nazwiskiem, ale z drugiej strony samej książki nie mam się specjalnie powodów wstydzić. Taki był etap. Książka była pewnym posunięciem naprzód. Oczywiście nie była żadnym wielkim dziełem naukowym.

ZR: Czy chętnie pisywał Pan Profesor z innymi osobami jako współautor? Jeśli tak, to czy chętniej z mistrzem – to znaczy, mistrza właściwie nie było – czy z kolegami, czy raczej z uczniami?

KD: No więc ja mam dwa elementy. To znaczy, że tu są dwie różne rzeczy, to znaczy, że kilkakrotnie wystąpiłem w takim zespole ludzi ze mną współrzędnych i to właściwie było sumowanie opracowań niezależnych. Zresztą to opracowanie sobie bardzo cenię i fakt, że występuję jako jeden w zespole autorskim, bardzo mile to wspominam. Nawet uważam, że to mi przynosi zaszczyt. Mam opracowania wspólne z profesorem Gieysztorem i Herbstem, potem opracowania z profesorem Andrzejewskim i Goryńskim wspólne. Ostatnio z profesorem Andrzejewskim i Kołodziejskim. Ale to są układy współrzędne, to znaczy, że właściwie to jest opracowanie pisane wieloczęściowo, potem tylko scalane w jedno opracowanie. Natomiast druga współpraca, to jest współpraca z uczniami. Otóż mój ojciec mnie tego nauczył, że jeżeli ja publikuję jakąś pracę i korzystam z pracy mojego ucznia, to wymieniam jego autorstwo, albo biorę go nawet na swojego współpracownika; to znaczy, że publikujemy pod wspólnym autorstwem. Mój ojciec tego bardzo ostro przestrzegał. Tak że jak by Pan zobaczył bibliografię prac mojego ojca, to by Pan prawie nie zobaczył po doktoracie prac podpisanych jednym nazwiskiem. Muszę powiedzieć, że ja starałem się to przekazać moim uczniom. Ja tego przestrzegałem i starałem się przekazać swoim uczniom. I nawet muszę powiedzieć, że z Kosińskim stoczyłem pewien bój w tym zakresie.

ZR: Zwycięski, jak myślę...?

KD: No nie; zwycięski. Po czym on mi dziękował za to, bo to była sprawa materiałów opracowanych przez panią Palonkę w tym tomie „Ludność Polski". I skutkiem tego, ponieważ ona się okazała, że była niesolidną pracowniczką, to to, że on był wymieniony, że to ona opracowała, zdejmowało z niego odium za błędy, jakie tam niewątpliwie są. Postępowanie takie jest, że – po pierwsze – nie wolno przywłaszczać cudzej pracy, z drugiej strony – to jest zabezpieczenie siebie przed złą pracą innych.

ZR: Czy nie sądzi Pan Profesor, że jest to jednocześnie – czy może być – forma promocji ucznia przez mistrza? Że praca wspólna, czy podpisana wspólnie przez mistrza i ucznia, może być formą promocji ucznia przez mistrza?

KD: No niewątpliwie... Niewątpliwie to jest wprowadzenie ucznia w publikacje i w prace naukowe. Mnie tego nauczył mój ojciec i ja uważam, że to jest bardzo zdrowa tradycja. To znaczy, że wszystkim raczej bym radził tego przestrzegać.

ZR: Wobec tego, jak Pan Profesor ocenia dopisywanie się mistrzów do prac uczniów? Znaczy, niekoniecznie musi być to mistrz w sensie merytorycznym. Może to być mistrz w sensie formalnym.

KD: Tutaj oczywiście trzeba być dosyć obiektywnym. Znaczy, na pewno jest niewłaściwe, żeby mistrz podpisywał pracę, której nie robił. Natomiast uczniowie czasami nie doceniają wkładu profesora. Znaczy, że w takiej spółce nie tyle mistrz, co nauczyciel – uczeń jest różny wkład. Jest inicjatywa, koncepcja, metody, krytyczna ocena. I on ma prawo do tego, żeby to było uwidocznione. Oczywiście to już jest zagadnienie sumienia naukowca, zarówno mistrza jak ucznia, w jakim stopniu to odpowiada rzeczywistości. Współautorstwo musi być związane z rzeczywistością. W wypadku tej jednej sprawy, o której mówiłem, to tam ona nie jest wymieniona jako współautorka pracy, tylko jest wymieniona jako autorka opracowań statystycznych. Można i tak dzielić. Natomiast to jest zagadnienie etyki pracownika naukowego, zarówno ze strony nauczyciela, jak i ze strony ucznia.

ZR: Jak Pan Profesor ocenia prace zespołowe? Czy – zdaniem Pana Profesora – te prace wnoszą więcej do rozwoju pracowników naukowych niż prace indywidualne? Znaczy, tu są niewątpliwie dwa elementy: praca zespołowa rozumiana jako tok pracy i praca zespołowa rozumiana jako publikacja.

KD: Zagadnienie publikacji to już wyjaśniłem. Zagadnienie pracy zespołowej to są tematy, których nie można opracować inaczej niż w pracy zespołowej. To zależy troszkę od tematu. Zależy od indywidualności również. Są jednostki, które potrafią współpracować naukowo, są jednostki, które nie potrafią współpracować naukowo. Ja sądzę, że tu nie ma żadnych praw. To znaczy, jeżeli są jakieś regularności, czy jakieś typowe wypadki, to one się wiążą z zagadnieniem kształcenia kadr, z zagadnieniem tematyki, jaką się podejmuje. Sprawa polega na tym, że przy dużej złożoności metod i pracochłonności zbierania materiałów praca zespołowa staje się nieunikniona. Natomiast jest rzeczą ważną, żeby wszyscy uczestnicy dobrze sobie zdawali sprawę ze swojej roli w zespole. Tylko to może gwarantować harmonijną pracę.

ZR: To tyle, jeśli chodzi o osiągnięcia. Natomiast na zakończenie tej części chciałbym zapytać o niepowodzenia. Mianowicie, czy są jakieś plany czy to badań, czy programów badawczych, czy w sferze zarządzania nauką, których Panu Profesorowi nie udało się zrealizować?

KD: O, bardzo dużo. I to jest zresztą może nawet typowe, że jak człowiek zaczyna, to buduje bardzo wielkie plany, których potem tylko część zostaje zrealizowana. Więc to jeżeli chodzi o większe koncepcje. A niezależnie od tego, w swoim życiu mam cały szereg prac, których albo nie dokończyłem, albo nie opublikowałem, albo w ogóle nie wyszedłem poza zbieranie materiałów. Jeśli Pana to interesuje mogę Panu tak krótko o takich pracach wspomnieć.

ZR: Bardzo proszę.

KD: W roku '39 przygotowałem na prośbę redakcji „Domu – Osiedla – Mieszkania" artykuł o miastach-ogrodach w Anglii. Ta praca zaczęła mi się rozrastać i oni się nawet zgodzili, że to nie będzie artykuł, tylko że to może powstać z tego broszura, którą by oni wydali. Potem jak byłem w Nowym Jorku we wrześniu '39 roku i nie miałem co robić, i taki jeden z ówczesnych prominentów Polonii amerykańskiej powiedział: „niech Pan chodzi do biblioteki publicznej w Nowym Jorku". Biblioteka publiczna w Nowym Jorku jest jedną z największych bibliotek, jaka jest w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Jest znakomicie zaopatrzona. I rzeczywiście chodziłem tam i ta praca zaczęła coraz bardziej rosnąć. Tam znalazłem literaturę, która nie była dostępna w Polsce, no i doszedłem do stu stron rękopisu. Rękopis został w Stanach Zjedno-

czonych i zaginął, i nigdy nie został zakończony. Losy wojenne i moje się potoczyły innymi drogami.

W latach pięćdziesiątych miałem napisać po „Geografii przemysłu" czy „Zasady lokalizacji przemysłu", miałem napisać drugą pracę o usługach. I ją napisałem. Nie znalazła zrozumienia, czy dodatniej oceny, w rękach recenzenta, po czym...

ZR: Przepraszam, która część lat pięćdziesiątych to była?

KD: No, to było '51-52. Wobec czego miałem konsultacje z takim ekonomistą marksistowskim i napisałem drugą wersję tej pracy. I ta druga wersja też nie znalazła ten... Obie wersje mam zachowane, ale nie ukazały się drukiem. Może zresztą dla mnie dobrze; czy ja wiem? Może znowu nie, bo tam pewne takie koncepcje były. To nie była taka praca całkiem popularnonaukowa. Cała trudność polegała na tym, że nikt nie miał żadnej teorii usług. Marksiści nie mieli teorii usług, bo się zawsze mówiło o produkcji. No więc w tym leżała trudność. A równocześnie w tym była jej oryginalność. W każdym razie rękopis leży gdzieś i można by do niego kiedyś zajrzeć, ale przypuszczam, że nie warto. To jest typ pracy określonego okresu.

Ja chciałem napisać trzy prace, trzy monografie: o bazie funkcjonalnej, o rozkładach kolejności według wielkości i o teorii osiedli centralnych – jako o tych trzech głównych osiągnięciach teoretycznej geografii osadnictwa. Więc pierwsza wyszła drukiem, nawet w dwóch wydaniach, z pewnymi błędami. Druga była napisana w dwóch trzecich, potem przyszły inne elementy. Poza tym zaczęła się mnożyć strasznie. Ona się zaczęła strasznie rozrastać i w jakimś sensie doszedłem do przekonania, że jest ponad moje siły. Tak czy inaczej leży taki nie dokończony rękopis, częściowo nawet przepisany na maszynie. Dzisiaj nawet do tego nie można wrócić, bo tę pracę trzeba by zacząć od początku. Tutaj ilość literatury jest taka olbrzymia, że może...

Potem miała być trzecia – teoria ośrodków centralnych, do której nawet się przymierzałem kilka razy, ale tu też literatura jest tak olbrzymia, że napisać dobrą pracę na ten temat... Bo to są prace takie dające historię pewnej koncepcji, czy pewnej idei. Okazało się, że jest ponad moje siły i odłożyłem ją. Jest tylko teczka materiałów dosyć duża, jest bibliografia zestawiona.

Tak że prac niedokończonych... To jest nieuniknione, że człowiek w swoim życiu podejmuje prace, których potem nie może zakończyć, nie wszystkie może zakończyć. To, że się pewne udało zakończyć, to jest sukcesem. Nie należy specjalnie rozpaczać, bo i tak te prace może nie były takie znakomite, jak się wydawało, że będą.

ZR: Na tym zakończylibyśmy część pierwszą, to znaczy dotyczącą bardziej osobistej części opowieści Pana Profesora i teraz moglibyśmy przejść do drugiej, to znaczy tej bardziej ogólnej. Chciałem zacząć od pytania, czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że istnieją związki kierunków badawczych w geografii z przemianami polityki państwowej i zmianami ideologicznymi.

KD: Proszę Pana, może istnieją pewne związki, ale one muszą być wieloczasowe. To znaczy, nie można oczekiwać, że jeśli nastąpi zmiana polityczna – u nas następują zmiany dosyć gwałtownie te zmiany polityczne – że zaraz potem nastąpi zmiana w nauce. Dojrzewanie zmian jest powolne. Czasami zmiany w nauce wyprzedzają zmiany polityczne. Związki są, ale związki nie są jednoznaczne. Trudno jest na ten temat coś mówić. To nie jest teoria, to jest historia.

ZR: Więc właśnie chciałem tutaj troszeczkę teraz pomęczyć Pana Profesora o te pytania z historii geografii w gruncie rzeczy. Mianowicie chciałem zapytać, jaką – Pana Profesora zdaniem – rolę odegrał w kształtowaniu oblicza geografii zjazd PTG w Gdańsku w '49 roku? O tym się dużo mówi, nasze pokolenie wie o tym z drugiej ręki...

KD: Ja wiem. Tylko że zjazd PTG w Gdańsku odbył się, jeszcze zanim ja wszedłem w pełni w obręb geografii. Więc dla mnie zjazd gdański nie ma żadnego znaczenia. […]

ZR: Dobrze. W takim razie, potem, to znaczy po dwóch latach, był Pierwszy Kongres Nauki Polskiej. W tym już Pan Profesor uczestniczył?

KD: Tak jest.

ZR: Jaka w takim razie była jego rola?

KD: No, proszę Pana, Pierwszy Kongres, jeśli chodzi o geografów, doprowadził do sformułowania pewnego programu badań. To nie był program badań państwowy, tylko to był program badań sformułowany przez geografów. Ja zresztą jeszcze wtedy brałem udział w Kongresie, ale ja brałem udział więcej w Kongresie doty-

czącym planowania przestrzennego i regionalnego, trochę nawet ekonomii, to znaczy lokalizacji przemysłu, niż geografii. Ja jeszcze nie byłem wtedy w pełni zintegrowany ze środowiskiem geograficznym, ale brałem udział. To znaczy, miałem nawet te wszystkie materiały. Więc Kongres Nauki od tej strony stworzył taki jakiś racjonalny program rozwoju badań geograficznych. Zwłaszcza w geografii fizycznej.

ZR: A w społeczno-ekonomicznej?

KD: W geografii ekonomicznej może słabszy – z tego względu że w tym momencie geografia fizyczna była znacznie silniejsza od geografii ekonomicznej. Kongres Nauki stworzył podstawy do istnienia Akademii Nauk. Nie należy zapominać, że profesor Leszczycki był zastępcą sekretarza naukowego Akademii przez sześć lat, czy ileś. I to umożliwiło stworzenie Instytutu Geografii Akademii. No więc w tym sensie też miał jakąś zasadniczą rolę dla geografii. Chyba tyle mogę powiedzieć.

ZR: Twierdzi się, że właśnie w tym okresie – być może na Pierwszym Kongresie Nauki, być może trochę wcześniej – zaczęto wprowadzać do geografii marksizm – rozumiany oczywiście w dosyć specyficzny sposób. Profesor Leszczycki w swoim podsumowaniu po latach, to znaczy w artykule, który się ukazał w „Przeglądzie" w '79 roku, napisał na ten temat następująco: „Zapanowała ogólnie filozofia marksistowska, która wyznaczała granice indywidualności, zobowiązywała do szukania rzeczywistości. […] Przestano wątpić o konieczności wiązania problematyki z celami praktycznymi, toteż wszyscy odnieśli się pozytywnie do celów i zadań geografii stosowanej". Czy można Pana Profesora prosić o komentarz?

KD: To nie jest sformułowanie, z którym się specjalnie gwałtownie nie zgadzam, ale równocześnie to jest sformułowanie subiektywne profesora Leszczyckiego. Moim zdaniem, to nie jest temat, który należy specjalnie dyskutować. To nie jest temat owocny. Ja sądzę, że deklaracja marksizmu w geografii nastąpiła w Gdańsku, nie na Kongresie. Na samym Kongresie na ten temat było bardzo mało mowy. Była dyskusja właśnie, czy robić mapę geomorfologiczną. Może najbardziej bym się zgodził z tym, że Kongres Nauki i marksizm ostatecznie przełamał opory geografów zajmowania się zagadnieniami geografii stosowanej.

Zna Pan tę anegdotyczną historię, jakkolwiek są zdania podzielone, kto wyraził tę opinię, że profesor Leszczycki w '39 roku, czy w '38, złożył jako pracę habilitacyjną

swoją pracę o regionie Podhala. Według tego, co mi mówiono, to był Romer; ktoś inny twierdzi, że to kto inny był, że tę pracę oddalono, twierdząc, że praca habilitacyjna nie może mieć żadnych zastosowań praktycznych. Więc to troszkę jest duch okresu międzywojennego. Notabene nie można powiedzieć, żeby Romer nie zajmował się zagadnieniami zastosowań geografii. Ktokolwiek zapozna się z dorobkiem Romera, ten wie, że on cały czas się zajmował zagadnieniami zastosowań. I oczywiście to ilustruje tę zmianę poglądów. Jeśli to były osiągnięcia marksizmu, no, to to jest zasługa marksizmu. Jeśli to była zmiana wywołana zmianami w społeczeństwie i potrzebami społecznymi... Proszę pamiętać, że w roku '45 wszystkie placówki geograficzne na uniwersytetach były rozbite. Je z trudem rekonstruowano. Geografowie byli pozbawieni warsztatów naukowych. Równocześnie potrzeby odbudowy kraju były bardzo duże. Wobec tego wszyscy prawie najwybitniejsi geografowie, prawie wszyscy, przeszli przez regionalne urzędy planowania przestrzennego. Leszczycki był dyrektorem w Krakowie, Uhorczak był w Katowicach, Galon był w Bydgoszczy. Może nawet Dylik był w Łodzi, to już tego nie pamiętam dokładnie. Ale w każdym razie powiązania geografów z urzędami odbudowy kraju były bardzo silne. Tak samo zresztą jak powiązania z zagadnieniami przygotowania, czy opanowania, nowego terytorium Polski, ustalenia granic. To życie już w jakimś sensie nauczyło... Można powiedzieć, że to również marksizm, że się tak wyrażę, kanonizował tę zasadę. Ale czy to specjalnie zasługa marksizmu? Tego nie wiem. Marksizm był właściwie... Właściwie nie marksizm, tylko partia ma jedną zasługę, że zmusiła geografów do uczenia się ekonomii politycznej, zajęcia się zagadnieniami ekonomicznymi i społecznymi *sensu stricto*, a nie rozważania zagadnień geografii społecznej jako takie zjawiska same w sobie.

ZR: Chciałem z kolei zapytać o atmosferę lat pięćdziesiątych w geografii w szczególności, a w nauce w ogólności. Proszę powiedzieć, jak się wtedy pracowało, tzn. kto decydował o tematyce badań na przykład.

KD: To ja już właściwie odpowiedziałem przy sobie. Były pewne tematy proponowane, ale na końcu każdy pracował w takim temacie, w jakim chciał pracować. Ja nie znam takich wypadków, żeby kogoś zmuszono do opracowania pewnych elementów. W latach pięćdziesiątych pojawiła się ta grupa poznańska pod wodzą Ku-

klińskiego. Do niej należał Chojnicki, Najgrakowski, Greszczak – z nimi Pan może rozmawiać. Oni byli dosyć tacy aktywni. Oni, że się tak wyrażę, przyjęli sobie Leszczyckiego jako swojego mistrza, czy opiekę, wytworzyli sobie niszę pod jego opieką i byli dosyć dynamiczni. Rozpoczęli pewne prace i prowadzili. Z nimi może Pan mówić więcej na temat atmosfery, jaka panowała.

ZR: Dobrze. Natomiast, jeśli można poruszyć ten wątek, to chciałem zapytać o rzecz bardziej osobistą. Mianowicie był to okres stalinizmu, jak wiadomo. Pan Profesor pracował wtedy w Komisji Planowania i to na stanowisku nie takim bardzo niskim. Z drugiej strony przecież przyjechał Pan zaraz po wojnie z Zachodu. Czy nie było żadnych wątpliwości oficjalnych co do tego, że Pan był na Zachodzie, a nie tam gdzie uważano, że trzeba było być?

KD: Na ten temat nie należy się mnie pytać. Natomiast mogę Panu tylko jedną rzecz powiedzieć. Ja w okresie stalinowskim nie piastowałem żadnego stanowiska administracyjnego. W Komisji Planowania byłem, ale byłem radcą ministra, to znaczy, że miałem charakter doradcy, czy eksperta. Pod tym względem można powiedzieć, że uszedłem cało z tych elementów... No, swoje przeżycia pewne miałem, ale nie chciałbym o nich mówić specjalnie.

Głównym człowiekiem był Józef Zaremba, który zajmował się planowaniem przestrzennym. I on był tym człowiekiem politycznym. A on należał do grupy woldenberczyków i był związany z pewną grupą ludzi, którzy nawet przeszli bardzo boleśnie. To właśnie generał Kuropieska, generał Herman i jeszcze inni. On był z nimi związany. Wobec tego jego w roku pięćdziesiątym usunięto z Komisji Planowania, a koło niego chodzono, że się tak wyrażę, szukając materiału do atakowania, czy do uwięzienia, czy może do procesu. Przerzucono go do drobnej wytwórczości, ale jakoś się obronił. To znaczy, że nie wszedł w układ aresztowanych, czy więzionych; procesu nie miał. Wobec tego chodzono i wokół nas. No więc ja muszę powiedzieć, że miałem szczęście w pewnym sensie, że nie znalazłem się w tym gronie. Jakkolwiek wiedziano, że ja blisko współpracuję z Zarembą, to nie znalazłem się w tym gronie najbardziej podejrzanych, to znaczy nie spotkały mnie takie represje. To już zresztą historia innych. Tutaj losy ludzi były indywidualne. Można powiedzieć, że przeszedłem stosunkowo szczęśliwą ręką przez okres stalinizmu. Więcej Panu nie

powiem. Pod jednym względem miałem nosa. To znaczy, że nie zgodziłem się na przyjęcie żadnych stanowisk odpowiedzialnych, a z pewnych rzeczy się wycofałem. To znaczy, wycofałem się ze studium planowania przestrzennego we Wrocławiu. I zlikwidowałem je w roku pięćdziesiątym, bo doszedłem do przekonania, że właściwie nie ma szans na prowadzenie, a równocześnie dojeżdżanie do Wrocławia z Warszawy mnie bardzo zmęczyło.

ZR: Wróćmy może w takim razie do tego nurtu bardziej obiektywnego. Chciałem zapytać, czy w latach pięćdziesiątych redakcje dopisywały części ideologiczne do artykułów, czy cytaty z klasyków. Wspomniał Pan Profesor, że w jednym wypadku tak było.

KD: Ale nie redakcja. Znaczy, to raczej już tak na szczeblu...

ZR: Cenzura?

KD: Cenzura, czy na szczeblu wydawnictwa. Jeśli chodzi o redakcje naukowe, to nie znam takich wypadków. Były elementy autocenzury. Proszono autorów, żeby zmodyfikowali, czy nie umieszczali pewnych części. Ja Panu mówiłem, że chodziło o obronę instytucji i czasami danego człowieka.

ZR: Ale to chodziło o wycofanie pewnych rzeczy. Natomiast mnie chodzi o to, czy skłaniano autorów do tego, żeby pewne rzeczy dopisali, to znaczy cytaty ze Stalina na przykład.

KD: Nie znam takich... Znaczy, może były takie wypadki. Ja nie miałem takich wypadków.

ZR: Czy w latach pięćdziesiątych pisywał Pan Profesor do szuflady? Czy pisywano do szuflady wtedy?

KD: Nie mogę odpowiedzieć. Możliwe, że ktoś pisał. Ja nie pisałem.

ZR: Czy w geografii zdarzały się samokrytyki w latach pięćdziesiątych?

KD: No, nie znam takiego wypadku. To znaczy, że może były, ale ja nie znam.

ZR: Czym było dla Pana Profesora powołanie Instytutu Geografii PAN w roku '53 i przywrócenie wydawania „Przeglądu Geograficznego"?

KD: No, proszę Pana, dla mnie to było znalezienie stałej posady. Znaczy, posady nie tyle stałej, co pewnej – w jakimś sensie. Ja byłem w tej Komisji Planowania na stanowisku tego doradcy; nie bardzo byłem z tego zadowolony. I równocześnie, jak

mówiłem o tym już przedtem, starałem się o katedrę w Krakowie. Urbanistyki. Z tego nic nie wyszło. Że się tak wyrażę, architekci mnie odtrącili, skutkiem tego byłem łatwym łupem dla profesora Leszczyckiego. Chętnym łupem dla profesora Leszczyckiego. Profesor Leszczycki załatwił mi sprawę nominacji na profesora. Z tym że, skutkiem tego że byłem w Komisji Planowania, to... Bo formalnie ja nie należałem do tych pierwszych pięciu czy dziesięciu osób, które dostały etat. Profesor Kostrowicki należał od samego początku. Ja jestem z opóźnieniem trzech czy czterech miesięcy, jeśli chodzi o formalne przyjęcie do pracy.

Natomiast trzeba jedną rzecz powiedzieć. W '55 roku mnie zaproponowano, żebym został wicedyrektorem Zespołu Planów Perspektywicznych w Komisji Planowania. I po naradzie z Leszczyckim ja się na to zgodziłem. I to był pierwszy etap już, proszę Pana, Października. To znaczy, że ludzie liczą od października, ale właściwie przełom nastąpił z końcem '54 roku, a w '55 była ta reorganizacja Komisji Planowania; zaczęła się. To znaczy, zaczęło się przygotowywanie reorganizacji w Komisji Planowania. Ja potem jeszcze na pięć lat wróciłem do Komisji Planowania, będąc na dwóch etatach. Znaczy, i w Instytucie, i w Komisji Planowania. To było dosyć niespodziewane, w jakimś sensie zabawne. Ale w '56 roku ja, jak wróciłem z wakacji, to zastałem taką sytuację, że mój bezpośredni zwierzchnik, dyrektor Zespołu Planów Perspektywicznych, wyjechał na objazd krajów socjalistycznych na sześć tygodni, czy na dwa miesiące, i ja zostałem z całym zespołem niespodziewanie. Odpowiedzialny za cały zespół. I w tym okresie przygotowywano następny plan pięcioletni. I znalazłem się, że się tak wyrażę, w roli redaktora tego planu. Tak że przez ileś tam miesięcy niemalże nocowałem w Komisji Planowania. Brałem udział w – że się tak wyrażę – najrozmaitszych konwentyklach. To wszystko było przed Październikiem. Tak że zobaczyłem wielkich naszego świata w bezpośrednim zetknięciu. Z triumfem zawiozłem do Sejmu, czy zawieźliśmy do Sejmu, we wrześniu '56 roku projekt planu pięcioletniego. Potem wrócił mój szef i ja pojechałem na konferencję historyczną urbanistyczną do Niemiec Wschodnich, do NRD; i to był październik '56 roku.

ZR: I okazało się, że ten cały plan zrobił się trochę jakby nieaktualny.

KD: No, przerabiali go. Nie, taki bardzo nieaktualny nie był, ale przerabiali go. Tak że to był jedyny moment w moim życiu, gdzie, że się tak wyrażę, byłem wmie-

szany od strony urzędniczej, czy administracyjnej, w wielką politykę gospodarczą. Gospodarczą!

ZR: Chciałem teraz przejść do Osiecznej i zapytać Pana Profesora, na czym polegało znaczenie konferencji w Osiecznej.

KD: No, ja sądzę, że polegało na tym, że nastąpiło przypomnienie i uporządkowanie wiedzy geograficznej, i nastąpiło przywrócenie ciągłości myśli geograficznej. Te dwa zeszyty „Przeglądu Geograficznego" to jest dokument Osiecznej.

ZR: Jak z kolei, zdaniem Pana Profesora, wpłynął Październik '56 roku na rozwój geografii? To znaczy, Październik rozumiany jako symbol oczywiście.

KD: Osieczna była przed Październikiem. Ja właśnie podkreślam, że właśnie zmiany w Polsce zaczęły się gdzieś w '54-55 roku. Tego się nie docenia. One potem, że się tak wyrażę, wypadki poznańskie, a potem Październik, je skrystalizowały, czy wyrzuciły na zewnątrz. Ale zmiany już głębokie zachodziły. Przełomem właściwie była ucieczka Światły. Ucieczka Światły była związana z tym, że on był związany z Berią. On się przestraszył i uciekł. I potem opowiadał prawdziwe i nieprawdziwe rzeczy na temat stosunków w Polsce.

ZR: To znaczy bardziej z Berią niż z Bermanem?

KD: A no oczywiście że z Berią, nie z Bermanem. Proszę Pana, system stalinowski polegał na tym... To był system. System polegał na tym, że wszyscy żyli w terrorze. Raz byli narzędziami terroru w stosunku do drugich, a z drugiej strony sami byli przedmiotem terroru ze strony swoich mocodawców. Zresztą niech Pan przeczyta przemówienie Bermana. Nie wspomnienia, tylko przemówienie na tym plenum październikowym. To on przecież tam wyraźnie mówi, że on się bał.

ZR: Czytałem. Natomiast muszę przyznać, że kiedy to czytałem, to z pewnym przekąsem przyjąłem jego oświadczenie – jako próbę uwolnienia się od odpowiedzialności. Nie jako szczere wyznanie.

KD: Pan myśli o tej Torańskiej, tak? O tym „Oni", o tej książce?

ZR: Nie, myślę o przemówieniu Bermana w '56 roku.

KD: No, ja wiem, ale jest jeszcze jego rozmowa z Torańską.

ZR: A, nie, nie; nie o tym mówię.

KD: To jest w drugim obiegu. To teraz wyszło na Zachodzie pod tytułem „Oni". Proszę Pana, muszę Panu powiedzieć, że profesor Leszczycki jednak, jak miał coś załatwić, to załatwiał przez Bermana. Znaczy, był człowiekiem, z którym można było rozmawiać. To też o czymś świadczy, że profesor Leszczycki poszedł na pogrzeb Bermana.

ZR: To było w którym roku?

KD: Dwa lata temu, czy rok temu. Więc Berman żył na przykład i opiekował się Hryniewieckim, tym architektem. Jemu zawdzięczamy Stadion Dziesięciolecia. We wszystkich tych sprawach trzeba być dosyć ostrożnym. Bo tu jest taki układ, że Pan zwierzchnika bezpośredniego widzi jako coś, co decyduje, a nie widzi Pan, co jest za nim. Właśnie tego całego aparatu i systemu terroru Pan nie widzi.

Niewątpliwie Berman był pewnym narzędziem. Ale wszyscy byli w takim czy innym układzie narzędziami. On sobie z tego zdawał sprawę, w jakimś stopniu był takim narzędziem. To jest system terroru. To trzeba dobrze zrozumieć ten element. Dlatego trzeba być dosyć ostrożnym z potępianiem ludzi. Jednoznacznym potępianiem. Bo na końcu oczywiście ktoś przyjmuje pewną odpowiedzialność za coś. Niewątpliwie, jeżeli już o tych sprawach mówimy, to Bierut przyjął odpowiedzialność za tych pewnych ludzi, którzy stracili życie, którzy zostali rozstrzelani. Równocześnie w Polsce nie było procesu Rajka ani Slanskyego i Bierut był najbardziej ludzki z nich wszystkich, z wszystkich przywódców tego czasu. Tak jak kiedyś powiedziałem, że z Bierutem to się historia łagodnie obejdzie. I zresztą dosyć ciekawe, że Wyszyński o Bierucie w swoich tych zapiskach więziennych pisze bardzo łagodnie.

ZR: Z pewnym przekąsem...

KD: No, ale... Pan wie to końcowe zdanie, które ja zawsze przypominam...

ZR: Kiedy po śmierci Bieruta... pamiętam taki fragment napisał, że...

KD: O tym śnie, prawda? Ten sen nie przedstawia Bieruta jako człowieka bardzo złego. A na końcu jest napisane takie zdanie: „I teraz wie, że Bóg jest i Bóg jest miłością".

ZR: Właśnie o tym myślałem. O tym właśnie myślałem.

KD: No, ja rozumiem, ale to jest zdanie bardzo głębokie i bardzo daleko idące.

ZR: ?

KD: To nie jest zdanie, które on potępia. No, ale to są inne sprawy zupełnie, polityczne.

ZR: Tak, czyli wróćmy troszeczkę może bardziej do meritum. Profesor Kukliński wyraził swego czasu takie przekonanie, że w okresie Października nie zmarnowano szansy obalenia stalinizmu w geografii polskiej. Na czym to polegało, Pana zdaniem?

KD: Ja przypuszczam, że to jest powiedzenie. Nie przywiązywałbym większego znaczenia.

ZR: Co w takim razie nastąpiło po Październiku '56 roku? Czy nastąpiło cofnięcie w rozwoju geografii, czy odbywał się dalszy jej rozwój? Bo pod względem politycznym nastąpiło pewne cofnięcie.

KD: No, ale dopiero w '57 roku. Nie, ono się na geografii nie odbiło. Geografia wyszła na zagranicę. Zaczęto publikować i opracowywać prace w układzie względnej swobody. Tak że ja tutaj nie widziałbym takich wielkich problemów. W '59 roku powstał Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju.

Proszę Pana, jeśli chodzi o pozycję geografii w okresie stalinizmu, to ja Panu przytoczę takie powiedzenie, które jest dosyć ciekawe; ono charakteryzuje sytuację, że po '56 roku, czy po stalinizmie, sformułowano taką tezę, że nauki dzielą się na trzy kategorie: na nauki ideologiczne, w których obowiązkiem uczonego jest apologetyka ustroju, nauki techniczne, których zadaniem jest służenie rozwojowi społeczeństwa, czy przyspieszenie rozwoju społeczeństwa, i nauki matematyczno-przyrodnicze, w których nie ma ograniczenia swobody badań. Profesor Leszczycki włączył geografię do nauk matematyczno-przyrodniczych. To określa znacznie większą swobodę w geografii niż gdyby było inaczej. Bo mógł łatwo trzymać się schematu przedwojennego, w którym geografia ekonomiczna była w naukach społecznych, w wydziale pierwszym, a geografia fizyczna – w wydziale trzecim; w naukach matematyczno-przyrodniczych.

ZR: Ale wracając do wypowiedzi profesora Leszczyckiego. Otóż w '56 roku w „Przeglądzie Geograficznym" – to było podsumowanie Osiecznej – profesor Leszczycki napisał następująco: „Dyskusja w Osiecznej wykazała, że zawężenie geografii ekonomicznej do badania rozmieszczenia tylko produkcji nie jest słuszne […]

dlatego w definicji geografii ekonomicznej obok słowa *produkcji* należy wstawić *i części usług*". Czy można Pana Profesora prosić o skomentowanie tego cytatu?

KD: To jest stwierdzenie, które – że się tak wyrażę – rehabilitowało geografię ekonomiczną jako geografię zajmującą się zjawiskami ekonomicznymi i społecznymi. To była deklaracja w układzie zewnętrznym, bo w wewnętrznym to nawet nie było takich specjalnych ograniczeń. Jakby Pan chciał tak powiedzieć, to było w jakimś sensie zaspokojenie domagań się, czy głosów profesor Zaleskiej.

ZR: Ale czy nie jest to pewien minimalizm, że jednak „części usług". Że w zasadzie dominuje w dalszym ciągu produkcja, tylko koncesja jest na rzecz, powiedzmy…

KD: Tylko to jest sformułowanie na zewnątrz, a nie do wewnątrz. Ja bym to tak sformułował. Bo jak Pan weźmie na przykład moje sformułowania na temat geografii osadnictwa, to one są już znacznie szersze. To było raczej zielone światło na zewnątrz, dla geografów innych.

ZR: Chciałem z kolei zapytać, czy zdaniem Pana Profesora w latach sześćdziesiątych nastąpiło ukształtowanie się nowych ujęć badawczych w geografii. Czy był realizowany program Osiecznej? Na przykład, czy w geografii osadnictwa był realizowany program, który Pan Profesor przedstawił w Osiecznej?

KD: No to już odpowiedziałem. No, był realizowany. Zresztą we wszystkich tych kierunkach był realizowany. Po Osiecznej nastąpił rozwój geografii gałęziowych, ku zresztą niechęci pani Zaleskiej. Ale ten rozwój bardzo wyraźny jest. Nawet w publikacjach, w tematyce prac doktorskich to można przeprowadzić.

ZR: Czy wydarzenia polityczne roku '68, zdaniem Pana Profesora, wpłynęły na stan geografii polskiej?

KD: Moim zdaniem nie, ale niewątpliwie one kosztowały bardzo dużo profesora Leszczyckiego.

ZR: Czy można prosić o pogłębienie tego wątku?

KD: Ja wszystkich rzeczy nie znam. Profesor Leszczycki był jednym z 36 osób, które podpisały ten słynny list do Cyrankiewicza. I gdyby nie to, że złapał półpaśca w tym okresie, to by może nawet miał dużo przykrości. W każdym razie miał dużo przykrości z tego powodu. Notabene profesor Leszczycki – to już takie anegdotyczne

historie – był tym, który Cyrankiewiczowi zaniósł ten list, tekst tego listu. Ale Cyrankiewicz też nie był taki głupi. Cyrankiewicz ten list schował do kieszeni. On go nigdy nie włączył do akt. Ale potem ten list się dostał..., ktoś z tych, którzy go podpisali, go puścił do prasy i cała awantura się koło niego zrobiła. W każdym razie profesor Leszczycki przez pewien okres miał kłopoty. Ale to w sumie na geografii się nie odbiło.

ZR: Jak Pan Profesor w tej chwili ocenia wyjazd Kosińskiego? Bo to mniej więcej było w tym okresie. Ale nie w tym kontekście chciałem o to pytać.

KD: On był wcześniej. Proszę Pana, ja do Kosińskiego mam pretensje. Ja mu zresztą to powiedziałem. Kosiński, gdyby nie wyjechał, to byłby wicedyrektorem Instytutu. Uciekł przed stanowiskiem, przed pracą, która z tym była związana. I oczywiście uciekł z punktu widzenia lepszych warunków ekonomicznych. Natomiast w żadnym wypadku nie można mówić, że był prześladowany politycznie. To znaczy, jeśli on był prześladowany politycznie, to profesor Leszczycki był prześladowany politycznie, ja byłem. Pewne trudności może mogliśmy mieć, ale naprawdę nic mu nie groziło. Ale on to zrobił w '66 roku.

ZR: Moje pytanie zmierza do tego, jakie to miało konsekwencje dla geografii polskiej, zwłaszcza dla geografii osadnictwa?

KD: Nie miało większych. Przecież on wyjechał legalnie, potem sobie tylko przedłużał. Tak że fakt, że on nie wrócił... Trzy lata trwało, zanim to się w pełni wyjaśniło. Tak że to nie miało żadnych konsekwencji. Dla niego miało jedną konsekwencję, że w drugim wydaniu „Bazy ekonomicznej" – ja już nie pamiętam czy w pierwszym, czy w drugim – zażądano, żebym ja usunął jego nazwisko. Więc ja powiedziałem, że to nie jest możliwe, dlatego że to jest część dorobku geografii polskiej. Tylko tam złagodziłem jakieś przymiotniki. To były pertraktacje z cenzurą na ten temat. Ale to właściwie już wszystko.

ZR: Jaki, zdaniem Pana Profesora, był wpływ wydarzeń roku '70 na problematykę badawczą w geografii polskiej? Czy był w ogóle jakiś?

KD: Trudno mi powiedzieć. Chodzi o to, że w roku '70 został wprowadzony system ten planowania badań naukowych i finansowamia, więc to miało pewien

wpływ. Ale żeby był specjalny przełom, to nie mogę powiedzieć, albo żeby nowa tematyka jakaś specjalnie...

ZR: Właśnie, czy można prosić o pogłębienie tego wątku dotyczącego nowej organizacji badań, to znaczy problemów węzłowych? To znaczy, pytanie jest tutaj podwójne: z jednej strony – jakie wówczas Pan Profesor nadzieje z tym wiązał, i drugie – jak to dzisiaj Pan ocenia – tę nową organizację badań?

KD: Proszę Pana, ja specjalnych nadziei nie wiązałem. Po prostu staraliśmy się to zrealizować na to, żeby zapewnić możliwość i pieniądze dla badań geograficznych. I, jak mówię, w pewnym momencie nawet robiliśmy pewne nadużycia do finansowania badań w sposób bardzo naciągany. Ja osobiście system ten, który został wtedy utworzony i potem troszkę zmodyfikowany, oceniam raczej dodatnio. To znaczy, że to był system, który działał, ludzie się nauczyli, on się dotarł. Ja bardzo negatywnie oceniam ten system wprowadzony dwa lata temu, dlatego że on został wprowadzony przez ludzi młodych, czy ludzi nie znających całej specyfiki badań. Że się tak wyrażę, te błędy, które popełniono w latach siedemdziesiątych, oni zaczęli na nowo powtarzać. Ale muszę Panu powiedzieć, bo może Pan o tym nie wie, że w tym okresie, tylko nie pamiętam czy przed, czy po..., tego dokładnie nie powiem, była powołana komisja do usprawnienia finansowania, czy kierowania badaniami naukowymi. I mnie zrobiono przewodniczącym tej komisji. I myśmy złożyli raport na ten temat, postulując cały szereg rzeczy.

ZR: To był początek lat siedemdziesiątych?

KD: Albo koniec sześćdziesiątych, albo początek siedemdziesiątych, ja bym to musiał sprawdzić. Wtedy profesor Szymański był sekretarzem naukowym..., Szulkiewicz, Szymański...? Widzi Pan, już zaczynam się starzeć..., był sekretarzem naukowym. Ja muszę powiedzieć, że on przyjął bardzo pozytywnie. Myśmy złożyli taki raport i większość tych naszych postulatów została przyjęta. To znaczy, została uwzględniona. Znaczy, nastąpiło poważne uproszczenie, czy usprawnienie. To się mniej więcej łączyło z tymi elementami.

ZR: Następne moje pytanie dotyczy Drugiego Kongresu Nauki Polskiej w '73. Jak Pan Profesor ocenia ten kongres z punktu widzenia geografii?

KD: Ja muszę powiedzieć: nie oceniam. To znaczy, że zbudowano olbrzymią machinę, która urodziła mysz. Niemniej Drugi Kongres Nauki z punktu widzenia geografii doprowadził do utworzenia Wydziału VII – Nauk o Ziemi i Górniczych, co dla geografii było poważnym ułatwieniem i wzmocnieniem jej pozycji. Geografia w Wydziale III była piątym kołem u wozu i zawsze była takim kopciuszkiem, któremu spychano...; w Wydziale VII jest jedną z głównych grup...; to są takie grupy...

ZR: ... nacisku.

KD: Jest *lobby* geograficzne. *Lobby* geograficzne w Wydziale III było słabe; w Wydziale VII jest dosyć silne. Niezależnie od tego, że profesor Leszczycki jest w jakimś sensie ojcem tego wydziału, więc tę pewną pozycję ma. No, to jest jedna sprawa. No a druga – spowodowała rozszerzenie..., notabene tu się zaczęły rozchodzić drogi Kuklińskiego i Leszczyckiego. Kukliński starał się, czy wprowadził tę pozycję, żeby stworzyć Instytut Gospodarki Przestrzennej, no a profesor Leszczycki dodał, rozszerzył problematykł Instytutu Geografii w ten sposób...

ZR: ... zabierając wiatr z żagli.

KD: ... z żagli Kuklińskiemu. To jest moment, w którym się zaczęły między nimi niesnaski, które w latach osiemdziesiątych przybrały charakter bardzo nieprzyjemny. Profesor Kukliński jest strasznie gwałtowny. Czasami, że się tak wyrażę, bije na oślep. To mu zresztą bardzo szkodzi.

ZR: Jak Pan Profesor ocenia w sumie lata siedemdziesiąte dla rozwoju geografii polskiej?

KD: Nie mam zdania. Znaczy, ja nie wiem, czy nie jesteśmy za blisko tego okresu. Jedno jest pewne, że to jest okres wymiany pokoleń. To znaczy, że jest w tej chwili ciągle w geografii... jest pewien układ bezkrólewia.

ZR: Właśnie, czy wymiana pokoleń, zdaniem Pana Profesora, dotyczyła również liderów geografii, to znaczy osób odpowiedzialnych...?

KD: Dotyczyła wszystkich. Oni po prostu odchodzą na emeryturę, wymierają. Sprawa kryzysowa polega na tym, że następne pokolenie jest nieliczne. Największe straty wojenne poniosło pokolenie, które w okresie wojny miało od, powiedzmy, 15 do 30 lat. Starsi ponieśli mniejsze straty, a mniejsi – też mniejsze straty. Osób w wieku profesora Kostrowickiego jest w całej Polsce dwie, czy trzy. Skutkiem tego, odej-

ście tego pokolenia, które objęło władzę bezpośrednio po wojnie, właśnie profesor Leszczycki, Klimaszewski, Galon, Dylik, Zaleska, to byli ludzie, którzy w tej chwili albo już nie żyją, albo są na emeryturze. Osiemdziesięciolecie urodzin ich czcimy. Natomiast następnego pokolenia – ma Pan Kostrowickiego i kogo jeszcze? Po prostu układ taki, że jak jest trzydziestu ludzi, to prawdopodobieństwo, że będą wśród nich ludzie wybitni, jest pewne. Jak jest z tego pokolenia pięć osób, czy trzy osoby, to prawdopodobieństwo jest bardzo małe. I skutkiem tego to jest ten kryzys pewien geografii. A teraz profesor Kostrowicki już w przyszłym roku idzie na emeryturę.

Teraz już przychodzi to liczniejsze pokolenie. Z tym się zaczynają kłopoty. Bo wAkademii w tej chwili geografowie są bardzo silnie reprezentowani, bo jest w tej chwili sześciu geografów, a jak Galon jeszcze żył, to było siedmiu geografów. Liczyć na powiększenie ich liczby prawie że nie można. No, może się w jakimś wypadku uda dojść do ośmiu. Ale prawdopodobnie ta granica siedmiu to jest maksimum. To jest i tak bardzo dużo. Bardzo duża liczba członków Akademii. No i teraz wszyscy ci geografowie – poza profesorem Domańskim i Kostrowickim – mają powyżej 75 lat. No, nie, teraz, przepraszam, jeszcze Starkel jest. Ale niby na to, żeby wprowadzić tych następnych, którzy powinni wejść, na to żeby się opiekować geografią, znaczy Kozarski, Chojnicki, może Korcelli w pewnym momencie, to muszą wymrzeć ci starsi. No więc to są problemy personalne geografii polskiej. Równocześnie sytuacja jest taka, że geografia się rozrosła. Ja sądzę, że nawet sytuacja nie sprzyja temu, żeby się pojawił jeden człowiek taki jak profesor Leszczycki, który by sterował wszystkim. Profesor Leszczycki miał jeszcze jeden element dodatni, którego żaden inny z geografów w tej chwili nie posiada – może Kostrowicki trochę – że stoi na pograniczu geografii fizycznej i ekonomicznej, to znaczy że dychotomia jest bardzo wyraźna i bardzo ostra.

ZR: Chciałem z kolei zapytać, jak ocenia Pan Profesor wkład geografii ilościowej w rozwój geografii polskiej?

KD: Ja sądzę, że nie jest zły, nie jest nadzwyczajny. To się wiąże troszkę z niedoinwestowaniem geografii. Bo geografia ilościowa wymaga nie tylko *software*, ale i *hardware*. U nas się poprawiło w tej chwili. Geografia polska ma dobrą pozycję

w tym zakresie, to znaczy że jest lepsza niż w innych krajach socjalistycznych w jakimś sensie.

ZR: Ale krajów socjalistycznych jest nie tak wiele, tak że nie bardzo się jest z kim porównywać.

KD: No niemniej jest... Jest przewaga oczywiście koncepcji teoretycznych nad opracowaniem... Geografia ilościowa jest postępem metodycznym. I to nie jest postęp w sensie naukowym, w tym sensie, żeby się wiedza geograficzna w tej chwili rozbudowała. Metody pracy się podniosły na wyższy poziom. A wiedza musi narosnąć w stosunku do tych metod. Problem polega na tym, że geografia ilościowa, moim zdaniem, bardziej wymaga pracy zespołowej. Tych prac ilościowych jest bardzo dużo nawet w Polsce, stosunkoowo dużo. Ale autorzy są tak zmęczeni opanowaniem metod, że jak piszą prace, to już prace są słabe od strony syntezy.

ZR: Czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że jest to kwestia zmęczenia, czy jest to kwestia ucieczki od rzeczywistości?

KD: Nie, to jest kwestia zmęczenia, to znaczy, że on już nie ma sił na to, żeby podsumować swoje wyniki. Może to się będzie tak układać, że to będzie przechodzenie od pracy doktorskiej do pracy habilitacyjnej, bo taki element może być. Poza tym oczywiście umysły analityczne i syntetyczne to są dwa różne umysły; nie zawsze ten element może być. No, poza tym problem polega na tym, że kiedyś Panu powiedziałem, że metody ilościowe mają element, że prowadzą do wyników, które są niesprawdzalne. Znaczy, jeżeli maszyna się pomyliła, to Pan nie jest w stanie... Są pewne metody sprawdzenia, ale tylko do pewnych granic. To jest jedna sprawa. Druga sprawa, że jest cały szereg rzeczy po drodze, które giną, których już Pan nie analizuje, z których można by bardzo wiele wniosków wyciągnąć. Tak że to są trudności, no ale na to nie ma rady.

ZR: Czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że w geografii polskiej była rewolucja ilościowa? Z naciskiem na *rewolucja*.

KD: No, w jakimś sensie była rewolucja, dlatego że zaczęto stosować metody i podejmować tematykę, która przedtem nie mogła być podjęta ze względu na pracochłonność materiału. Natomiast na ten temat pisałem, że problem polega na tym, że

uzależnienie geografów od materiałów statystycznych wymaga krytycznego stosunku do materiałów statystycznych.

ZR: Na jaki okres Pan Profesor by datował tę rewolucję? Czy to jest koniec lat sześćdziesiątych, czy raczej początek?

KD: Nie, nie, koniec lat sześćdziesiątych. To można pracami doktorskimi, datowaniem prac doktorskich można. Sprawa rewolucji ilościowej polega na tym, że w tej chwili wchodzimy w fazę, że pewne metody stają się metodami standardowymi, nad którymi się nikt nie namyśla, tylko je przeprowadza. To jest tak jak... Zawsze używałem tego porównania, że to jest tak jak z samochodem. Jak było mało samochodów, to tam wykładano na kursach dla kierowców, jak jest skonstruowany model, motor i na czym polega fizyczna strona jego funkcjonowania. Obecnie nikt się nie interesuje. Wielu kierowców może mieć zaplombowany motor i jeździ. Ale dlaczego to się tak dzieje, to zupełnie sobie nie zdają sprawy. Wiedzą, że trzeba dodać benzyny i że pewna kolejność pewnych ruchów jest potrzebna, a bardzo często nawet, jak im motor stanie, to nie wiedzą, co zrobić. Taka sytuacja jest z metodami ilościowymi w geografii. Metody ilościowe są właściwie od strony teoretycznej, czy formalnej, już zagadnieniem matematyków, czy informatyków. Natomiast tutaj właśnie wychodzi ta międzydyscyplinarność. […] Niemniej krytyczny stosunek... To jest faza. To znaczy, że można było mówić o metodzie ilościowej, teraz metody ilościowe zostaną wchłonięte. Oczekujemy, że geografowie wiedzą, co to jest, jak się nimi posługiwać i teraz wracamy do zagadnienia poznania środowiska człowieka.

ZR: Przejdźmy teraz do końca lat siedemdziesiątych. Chciałem zapytać, czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że nastąpiły wtedy objawy kryzysu w geografii polskiej – pod koniec lat siedemdziesiątych?

KD: Trudno mi odpowiedzieć. Ja już zaczynam wychodzić z obiegu. Znaczy, już nie wiem. Był moment, kiedy ja wiedziałem, co się dzieje w całej Polsce. Teraz już nie wiem. Ja sądzę zresztą, że twierdzenie, że jesteśmy w okresie kryzysu jest, że się tak wyrażę, wygodnym frazesem.

ZR: Ja nie twierdzę, że jesteśmy teraz, tylko czy pod koniec lat siedemdziesiątych, sądzi Pan Profesor, że taki kryzys nastąpił?

KD: Nie, nie sądzę. Ja nie widzę żadnych elementów przełomu, no! Wystąpił w tym sensie, że pewna grupa ludzi chciała się wypowiedzieć. Młode pokolenie ma zawsze...

ZR: Już mamy rok '80 i '81, tak?

KD: No tak. Nowe pokolenia ciągle narastają. Nowe pokolenie zawsze usiłuje znaleźć sobie punkt oparcia. Tak jak z tym Archimedesem: dajcie mi punkt oparcia, a ja podniosę Ziemię. Punktem oparcia jest opozycja w stosunku do poprzednich... To znaczy, że się dokona rewolucji. To jest potrzebne psychologicznie. Natomiast potem się okazuje, że rewolucja nie była taka wielka, albo była powrotem, czy odtworzeniem. No, niestety każdy musi sam przeżyć pewne fazy rozwoju. Na to nie ma rady.

ZR: Czy zgodziłby się Pan Profesor ze stwierdzeniem profesora Kuklińskiego, że w latach '80 i '81 głębokiemu zaangażowaniu i odwadze politycznej młodszej generacji geografów polskich towarzyszyła bojaźliwość w zakresie formułowania sądów krytycznych o stanie geografii polskiej?

KD: Tej odwagi nie widzę. Wobec tego nie widzę tej bojaźliwości.

ZR: Znaczy, akcent w pytaniu postawiłbym raczej na tę bojaźliwość, nie na odwagę. Czy sądzi Pan Profesor, że rzeczywiście istniała bojaźliwość naszego pokolenia w krytykowaniu dorobku dotychczasowego geografii polskiej?

KD: Proszę Pana, odwagę widzę w tym, że czuli potrzebę przeciwstawienia się. Bojaźliwości nie widzę. W jakim sensie? Trzeba powiedzieć, że na szczęście – może na szczęście nawet – geografowie polscy pozostali troszkę na uboczu tych wielkich przemian. Jeden tylko, właściwie nie geograf, tylko...

ZR: ... pracownik Instytutu...

KD: ... pracownik Instytutu był internowany. W całej Polsce ja nie wiem, czy jeden geograf był internowany. No więc nie ma właściwie o czym mówić. A jeśli chodzi o bojaźliwość... No, starsi ludzie, bardziej doświadczeni, nie spieszą się z obnażaniem się publicznym, dopóki nie są pewni, że nastąpiła zmiana sytuacji. To nie jest bojaźliwość, tylko jest doświadczenie.

ZR: Z tym, że Kukliński zarzuca bojaźliwość młodszemu pokoleniu. Przede wszystkim.

KD: Czy ja wiem... To znaczy...

ZR: Jego zdaniem, byliśmy za mało krytyczni w krytykowaniu geografii; że krytykowaliśmy otoczenie zewnętrzne, natomiast nie krytykowaliśmy sedna naszej działalności naukowej.

KD: Proszę Pana. Ponieważ, moim zdaniem... Ja nie wiem, czy było co krytykować. Można w ten sposób powiedzieć. Można krytykować wtedy, jeżeli jest zastój, czy jeżeli się nie dopuszcza pewnych metod, czy nie dopuszcza się pewnej tematyki. Właściwie tego nie było, wobec czego... Moim zdaniem, krytyka Kuklińskiego była robiona trochę na siłę, jeśli chodzi o samą geografię.

ZR: Jak w takim razie ocenia Pan Profesor wpływ stanu wojennego na sytuację geografii polskiej? Czy coś się zmieniło wtedy?

KD: Chyba nie. Niewiele. Może zresztą jest za wcześnie na to, żeby na ten temat mówić. Bo niech Pan pamięta, że od sytuacji do pracy naukowej, od pracy naukowej do publikacji, upływa ileś tam lat. My tu właściwie jeszcze ciągle mamy prace, które zajmują się rokiem przed osiemdziesiątym. […]

Natomiast oczywiście mówienie o kryzysie jest elementem odśrodkowym. Pan wie zresztą o tej przygodzie Kuklińskiego. No bo on wydał ten tom angielski „Regional Policies in Poland”. No i on to wydał w układzie deklaracja rewolucyjna, czy krytyczna. W jednym piśmie angielskim ukazała się recenzja, która zarzuca temu tomowi, że jest językiem urzędowego optymizmu pisana. Kukliński jest po prostu zbulwersowany, bo nie można było nic gorszego napisać o jego pracy.

ZR: Przejdźmy w takim razie do Rydzyny. Chciałem zapytać Pana Profesora, jaka była geneza zwołania konferencji w Rydzynie.

KD: To już powiedziałem.

ZR: Ale kto był pomysłodawcą samego zwołania konferencji?

KD: No, to do mnie należało.

ZR: Jakie, zdaniem Pana Profesora, miała spełnić cele?

KD: Miała rozruszać z apatii młodsze pokolenie.

ZR: Sądzi Pan Profesor, że należało pobudzać młodsze pokolenie?

KD: Tak. Znaczy, że należało pobudzać do powrotu do normalnej pracy, do wysiłku. Stan wojenny wywołał przygnębienie, zresztą w całym społeczeństwie.

I oczywiście najsilniejsze to przygnębienie wywarło się na młodszych ludziach. Czy ten skutek został osiągnięty, tego nie wiem. W jakimś sensie został, o tyle że żeście spojrzeli, żeście dokonali takiej czy innej oceny.

ZR: Jak Pan Profesor ocenia rezultaty Rydzyny?

KD: Rezultaty... Mnie jest trudno odpowiedzieć, bo to dopiero można w przyszłości zobaczyć. Jeśli chodzi o same referaty, no to one były bardzo nierówne. Tam doszło do takiej głupiej scysji wśród geomorfologów. Czyli ja byłem tym obrońcą gniewnego geomorfologa [Andrzeja Rachockiego – ZR]. No a jeżeli chodzi o Wasze opracowania, no to właściwie było niedocenienie... Znaczy, okazało się, że dla Was okres stalinowski jest okresem legendarnym. To znaczy, że już jest poza Waszą świadomością.

ZR: No, poza świadomością niewątpliwie, bo to jest zrozumiałe ze względów demograficznych.

KD: No ja rozumiem, ale to również proszę Pana... Znowu wracając do Leszczyckiego... No nie wiem, czy Pan sobie zdaje sprawę, że do historii geografii polskiej powojennej ma Pan pełną dokumentację. Dlatego że jednak Leszczycki pilnował; nie tylko archiwalną, ale nawet drukowaną. Jak Pan przejrzy „Przegląd Geograficzny", to Pan ma sprawozdania ze wszystkich spotkań, ze wszystkich dyskusji. Oczywiście, że pewne rzeczy są złagodzone, że nie ma ostrości dyskusji, ale zagadnienia tam są.

ZR: Ja muszę przyznać, że to jest dla mnie pewna nowość.

KD: No niech Pan zobaczy. Wznowiono „Przegląd Geograficzny" po Pierwszym Kongresie i Leszczycki niesłychanie pilnuje. Ze wszystkich rad naukowych protokoły, wszystko jest publikowane. To samo Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju. Pod tym względem dokumentacja jest, że się tak wyrażę, zupełnie zaskakująca; lepsza niż w innych gałęziach nauki.

ZR: Ale czy nie zgodziłby się Pan Profesor tutaj ze stwierdzeniem Kuklińskiego, że to, co jest publikowane, to jest geografia jubileuszowa? Już nie chcę powiedzieć, że hagiograficzna, bo to nie o to chodzi w tym momencie.

KD: Proszę Pana, gdybym miał przekonanie, że są jakieś prace nie opublikowane... To znaczy to jest złagodzone; to, co jest opublikowane, jest złagodzone. Zna-

czy, że nie ma najostrzejszych elementów dyskusji. Ale można by do nich się do-grzebać na końcu. Natomiast, jeśli chodzi o prace naukowe, no to nie znam pracy, którą by należało opublikować, która jest nie opublikowana. Proszę Pana, praca naukowa, dobra praca naukowa, broni się sama. Ona nie zginie.

Bohdan

Zbigniew Rykiel

Stowarzyszenie Naukowe Przestrzeń Społeczna i Środowisko,

al. Rejtana 16c, 35-959 Rzeszów

gniew@poczta.onet.eu

Drogi Bohdanie!

Poniżej załączam link do swojego tekstu odredakcyjnego opublikowanego w nr. 20 *PS(SS)*. Tekst jest poświęcony bezsensownemu używaniu terminu „dystans społeczny" w dyskursie publicznym. Mam nadzieję, że Cię zainteresuje.

Serdecznie pozdrawiam

[…]

http://socialspacejournal.eu/20%20numer/Zdystansowanie%20-%20Zbigniew%20Rykiel.pdf

2020-12-10 14:29

Po wysłaniu powyższego maila wszedłem na Facebooka, aby umieścić tam link do odredakcyjnego tekstu pt. *Dystansowanie* – z wyraźnie widoczną inspiracją Bohdana Jałowieckiego. Pierwszą rzeczą, jaką zauważyłem na Facebooku, była wiadomość od Tomasza Nawrockiego o śmierci Bohdana. „A wydawało się, […] że był niezniszczalny" – napisał Tomek.

Z Bohdanem Jałowieckim zetknąłem się po raz pierwszy około połowy lat 70. XX wieku, kiedy na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim był związany z zespołem prof. Stefana Golachowskiego. Moja afiliacja instytucjonalna w Instytucie Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN dawała przywilej kontaktów z całą plejadą wybitnych przedstawicieli nauk społeczno-przestrzennych. Współpraca Bohdana Jałowieckiego z geografami skutkowała znacznie lepszą – w stosunku do głównego nurtu socjologii polskiej – świadomością, że podstawowe kategorie i teorie akade-

mickiej geografii społeczno-ekonomicznej wykraczają daleko poza wyniesione ze szkoły średniej wyobrażenia o geografii jako zbiorze opisów lokalizacji i ciekawostek. Z drugiej strony (chociaż nie mam pewności, czy w związku z tym), język narracji naukowej Bohdana daleko odbiegał od pseudohumanistycznego („chómanistycznego") stylu narracji głównego nurtu socjologii polskiej. W tekstach Bohdana trudno bowiem znaleźć baśniowe tytuły i rytualne w tym nurcie wyrazy „niejako" i „swoisty", bez których użycia przynajmniej dwukrotnie na jednej stronie tekst nie mógł być uznany za prawdziwie socjologiczny. Bohdan pisywał stylem prostym i lekkim – bez pseudonaukowych udziwnień z jednej strony, ale także bajdurzenia i bełkotu, z drugiej. To przy lekturze jego tekstów stwierdziłem ze zdziwieniem na dość wczesnym etapie swej działalności naukowej, że teksty socjologiczne da się jednak czytać.

Zainteresowanie Bohdana socjologią miasta, a następnie regionu, spowodowały zbieżność naszych zainteresowań badawczych. Na przełomie lat 70. i 80. XX wieku, w związku z mymi badaniami regionu katowickiego, Bohdan zapoznał mnie z grupą swych współpracowników na Uniwersytecie Śląskim, z którymi kontakty naukowe i osobiste okazały się owocne. Obracając się coraz częściej w środowisku socjologów, zacząłem dostawać propozycje sformalizowanych związków instytucjonalnych z socjologicznymi placówkami dydaktycznymi, w tym z co najmniej dwoma uniwersytetami. W rezultacie grono mych wypromowanych doktorantów obejmuje niemal wyłącznie doktorów socjologii. Nie mając formalnego wykształcenia socjologicznego, zostałem też przyjęty na członka zwyczajnego Polskiego Towarzystwa Socjologicznego. Bez Bohdana prawdopodobnie nigdy nie wszedłbym do socjologii instytucjonalnej, przy czym pisząc to mam na myśli nie tyle nawet pomoc formalną, ile inspirację intelektualną i kontakty nieformalne w środowisku.

Bohdan był członkiem Rady Programowej naszego czasopisma *Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)*, chętnie podejmując trud recenzowania tekstów napływających do redakcji. Był jednym z trzech najczęściej cytowanych socjologów polskich, z których dwaj byli członkami naszej Rady Programowej. Twierdzenie, że Bohdan umarł w wieku podeszłym (gdyż w lutym skończyłby 87 lat), byłoby kuriozalne, gdyż do końca swych dni był pełen młodzieńczego zapału i pasji poznawczej. Bardzo aktyw-

ny na Facebooku, dystansował się od pomysłów ilościowej ewaluacji dorobku naukowego, zaściankowej pogoni za obcojęzyczną „światowością" publikacyjną, miał krytyczny stosunek do żarłocznego kapitalizmu jako wizji powszechnego szczęścia ludzkości, dystansował się od ksenofobii i nacjonalizmu etnicznego oraz zastępowania krytycyzmu naukowego wiarą w dogmaty i hipokryzją. Będzie nam brakować Jego inspirujących komentarzy na Facebooku. Będzie Go nam brakować bardziej niż sobie teraz zdajemy z tego sprawę. Tym bardziej że ani On, ani ja nie mieliśmy nadziei, że kiedyś gdzieś się jeszcze spotkamy po drugiej stronie. Może szkoda…

Komentarze
Commentaries

PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna

Social
SPACE

Bohdan Maria Jałowiecki (26.02.1934 – 09.12.2020)
Zapiski prywatne

Marek S. Szczepański

Instytut Socjologii, Uniwersytet Śląski,

ul. Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice

marek.s.szczepanski@us.edu.pl

Bohdana, piszę tak familiarnie, poznałem niemal pół wieku temu. Był wówczas docentem wykładającym współczesne teorie socjologiczne. Nie mówił tylko o klasykach socjologii, takich jak Émil Durkheim, Max Weber i Georg Simmel, ale także – o dziwo – o Ibn Chaldunie. Nie miałem pojęcia o tej personie z arabsko-berberyjskiego świata. Wciąż jednak pamiętam termin *al-Asabiya*. Podczas egzaminu docent B. M. Jałowiecki był niezwykle skrupulatny i dociekliwy. Udało mi się złożyć ten egzamin z wynikiem bardzo dobrym. Chwilę później docent zaproponował mi studia podwójne, na Uniwersytecie Śląskim i Warszawskim. Dzięki niemu mogłem poznać tuzy socjologicznego myślenia: Zygmunta Piórę, Józefa Chałasińskiego i Andrzeja Zajączkowskiego. Jako *homo novus* w Warszawie byłem pod życzliwym i dyskretnym nadzorem docenta. Codziennie, zgodnie z Jego wolą, odwiedzałem bibliotekę Instytutu Krajów Rozwijających się przy ul. Żwirki i Wigury.

Pewnego razu, z wielu powodów, nie byłem w stanie dotrzeć do książnicy. O tej absencji poinformowała profesora Piórę kustosz biblioteki, a ten bezzwłocznie zatelefonował do mojego Patrona. Po reprymendzie zawsze już karnie stawiałem się w bibliotece. Bohdan Jałowiecki kochał i niezwykle cenił książki. Miał ich wiele w swoim domowym świecie. Pisał ich wiele, 18 z nich było książkami autorskimi, a wszystkie bez wyjątku stały się przedmiotem debaty naukowej.

Nigdy nie zapomnę spotkania po awansie profesorskim Bohdana. Jego żona Hanka podała biesiadnikom surowe warzywa z jogurtem i majonezem (obecnie nazywanymi dipem). Był to dom otwarty, przyjazny ludziom i myśleniu, z oryginalną

kuchnią i wystrojem. Dom i jego gospodarze stanowili niecodzienną jednię, gdyby użyć pojęcia Plotyna.

Profesor był bardzo wyrazisty w codziennej postawie i poglądach politycznych. Dawał temu wyraz zwłaszcza w czasach społeczeństwa sieciowego. Unikał trybutów płaconych pospolitości, taki też wizerunek zalecał swoim uczniom i przyjaciołom. Pamiętam dokładnie dzień, w którym Profesor zaproponował mi przygotowanie dysertacji doktorskiej. I chociaż czasy stanu wojennego były trudne i nieznośne, to jednak stanowiły poważne wyzwanie dla młodego jeszcze socjologa. Intrygowało mnie, dlaczego Bohdan tak bardzo eksponował odległy świat społeczny innego kontynentu. Wkrótce okazało się, że uczestniczył w tworzeniu planu zagospodarowania przestrzennego Algieru. Moja praca doktorska miała więc dotyczyć gwałtownego procesu urbanizacji w strukturze społecznej w Afryce. Powinna być zatem wolna od bieżących referencji geopolitycznych i cytowań prac marksistów i plenów partyjnych.

Później Profesor przeprowadził się do Warszawy i znalazł zatrudnienie na uniwersytecie. Nigdy jednak nie odmówił życzliwej kooperacji naukowej swoim uczniom. Był dla nich Mistrzem, o jakim obecnie mogą tylko pomarzyć adepci nauki w epoce społeczeństwa sieci.

Wspominam ze znacznym niedowierzaniem propozycję przygotowania podręcznika socjologii miasta, którą Profesor złożył mi na początku XXI wieku. Byłem zaskoczony i zaszczycony. Tom ukazał się w prestiżowej serii *Socjologia* w Wydawnictwie Scholar pod patronatem profesorów Piotra Sztompki i Jacka Raciborskiego. Byłem we Włoszech, kiedy Profesor zatelefonował z informacją o publikacji tomu. Mówił o nim z radością i entuzjazmem, a to nieczęsto Mu się zdarzało. Był bowiem niesłychanie wymagający wobec swoich współpracowników, ale i samego siebie.

W głębokiej pamięci zachowuję rozmowy, które toczyliśmy przy stole, w mieszkaniu Profesora przy ul. Flory w Warszawie. Uczestniczyliśmy w nich z profesorem Jerzym Chłopeckim z Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, wielkim miłośnikiem koni i hippiki. Lidka – żona Profesora – była dobrym duchem tych spotkań i z maestrią przygotowywała dla nas coraz to odmienne dania. Od lat bowiem znała kulinarne preferencje całego towarzystwa i samego Profesora.

Bohdan odwiedził mnie i Darię we wszystkich trzech tyskich mieszkaniach. Ale ze szczególnym sentymentem wspominamy wizytę w naszym domu przy ul. Ziemiańskiej. Pamiętamy nadzwyczajną opiekuńczość Lidki wobec Bohdana i jego zadowolenie z tej relacji. Lgnęła do Niego nasza kotka Miya, a On sam przyjmował te karesy z nieskrywaną radością. Był zdeklarowanym *animalsem*. Przez długi czas zachowywał się jak poddany warszawskiego basseta.

Utkwiło mi również w pamięci nasze konferencyjne, paryskie spotkanie u profesor Nicole Mathieu. Byliśmy wówczas biedni jak myszy kościelne, ale Profesor, nie bacząc na zawartość portfela, zaordynował w kwiaciarni zakup pięknych słoneczników dla naszej wielkodusznej gospodyni. A ta przyjęła nas hojnie na trzech poziomach swojego mieszkania. Bohdan ze swadą, erudycją i elegancją mówił biegle po francusku, nawet po kilku kieliszkach wybornego wina. Rozmawialiśmy wówczas o odwadze utopii, jaka kierowała Georges'a-Eugène'a Haussmanna przy przebudowie Paryża. Całkiem niedawno Bohdan wrócił do tej idei w odniesieniu do Warszawy. Stwierdził wtedy, że miasto stołeczne potrzebuje takiego właśnie wizjonera, prezydenta, samorządowca, odważnego i nieoddającego stolicy deweloperom ani działkowcom.

W tym lapidarium nie mogę nie wspomnieć o szczególnej cesze i drobiazgowości Profesora. Pewnego razu zobaczyłem u Niego niezwykle elegancki jedwabny krawat. Zdobyłem się wówczas na impertynencję, pytając skąd owe utensylium pochodzi. Kilka tygodni później w dniu moich urodzin Bohdan wręczył mi z szelmowskim uśmiechem ten właśnie krawat. Nie sądzę, że ten gest uszczuplił Jego garderobę, albowiem Bohdan był znany z wyszukanej elegancji i smaku, a w swej kolekcji posiadał setki krawatów.

Powiedzieć o Profesorze, że był wybitnym socjologiem, to powiedzieć niewiele. Opublikował ponad trzysta prac, z których wiele weszło do kanonu literatury z zakresu socjologii miasta – nie tylko w Polsce. Był znakomitym organizatorem w środowisku akademickim, pełniąc funkcje dziekana, a później prorektora Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. W najbardziej reprezentacyjnej Sali Wydziału Nauk Społecznych wciąż wisi Jego portret.

Swoją śmiercią osierocił całe grono socjologów polskich wielu pokoleń. Na zawsze pozostanie w ich umysłach i pamięci. Był Mistrzem, nauczycielem i niedościgłym mentorem. Dla mnie był jak Ojciec.